Various Authors Various Authors - Talmud

GEMARA: "Cucumber seeds." The rabbis taught: The prescribed quantity for seeds used for planting is two, but for seeds used for food it is the equivalent of a pig's mouthful. How much is a pig's mouthful? The seeds of one cucumber. For cucumber seeds used as fuel the prescribed quantity is as much as will suffice to cook an egg; for cucumber seeds used as counters (for figures) only two. Anonymous teachers say five.

The rabbis taught: One who carries two hairs from the tail of a horse or a cow is culpable, because the hairs are always preserved for making nets. The prescribed quantity for hog bristles is only one; for willows (used for wickerwork) two; for tree-bark 1one strip.

" R. Jehudah says: A locust (which must not be eaten) ," etc. Why did not the first Tana of the Mishna mention this? Because in his opinion it is forbidden to carry it even on week-days, lest one eat it. If such is the case, why should an eatable locust be allowed to be carried? Did not R. Kahana stand before Rabh and a small locust lighted on his lips: Rabh said to him. (R. Kahana), Take it away, lest people say that thou hast eaten it and thou hast violated the commandment [Leviticus, xi. 43]: "Ye shall not make yourselves abominable with any creeping thing that creepeth"? Nay; there was no fear that the locust would be eaten alive, but they apprehended lest it die and then be eaten. (An eatable locust would not matter, but an uneatable locust would be a violation of the law.) If that is the case, why does R. Jehudah permit this? R. Jehudah holds that there is no fear of the locust being eaten when dead, as the child will mourn its death.

Footnotes

1The Hebrew term used for "filthy thing" in the passage is "Davah," and in Leviticus, xx. 18, Davah is translated, "a woman suffering from her separation (menstruation)."

2The word "Tizrom" (cast them away) Rabba holds to be a derivation from the word "Zar" (strange) and not from "Zarah" (cast away).

1See II Kings, i. 2.

2The term "it is certain" (peshitah) is generally used by the Gemara in the sense of the question, "Is it not self-evident?" In the above case, however, it is intended for an explanation of the reason for R. Aqiba's adduction. See Rashi.

1Rashi declares this to be the best possible explanation of Samuel's opinion, and says that many others offered many different explanations, none of which are comprehensible.

2See Leviticus, xv. 16, 17, 18, and ibid. xxii. 4.

3See Lev. xvi. 21.

1It is not meant a real Sadducee, as they did not yet exist in Rabha's time, but one of the other sects which opposed the oral law; and the name may be here a correction of the censor instead of Akum , as there are many such corrections of the censor. It may also be another sect for which the name Sadducee was borrowed.

1The Hebrew term for bundle is Tzror, and for oppressor is Tzoror; hence R. Johanan interprets Tzror as if it were Tzoror.

1 Shanah in Hebrew means year ( Shanim , plural, years). Shany means crimson, but the latter is used only once (Prov. xxxi. 21) in plural; the former, however, is generally used in plural, as, for many years . As here it is in plural ( Kashanim ) he declares it like years.

2In Isaac Leeser's translation of the Bible, which we use in Biblical citations, this passage is rendered "Come now," but the literal translation is "Go now."

1None of the commentators can explain what kind of birds is meant.

1Rashi declares in his commentary that he does not know what it is nor for what purpose it is used. See Aruch.

Table of Contents

FURTHER REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE PRESCRIBED QUANTITY OF THINGS TO BE STORED.

MISHNA I .: One who had stored anything for planting, sampling, or medicinal purposes (before the Sabbath) and carried some of it out (into public ground) on the Sabbath, be it ever so small a quantity, is liable for a sin-offering. Any one else, however, is culpable only then if (he carried out) the prescribed quantity. Even the one who had stored is culpable only for the prescribed quantity, if he brought the thing carried out by him back (to private ground).

GEMARA: For what purpose is it said in the Mishna, "One who stored anything"? Would it not be sufficient to say, "One who carried out things intended for planting, sampling, or medicinal purposes, be the quantity ever so small, is culpable"? Said Abayi: The Mishna treats of the case of a man who, after storing the thing, forgot for what purpose he had stored it, and then carried it out into the street for any purpose whatever. Lest one say that the original intention (to store it) is abolished, and now the thing carried out has for him only the same value as for others, and he would be culpable only for carrying out the regularly prescribed quantity, it comes to teach us that one who commits a deed executes his original intention.

R. Jehudah said in the name of Samuel: R. Meir declares one who carried out only a single wheat grain, intended for sowing, culpable. Is this not self-evident? The Mishna taught: "Be it ever so small." One might presume that the term "be it ever so small" denotes something smaller than a dried fig but not smaller than an olive. R. Meir therefore informs us (that it refers even to one wheat grain). R. Itz'hak, the son of R. Jehudah, opposed this: "(We see that) the Mishna declares one culpable for an act originally intended to be performed, but now, supposing a man intended to carry out his entire household at once; is he then not culpable until he had accomplished the entire task, even if he had carried out part of it?" The answer was: If a man has an absurd intention it is abolished by the law, and he is culpable for carrying out the prescribed quantity.

" Any one else, however ," etc. Our Mishna is not in accordance with that of R. Simeon b. Elazar (on page 145).

Rabha in the name of R. Na'hman said: "If one carried out a thing the size of a dried fig with the intention of eating it, but changed his mind in the meantime and then intended to sow it, or, on the contrary, first intended to sow it and then to eat it, he is culpable. Is this not self-evident? The prescribed quantity for both eating and sowing was carried. Lest one say that the removing and the depositing of a thing must be done with the very same intention in order to make one culpable, which is not so in this case, he comes to teach us that he is culpable.

" If he brought the thing ," etc. Is this not self-evident? (for he did not sow it, we then see that his original intention is abolished). Said Abayi: "The Mishna speaks of a case where the man took the thing brought from his house, and threw it into the place where his full supply was kept, and the place where he threw it remained conspicuous. Lest one say, if the place is conspicuous, his original intention is not yet abolished, because he took the same thing again, it comes to teach us that the throwing of the thing among his other supplies annulled his original intention.

MISHNA II .: If one intended to carry out victuals and deposited them on the doorstep, whether he afterward carried them out (into the street) himself, or this was done by some one else, he is not culpable, because he did not accomplish the deed at one time. If one deposited a basket of fruit on the outside doorstep, even if the bulk of the fruit was on the outside (in the street), he is not culpable, unless he carried out the entire basket (into the street).

GEMARA: What kind of a doorstep does the Mishna have reference to? Should we assume that the doorstep was public ground, how can the man be not culpable? He carried out from private into public ground. Should we assume that the doorstep was private ground, why does the Mishna teach that if he carried it out (into the street), or any one else, he is not culpable? It is again a case of carrying out from private into public ground? We must therefore assume that the doorstep was unclaimed ground, and it comes to teach us that only when the victuals were deposited on the unclaimed ground the man is not culpable, but if they had been carried out from private into public ground, even by way of unclaimed ground, he is culpable. And the Mishna does not agree with the opinion of Ben Azai, of the following Boraitha: "One who carries out from his store into the market by way of the alley is culpable, but Ben Azai says he is not."