Bioethics

41 41 Pellegrino E.D., and Thomasma D.C. For the Patient’s Good. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.

42 42For an overview of the normative approach, see Caplan A. Moral Matters. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1995.

43 43Culver C. and Gert B. Philosophy in Medicine. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.

44 44Lennox J. Health as an objective value. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1995; 20: 501–11.

45 45See note 44, Lennox 1995.

46 46Culver K. The current status of gene therapy research. The Genetic Resource 1993; 7: 5–10.

47 47See note 25, Resnik, Langer, and Steinkraus 1999.

48 48English J. Abortion and the concept of a person. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1975; 5(2): 233–43.

49 49It is possible to define “human” in such a way that it is logically impossible to change our humanness. If we stipulate that possession of a single property is a necessary and sufficient condition for being human, then any changes we make in that property would result in people that are not human. For example, we can define “triangle” = “three‐sided object.” If we make an object that has four sides, it is not an altered triangle; it is not a triangle at all. For a definition of humanness that would seem to imply that it is difficult (though not impossible) to alter our humanness, see Anderson W. Genetic engineering and our humanness. Human Gene Therapy 1994; 5: 755–60.

50 50See note 25, Resnik, Langer, and Steinkraus 1999.

51 51For the purposes of this essay, I will not attribute this view to any particular author, since I think it deserves consideration on its own merit. For writers who come close to defending this view, see note 8, Vogel 1997, as well as Kass L. Toward a More Natural Science. New York: Free Press, 1985.

52 52See note 20, Rifkin 1983.

53 53These arguments do not address genetic enhancement per se, since they also apply to GLGT and they do not apply to SGT or SGE.

54 54See note 25, Resnik, Langer, and Steinkraus 1999.

55 55See note 21, Ramsey 1970.

56 56Cole‐Turner R. Genes, religion, and society: the developing views of the churches. Science and Engineering Ethics 1997; 3(3): 273–88.

57 57National Council of Churches. Human Life and the New Genetics. New York: National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA, 1980.

58 58National Council of Churches. Genetic Engineering: Social and Ethical Consequences. New York: National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., 1983.

59 59Peters T. Playing God?: Genetic Determinism and Human Freedom. New York: Routledge, 1997.

60 60For further discussion see Buchanan A, Brock D. Deciding for Others. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

61 61Lappé M. Ethical issues in manipulating the human germ line. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1991; 16:621–39.

62 62Commission of the European Community. Adopting a Specific Research and Technological Development Programme in the Field of Health. Brussels: Commission of the European Community, 1989.

63 63Davis D. Genetic dilemmas and the child’s right to an open future. Hastings Center Report 1997; 27(2): 7–15.

64 64These arguments do not constitute an objection to SGT or SGE.

65 65See note 25, Resnik, Langer, and Steinkraus 1999.

66 66Feinberg J. Social Philosophy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice‐Hall, 1973.

67 67Feinberg J. The child’s right to an open future. In: Aiken W. and Lafollette H. eds. Whose Child? Children’s Rights, Parental Authority, and State Power. Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adam, 1980: 124–53.

68 68See note 7, McGee 1997.

69 69For further discussion of eugenics, see Paul D. Controlling Human Heredity: 1865 to the Present. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1995.

70 70Kitcher P. The Lives to Come. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997.

71 71Robertson J. Children of Choice. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994.

72 72For further discussion, see Parens E. Taking behavioral genetics seriously. Hastings Center Report 1996; 26(4): 13–18.

73 73Rachels J. Active and passive euthanasia. New England Journal of Medicine 1975; 292(2): 78–80.

74 74See note 15, Resnik 1993.

Nick Bostrom

Transhumanism is a loosely defined movement that has developed gradually over the past two decades, and can be viewed as an outgrowth of secular humanism and the Enlightenment. It holds that current human nature is improvable through the use of applied science and other rational methods, which may make it possible to increase human health‐span, extend our intellectual and physical capacities, and give us increased control over our own mental states and moods. 1 Technologies of concern include not only current ones, like genetic engineering and information technology, but also anticipated future developments such as fully immersive virtual reality, machine‐phase nanotechnology, and artificial intelligence.

Transhumanists promote the view that human enhancement technologies should be made widely available, and that individuals should have broad discretion over which of these technologies to apply to themselves (morphological freedom), and that parents should normally get to decide which reproductive technologies to use when having children (reproductive freedom). 2 Transhumanists believe that, while there are hazards that need to be identified and avoided, human enhancement technologies will offer enormous potential for deeply valuable and humanly beneficial uses. Ultimately, it is possible that such enhancements may make us, or our descendants, ‘posthuman’, beings who may have indefinite health‐spans, much greater intellectual faculties than any current human being – and perhaps entirely new sensibilities or modalities – as well as the ability to control their own emotions. The wisest approach vis‐à‐vis these prospects, argue transhumanists, is to embrace technological progress, while strongly defending human rights and individual choice, and taking action specifically against concrete threats, such as military or terrorist abuse of bioweapons, and against unwanted environmental or social side‐effects.

In opposition to this transhumanist view stands a bioconservative camp that argues against the use of technology to modify human nature. Prominent bioconservative writers include Leon Kass, Francis Fukuyama, George Annas, Wesley Smith, Jeremy Rifkin, and Bill McKibben. One of the central concerns of the bioconservatives is that human enhancement technologies might be ‘dehumanizing’. The worry, which has been variously expressed, is that these technologies might undermine our human dignity or inadvertently erode something that is deeply valuable about being human but that is difficult to put into words or to factor into a cost‐benefit analysis. In some cases (for example, Leon Kass) the unease seems to derive from religious or crypto‐religious sentiments, whereas for others (for example, Francis Fukuyama) it stems from secular grounds. The best approach, these bioconservatives argue, is to implement global bans on swathes of promising human enhancement technologies to forestall a slide down a slippery slope towards an ultimately debased, posthuman state.

While any brief description necessarily skirts significant nuances that differentiate between the writers within the two camps, I believe the above characterization nevertheless highlights a principal fault line in one of the great debates of our times: how we should look at the future of humankind and whether we should attempt to use technology to make ourselves ‘more than human’. This paper will distinguish two common fears about the posthuman and argue that they are partly unfounded and that, to the extent that they correspond to real risks, there are better responses than trying to implement broad bans on technology. I will make some remarks on the concept of dignity, which bioconservatives believe to be imperiled by coming human enhancement technologies, and suggest that we need to recognize that not only humans in their current form, but posthumans too could have dignity.