Various Authors Various Authors - Talmud

R. Elazar said: "If one throw something (from public ground) within the enclosures around a well, he is culpable." Is this not self-evident? If the enclosures were not regarded as a partition, how would it be allowed to draw water from the well on Sabbath? R. Elazar means to tell us, that if such enclosures were erected in public ground without having a well, it also makes one culpable to throw a thing within the enclosures. Is this not self-evident? If such enclosures were not regarded as a partition elsewhere, how could they be thus considered when erected around a well? He lets us know, that even if the space surrounded by the enclosures is used as a public thoroughfare, it is nevertheless regarded as private ground. Then he means to tell us, that the public who pass through the enclosures do not nullify the validity of the enclosures? This we have also been taught [in Tract Sabbath, page 10]. The ordinance there is derived from his dictum above.

" It is permitted to place the enclosures quite close to the well ." We have learned in a Mishna [Sabbath, xi.]: A man must not, standing in private ground, drink in public ground, nor, standing in public ground, drink in private ground, unless he place his head and the greater part of his body within the place in which he drinks. Such is likewise the law regarding a vine-press. Shall we assume, that it is sufficient for a man to have his head and the greater part of his body in the place in which he drinks, but does this also apply to cattle or not? If the man hold the vessel from which the cattle drink and holds also the cattle (so that they cannot turn around), there is no question but that it is sufficient if they have their heads and the larger part of their bodies within the enclosures; but if the man hold the vessel only, and not the cattle, what is the law? Replied one of the schoolmen to the questioner: We have learned this in our Mishna, viz. "Providing the head and the greater part of the body of the animal be within the enclosure while it drinks." Must we not assume, that in this case the man holds only the vessel and not the animal? Nay; he holds both the vessel and the animal and the law seems to apply to the latter instances; for had he not held the animal also, how could this be allowed? Did we not learn in a Boraitha: A man must not fill a vessel with water to give to his cattle, but he may fill up the vessel and let his cattle drink of their own accord. (This was taught concerning the enclosures around the well.) Now, then, if we should say, that this Boraitha applies to a man who holds both the vessel and the cattle, why should he not water the cattle out of the vessel? We must therefore assume, that he did not hold the cattle, and consequently it is obvious that one must hold both the vessel and the cattle.

Have we not learned, that Abayi explains the mentioned Boraitha as follows: The case was, where a crib, ten spans high and four spans wide (forming in itself a private ground), and opening into the enclosures surrounding the well, stood in public ground and the animal stood in private ground? The Boraitha ordains, that the man should not fill a vessel with water and carry it to the animal, but pour it into the crib, i.e. , he should not lift the vessel with water over the crib and carry it through public ground to the animal, lest he notice that the crib is broken and he will carry the crib into the place where the animal stands to mend it, thus carrying a thing from public into private ground?

Even if he did so, can the man be held culpable? Did not R. Saphra say, in the name of R. Ami, quoting R. Johanan: "If one moved a certain thing from one corner into another in private ground and then carried it into public ground, he is not culpable, because his original intention was not to carry it into public ground?" Abayi means to state, that the man might mend the crib where it was standing and then carry it into private ground. Come and hear (another objection): "A camel, whose head and greater part of the body was within the enclosures around a well, may be crammed." Now, in such a case, the man certainly holds the animal and the vessel, and still it is necessary that the head and larger part of the body of the animal be within the enclosures? Said R. A'ha bar R. Huna in the name of R. Shesheth: "With a camel it is different; the neck of a camel being very long, if the camel turned its head around it would be in public ground."

We have learned also in a Boraitha, that R. Eliezer also prohibits this to be done with a camel, because its neck is very long.

R. Itz'hak bar Ada said: "The enclosures around wells are not permitted to be used by any but the pilgrims while going to Jerusalem for the festivals." Did we not learn in a Boraitha that the enclosures are allowed only for cattle? By cattle is meant the cattle of the pilgrims, but what should a man who wishes to drink do? He should hold on to the walls of the well and drink there. [This is not so! Did not R. Itz'hak in the name of R. Jehudah quoting Samuel say, that the enclosures are permitted to be made only around wells containing spring-water but not rain-water? If the wells were only allowed for cattle, why should this distinction be made? The water must be fit for human use also (because the enclosures are erected for the sake of the water, the latter should be good water).] If the walls of the well were very wide and a man could not climb over them, he may draw water from the well and drink it.

R. Jeremiah bar Abba said in the name of Rabh: The laws of a road that had huts built on it at seventy ells apart and of enclosures around wells do not hold good in Babylon or anywhere outside of Palestine. The first law does not apply to Babylon on account of the frequent floods and to other lands on account of thieves who would steal the huts, and the second law does not apply to Babylon because of the abundance of water and to other lands because there are no colleges of learning.

Said R. Hisda to Mari the son of R. Huna the son of Jeremiah bar Abba: "I have heard, that ye, men of Barnash, go to the synagogue of Daniel on the Sabbath, a distance of three miles. Upon what grounds do ye do this? Do ye depend upon the law of huts? Was it not said by thy grandfather in the name of Rabh, that this law does not apply to Babylon?" R. Hisda was shown by Mari demolished buildings scattered over the entire road, at about seventy ells apart, which at one time formed part of the city itself.

Said R. Hisda: Mari bar Mar related: It is written [Jeremiah xxiv. 1]: "The Lord caused me to see, and, behold, there were two baskets of figs placed before the temple of the Lord," etc., and [ibid. 2]: "The one basket had very good figs, like the figs that are first ripe; and the other basket had very bad figs, which could not be eaten, from being so bad." The good figs represent the strictly righteous and the bad figs the grossly wicked, but if you mean to say, that for the grossly wicked there is no more hope, therefore it is written [Solomon's Song vii. 14]:

The mandrakes 1give forth their smell."

Rabha preached: "By the passage 'The mandrakes give forth their smell' is meant the young men of Israel who have not yet tasted of the fruit of sin, and by 'at our doors are all manners of precious fruits' is meant the virgins of Israel who are modest before their marriage, and by the passage 'new and also old, O my friend! these have I laid up for thee' is meant what the congregation of Israel said to the Holy One, blessed be He, namely: 'Creator of the Universe! Even more than thou hast ordained for us, have we ordained for ourselves and have faithfully observed.'"

Said R. Hisda to one of the scholars who read legendary matter before him: "Hast thou not heard what is meant by new and also old' (in the passage quoted)?" He answered: "'The old' refers to biblical ordinances and the 'new' to rabbinical."