David Shambaugh - China's Leaders

Xi Jinping was also thrust into the world at the tender age of 14, when he was sent from Beijing to rural Shaanxi province during the Cultural Revolution. His father had been imprisoned five years earlier and his mother was sent to a rural cadre school. The Xi family household thus broke apart early in Xi’s young life—he was just 9 when his father was imprisoned— Xi was thereafter sent to a boarding school on the outskirts of Beijing.

Thus, if self-confidence and independence born of adversity at an early age is a characteristic of individuals who become leaders, all five leaders in this study had their youths and home life disrupted and had to learn to cope on their own in their mid-teens. Only Jiang Zemin had the semblance of a normal family life, although he grew up in split households between his birth parents and his aunt and uncle.

Of course, leaders—like all humans—are not static creatures. Despite the important impact of childhood and early adult socialization, we all learn and change as we grow older. Certain learned “lessons” from the past are assimilated and applied to the future—or at least they should be (“those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it,” famously observed philosopher George Santayana). So, a leader at one stage of his or her career may act differently at another. It is thus relevant to consider mid-life and late-life experiences. As individuals approach death, paranoia and irrationality grip some leaders. However, it is not only that people pass through identifiable stages in the life cycle, but psychologists observe that the transitional periods from one stage to the next can be particularly unpredictable and unsettled (like “power transitions” in international relations). Three key transitions are distinguishable: adolescence to young adulthood (ages 17–22); the young adult to middle adulthood transition (ages 40–45); and mid-life to late adulthood transition (ages 60–65). 16The literature in psychology generally argues that one’s political orientations are formed by stage 1, habits of decision-making and leadership emerge by stage 2, increasing decisiveness occurs by stage 3, but that “decisional sclerosis” can set in after age 65, with increasing unpredictability, irrationality, and dogmatism frequently apparent (which fear of death only exacerbates). 17

In the case of the five leaders in this study, it does not seem to me that these transition points were very influential (the exception being Mao, who certainly grew quite irrational, unpredictable, and dogmatic in his sixties). Rather, I would argue, more significant in shaping the personas and leadership styles of the five were experiences they all had during their twenties and thirties, prior to the mid-life transition point noted above. As is described in detail in their individual chapters, it was primarily during these two decades of their lives that each really began to form a distinct leadership style and modus operandi.

While it is important to analyze leaders in their adult years, psychologists have long established that people are actually creatures of habit, and are quite resistant to change and adaptation. People’s essential personalities are fairly firmly established by early adulthood—absent profound experiences (such as war, natural calamity, or life-altering events). Their basic belief systems and worldviews ( weltanschauungen ) are predominantly determined by one’s twenties—and they are determined by a combination of family, school, community, and peer group socialization influences. Thereafter, as the psychological theory of cognitive dissonance (expounded most thoroughly by Leon Festinger) 18tells us, adults go through life selectively accepting evidence that confirms pre-existing beliefs and images while rejecting (dissonant) information that contradicts the core belief systems established by their twenties.

With respect to our five Chinese leaders, I would argue that the theory of cognitive dissonance and the argument that their worldviews were strongly formed prior to their thirties applies really only to Mao. Deng, Jiang, Hu, and Xi all forged their professional personas during their thirties and forties—through working in and managing CCP institutions. All three were strong institutionalists, and I would argue that this was an outgrowth of their work experience rather than their childhoods, teenage years, twenties, or revolutionary activities (in the case of Deng).

All of these features of human development and behavior should be kept in mind when reading this book, as Chinese leaders are not unique human beings—they are susceptible to many of the behavioral patterns that psychologists, political scientists, and other researchers have discovered across multiple countries and cultures. Recognizing this, individual countries and cultures also exert their own specific influences on individual leaders. In this context, the next two sections discuss, respectively, the unique impacts of Chinese traditional political culture and that of Leninist-type communist parties.

CCP leaders are, of course, communist (Marxist-Leninist) in their orientation. In the next section we examine the unique aspects of communist party systems and how that institutionally and normatively shapes the environment in which the CCP leaders examined in this book must operate. They are also Chinese leaders and are thus deeply shaped by historical and cultural traditions of politics and rule. As far back as Plato’s Republic it has been recognized that the cultural socialization of politicians is determinative of their orientation and behavior. There are limits to the political culture approach, of course, as criticisms tend to take aim at the level of (over)generalization of alleged influences, but I nonetheless am one political scientist who finds this analytical approach extremely insightful and valuable. Below I list a number of the most salient residual elements and built-in assumptions from Chinese historical political culture that have continued to influence post-1949 CCP leaders:

Leaders should inherently be benevolent (王道) and look out for the best interests of the people. Rulers should set a moral example (道德) through their behavior. Legitimacy is based on benevolent and benign morality.

While benevolence is preferred, coercion against usurpers is justified to maintain stability and the sanctity of the regime; excessive coercion, however, is considered hegemonic (霸道) and thus illegitimate.

The physical core (内心) of China is ethnically Han; other ethnic groups on the periphery, as well as further away, are “outsiders” (外人) or “barbarians” (夷人).

Other powers are predatory, foreigners have ulterior motives to take advantage of China, and thus are not to be trusted.

China is a global great power with over 3,000 years of history and a highly accomplished civilization and is deserving of respect from all others on this basis. Restoring China to global status as a respected great power is the primary mission of all Chinese leaders.

China is the leading power in Asia and should be treated deferentially by all neighbors (the “tribute system”).

Beginning in the late eighteenth century until 1949 China experienced external aggression and plundering by foreign (mainly European) powers—leading to the “century of shame and humiliation” (百年国耻). China must never again be subjected to such physical dismemberment, social exploitation, and psychological trauma.

Japan’s aggression during the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) and atrocities in China (1937–1945) are unforgivable.

A strong national identity and patriotic nationalism must be inculcated in all Chinese.