Daniel C. Dennett - Just Deserts

Caruso:Thank you again for your candor and for acknowledging that your account of free will is a revisionist or reformist one. To be clear, I do not reject your account of free will because it seeks to revise or reform our traditional notion of free will. I acknowledge that a revisionist account of free will is a legitimate position. Instead, I reject it because it fails to preserve the kind of control in action (i.e. free will) required for moral responsibility in the basic-desert sense. That is, I hope to show in the arguments to come that if an action is produced by a determinist process that traces back to causal factors beyond the agent’s control, then it would be wrong to hold that agent morally responsible in the desert-based sense – the sense required for an agent to justly deserve to be praised and blamed, punished and rewarded. But perhaps we should delay no longer and just get directly into the argument. What do you say?

Dennett:Yes, let’s get on with it.

1 *(Nichols 2004, 2012; Nichols and Knobe 2007; Feltz and Cokley 2009; Feltz, Perez, and Harris 2012; Deery et al. 2013; Knobe 2014; Nadelhoffer et al. 2019; Rose and Nichols 2013; Sarkissian et al. 2010)

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