Operation Danube Reconsidered

13 Майоров А . Вторжение. Чехословакия 1968. Свидетельства командарма [Intervention. Czechoslovakia 1968, The Testimonies of the Commander of the Army]. М., 1998. С. 19–21.

14 Кыров А. Десантники в операции “Дунай” (Советско-чехословацкие военно-политические отношения, 1968 [Paratroopers in Operation Danube (Soviet-Czechoslovak military-political relations, 1968]. М., 1996.

15Встречи и переговоры на высшем уровне руководителей СССР и Югославии в 1946–1980 гг. [Meetings and negotiations at the highest level of the leaders of the USSR and Yugoslavia in 1946–1980] Том второй. 1965–1980. М., 2017. С. 211–230.

16Ibid., p. 223–224.

17Ibid., p. 236.

18Ibid., p. 243.

19Ibid., p. 263.

20We can also note that it was precisely after the publication of the ‘2000 words’ that the position of the Hungarian leadership, and in particular of János Kádár, who so far generally supported the economic component of the Czechoslovak reforms, became noticeably tougher. This follows both from public speeches by Kádár, including that he made during his visit to Moscow in early July, and from his position, outlined at his talks with Dubček, not long before the Warsaw meeting of leaders of the Communist Parties which took place in middle June (the Czechoslovak delegation did not come to Warsaw). Despite the increasing convergence of positions of Brezhnev and Kádár it was Kádár who tried to persuade the communist leadership of Czechoslovakia to seek a compromise demonstrating to Moscow the desire to take measures against non-communist opposition, but Kádár’s mission was not successful (see in this volume the study of Miklós Mitrovics).

21See the materials: Чехословацкий кризис 1967–1969 годов в документах ЦК КПСС.

22See: Суверенитет и интернациональные обязанности социалистических стран [Sovereignty and international obligations of socialist countries] // Правда, 1968, 26 сентября.

23The first study where the subject was deeply examined is: Латыш М.В. “Пражская весна” 1968 г. и реакция Кремля.

24For more on his position and his activities in Hungary of 1956, see: Советский дипломат перед национал-коммунистическим вызовом. Ю.В. Андропов в Венгрии (1953–1957) [Soviet diplomat in front of the national communist challenge. Yu.V. Andropov in Hungary (1953–1957)] // Стыкалин А.С. Венгерский кризис 1956 года в исторической ретроспективе. М., 2016. С. 33–78.

25See in detail: Стыкалин А.С. Память о венгерских событиях 1956 г. в период Пражской весны 1968 г. [The memory of the Hungarian events of 1956 in the period of the Prague Spring of 1968] // Социальные последствия войн и конфликтов XX века: историческая память. М.–Спб., “Нестор”, 2014. С. 279–287.

26 Пихоя Р.Г. Чехословакия, 1968. Взгляд из Москвы. По документам ЦК КПСС [Czechoslovakia, 1968. View from Moscow. According to documents of the Central Committee of the CPSU] // Новая и новейшая история, 1995. № 1. С. 35.

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