Kris McDaniel - This Is Metaphysics

1.57 So, we have a choice to make. One option is to believe that for every predicate, there is a corresponding property and some, but not all, of these properties are important , and then give a theory of what it is for a property to be an important property. Another option is to deny that every predicate corresponds to a property: on this option, although it is, for example, true of both Ranger and Mars that they are either dogs or planets, nonetheless there is no property of being a dog or a planet. On this second option we don’t obviously need a theory of when some property is an important property, since we can just say that all properties are important properties. (That said, if being an important property is something that comes in grades or degrees—if all properties are important but some important properties are more important than other important properties—then we still need a theory of grades or degrees of importance.) We do need a theory to tell us which predicates have properties corresponding to them. I suspect that on either option, the theories that we will give will look very similar to each other when they are fully developed, but I encourage you to see whether this suspicion ends up being correct. (We will further discuss the idea of an important property in Sections 2.4and 2.9.)

1.58 Here’s another idea worth considering: maybe we can’t define or explain what it is for some things to objectively belong together in terms of anything simpler. Instead of trying to define this concept, we could try to use it to define other concepts—such as, for example, the concept of an important property. It’s not clear to me how to do this, but that doesn’t mean this isn’t a project worth pursuing, especially since we already know that some expressions in our language can’t be explicitly defined.

1.59 Either way, the metaphysics of classification and the metaphysics of properties are deeply connected. And so, if we want to know more about the former, it will help to know more about the latter. Chapter 2will focus on the metaphysics of properties, although we will on occasion revisit some of the issues discussed in this chapter.

1.60 We’ve barely scratched the surface of the metaphysics of classification. Here are some further questions to consider:

We distinguished between subjective and objective ways of classifying objects. Are there other ways of classifying objects that aren’t neatly categorized as either subjective or objective?

Are there degrees of objective belonging? That is, does it make sense to talk about quantities of objective belonging, for example, these objects belong to each other to degree n? If not, is there a best way to understand grades of objective belonging?

Are there other classifications of people that seem at first to be objective but really are subjective? If so, what are they, and why do they seem (to at least some people) to be objective?

How would you solve the new riddle of induction? Are there good solutions that don’t claim that some things objectively belong together?

If not every predicate stands for a property, when does a predicate stand for a property?

In addition to the readings I mentioned earlier in this chapter, here are some suggestions for further reading, along with very brief descriptions of them:

1 Anjan Chakravartty (2011) “Scientific Realism and Ontological Relativity,” The Monist, vol. 94, no. 2, pp. 157–180. 11 This is an important paper on the metaphysics of classification from a perspective from the philosophy of science rather than metaphysics.

2 Sally Haslanger (2012) Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 12 This collection of essays contains important discussions of the metaphysics of social groups, including discussions of the metaphysics of race and gender.Ned Hall’s discussion of David Lewis’s views on the natural and non‐natural property distinction in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 13 An important philosopher discusses one way of cashing out the distinction between important and non‐important properties discussed earlier in this chapter. (And in Chapter 2as well.)

1 1 http://www.mathsisfun.com/sets/venn-diagrams.html

2 2Whether tomatoes are fruits might seem completely trivial, but interestingly this is a question that has been addressed by no less than the Supreme Court of the United States! http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2013/12/26/256586055/when-the-supreme- court-decided-tomatoes-were-vegetables

3 3If you are curious about why whales are not fish: http://scienceline.ucsb.edu/getkey.php?key=2536

4 4Here's what NASA has to say about Pluto: http://www.nasa.gov/audience/forstudents/k-4/stories/what-is-pluto-k4.html#.U6nCQ_ldWSo

5 5The concept of race is in need of retirement, according to Professor Jablonski. http://edge.org/responses/what-scientific-idea-is-ready-for-retirement

6 6The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is a wonderful resource. It's filled with excellent introductions. Here is the one for “race,” which I highly recommend: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/race/

7 7Appiah is currently a professor of philosophy and law at New York University. His website is: http://www.appiah.netMost of his published papers are available there, including: http://appiah.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/The-Uncompleted-Argument-Du-Bois-and-the-Illusion-of-Race.-Critical-Inquiry-12.1.-1985.pdfThis paper discusses Appiah's views on the metaphysics of race.Zack is currently a professor of philosophy at the University of Oregon. Zack's views on the metaphysics of race can be found in her book Philosophy of Science and Race (London: Routledge, 2002). Her faculty profile is here: http://philosophy.uoregon.edu/profile/nzack/

8 8Quayshawn Spencer is currently a philosopher at the University of Pennsylvania. His webpage, which contains many of his published papers, can be found here: https://sites.google.com/site/qnjspencer/publications

9 9Eli Hirsch is currently a professor of philosophy at Brandeis University: http://www.brandeis.edu/facultyguide/person.html?emplid=3b8c58f368269c9b2a81bea2caf5cd32e3d4e84aAn important book by Hirsch on the subject of classification (among other metaphysical topics) is Dividing Reality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

10 10This puzzle appeared in chapter 3 of Nelson Goodman's book Fact, Fiction, & Forecast (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

11 11 http://monist.oxfordjournals.org/content/monist/94/2/157.full.pdf

12 12 https://global.oup.com/academic/product/resisting-reality-9780199892624?cc= us&lang=en

13 13 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lewis-metaphysics/natural-distinction.html

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