Anthony Giddens - Sociology

Although this structural perspective has many adherents, it has also met with sharp criticism. What is ‘society’ if it is not the composite of many individual actions? If we study a social group we do not see a collective entity or ‘thing’, just many individuals interacting with one another in various ways. In the same way, what we call ‘society’ is only an aggregate of individuals behaving in regular ways in relation to one another. According to interactionists, human beings have reasons for what they do, and they inhabit a social world constructed by meanings. Social phenomena are not like ‘things’ but depend on the symbolic meanings we invest in them, which means we are not at the mercy of an external ‘society’ but are instead its creators.

Yet the differences between structure and agency perspectives can be exaggerated, and we can easily see connections between them. Social structures do precede and constrain the individual. For example, I did not invent the monetary system I use, nor do I have a choice about whether I want to use it if I wish to have the goods and services money can buy. On the other hand, it is mistaken to suppose that society is ‘external’ in the same way as the physical world. The physical world would still exist if no human beings were alive, but the monetary system would not. Moreover, ‘social facts’ do not entirely determine our actions. I could choose to live without using money, even if it proved very difficult to eke out an existence. As human beings, we can make choices and do not simply respond passively to events.

An antiques and vintage market demonstrates structure and agency in economic exchanges. Buyers are constrained to pay using an established currency (structure), but final prices are not fixed and can be bartered (agency).

The divide between structural and agency perspectives is seen as unproductive by many sociologists, and several attempts have been made to bring them together in one theoretical perspective. Here we look briefly at just two of the more successful attempts, in the contrasting approaches of Norbert Elias and Anthony Giddens. Pierre Bourdieu’s equally influential ideas are covered in detail in chapter 16, ‘Education’.

The German sociologist Norbert Elias (1897–1990) saw the structure–agency dilemma as a hangover from earlier philosophical ways of thinking and an obstacle to be overcome. Sociology inherited this ‘problem’ from philosophy, which left a series of other dualisms, such as mind–body, individual–society and micro–macro. Sociological theorists tended to defer to the expertise of philosophers in matters of logic and assessing the validity of knowledge claims. But, for Elias, sociology is a distinct theoretical-empirical science that produces a more empirically adequate knowledge, and therefore sociologists do not need philosophers to adjudicate for them (Kilminster 2007).

The structure–agency dilemma is unhelpful and inaccurate (as are all other such dualisms). For example, the distinction between individual and society implies that each has a ‘thing-like’ existence and that the individual is distinct from society. But discussing social life using these terms is misleading because ‘they encourage the impression that society is made up of structures external to oneself, the individual, and the individual is at one and the same time surrounded by society yet cut off from it by some invisible barrier’ (Elias 1978: 15).

Elias argues that sociology studies people (in the plural), who are always in networks or relations of interdependence. Elias calls these interdependent networks figurations, and the approach he pioneered is known as figurational studies or, sometimes, process sociology (Mennell 1998). This theoretical move is deceptively simple. But, if we start from social figurations, then radical conclusions follow. The individual person is not an autonomous, ‘closed’ being entombed within a physical body, coming into contact with others only during interactions, a little like snooker balls colliding. Elias argues that human beings are ‘open people’, whose individual identities and ‘selves’ are socially produced in networks of social relations – they are social selves (Burkitt 2008).

On the other hand, the ‘thing’ that is routinely called ‘society’ is not a thing at all but is, in reality, a long-term social process of ever-changing figurations (Van Krieken 1998: 5–6). A long-term perspective is necessary because it is only by tracing the development of social life in the past that we can arrive at a realistic understanding of the present and of ourselves. Elias insists that a figurational perspective, which focuses attention on this continual social process, is a clear advance over theories which discuss ‘society’ as a static thing-like entity.

For example, in The Civilizing Process (2000 [1939]), Elias traces the development of ‘civilized’ codes of manners, such as etiquette at the dinner table, from the European Middle Ages onwards. These codes first developed in the royal courts, where people were expected to control their behaviour and emotions, but subsequently spread to other social classes through a process of status competition. Hence, the rather strange habits and customs of people in previous times are not just historical curiosities unrelated to modern life. In fact, we can never understand why the standards we accept as ‘natural’ exist unless we appreciate how they developed over very long periods of time.

See ‘Classic studies’ 21.1 in chapter 21, ‘Nations, War and Terrorism’, for a discussion of Elias’s ‘civilizing process’ theory, which shows how he handles social structures and individual actions.

Elias’s figurational perspective does not try to ‘bridge’ the structure–agency dilemma in sociology. Rather, it effectively dissolves the ‘problem’ altogether. There is no need for sociologists to focus exclusively on the micro level of small-scale interactions or the macro level of social structures and institutions. Understanding the shifting figurations formed by interdependent people means we have to be concerned with every aspect of human life, from individual personalities to the large figurations represented by the concepts of nation-state or the city.

One often-repeated criticism is that Elias tends to see ‘society’ as largely the unintended outcome of many intentional actions. Yet this may not give enough weight to the influence of very powerful actors such as states, social movements or multinational corporations in shaping society in their interests (Van Krieken 1998). Nevertheless, figurational sociology has developed into a thriving research tradition which has produced some fascinating studies.

An alternative way of tackling this dilemma was developed by Anthony Giddens. Unlike Elias, Giddens (1984: vii) does not reject philosophy, arguing that sociology must be ‘alive’ to philosophical problems: ‘The social sciences are lost if they are not directly related to philosophical problems by those who practise them.’ Debates in philosophy can contribute to our understanding of social life and should not be ignored. However, Giddens also adopts a central focus on the structuring activity of individual actions, which bears some similarity to Elias’s interest in social processes.