Bioethics

Regardless of whether one accepts the views of a particular church, it is not at all clear that a theologically based natural law theory provides us with good reasons for thinking that it is inherently wrong to change the human form. One could accept a theologically based approach to morality that leaves some room for human beings to alter the human form, provided that we exhibit wisdom, care, and restraint in changing our form. 59 Some changes (e.g., those that result in suffering or injustice) are morally wrong, but other changes (e.g., those that promote happiness or justice) are morally acceptable.

Another way of arguing that at least some forms of genetic enhancement are inherently wrong is to claim that GLGE and GLGT violate the rights of unborn children. 60 These procedures are often said to violate the rights of unborn children because they:

1 are experimental procedures that violate the informed consent of unborn children; 61

2 deny unborn children the right to have a germline that has not been genetically manipulated; 62 or

3 deny unborn children a right to an open future. 63

All of these arguments make the morally controversial assumption that unborn children have rights. I will not challenge this assertion here. 64 Even if one assumes that unborn children have rights, it still does not follow that GLGE or GLGT violate those rights.

Let’s consider (a) first. GLGT and GLGE do not violate the unborn child’s right to informed consent because this right can be exercised by competent adults acting in the child’s best interests. We allow proxy consent as a legitimate way of exercising informed consent for many procedures that can profoundly affect the welfare of children, such as fetal surgery and experimental surgery on newborns to repair congenital defects. If it makes sense to use proxy consent in these kinds of experiments, then it should also make sense to use proxy consent for other types of experiments, such as GLGT or GLGE, provided that these experiments can be shown to be in the best interests of unborn children. 65

(b) is a very esoteric position. What kind of right is the “right to have a genome that has not been genetically manipulated”? Most writers conceive of rights in terms of interests: rights function to protect the interests of individuals. 66 Interests are needs and benefits that most people require to have a fulfilling life, such as freedom, health, education, self‐esteem, and so on. So do unborn children have an interest in being born with a genome that has not been manipulated? If such an interest exists, then it is highly unusual and certainly not universal. Children whose parents hold specific religious or philosophical doctrines that forbid germline manipulation may have an interest in being born with an unadulterated genome, but other children will not have this interest. For most children, being born with a genome that predisposes them to health and a wide range of opportunities is more important than being born with a genome that has not been manipulated.

This bring us to argument (c). A right to an “open future” is a right to make one’s own choices and life plans on reaching adulthood. 67 Parents who excessively impose their own choices, values, and life plans on their children may violate this right. For example, parents who decide to have a son castrated in order to make sure that he becomes a good singer close off many choices and plans that he could have made as an adult, e.g., having children through natural means. The right to an open future is by no means an unusual or esoteric right, since almost all children have the interests that this right protects, e.g., freedom of choice, freedom of opportunity, etc. But even if we admit this much, does it follow that GLGT or GLGE constitute an inherent violation of this right? I don’t think so. While some uses of genetic technology could be regarded as an overbearing imposition of parental values on children, other uses of GLGT and GLGE may augment a child’s right to an open future. If parents use GLGE to enhance a child’s immune system, then they could be increasing his opportunities to an open future by helping him fight diseases, which can limit opportunities. On the other hand, parents who attempt to produce an eight‐foot‐tall child in order to make her into a basketball player probably are violating her right to an open future by imposing their choices on her life.

However, there is not a sharp distinction between violating a child’s right to an open future and being a responsible parent. 68 We readily accept the idea that parents should try to raise children who are healthy, intelligent, responsible, and happy, and we endorse various parental attempts to promote these values, such as private education, athletics, SAT preparation, and so on. Parents that act in the best interests of the children and have hope for their future are simply being good parents. But when does this healthy and responsible concern for a child’s future interfere with the child’s right to choose his own values and life plans? This is not an easy question to answer. In any case, this quandary supports my claim that GLGT and GLGE do not inherently violate a child’s right to an open future. Some uses of these technologies might have this effect; others might not. The upshot of this section is that we have once again debunked several arguments that might be construed as proving that genetic enhancement is inherently wrong. It may be wrong under some circumstances, but not in others.

Some have attacked GLGT and GLGE on the grounds that they constitute a form of eugenics, an attempt to control the human gene pool. 69 Is eugenics inherently wrong? To understand this question, we can distinguish between positive and negative eugenics: positive eugenics attempts to increase the number of favorable or desirable genes in the human gene pool, while negative eugenics attempts to reduce the number of undesirable or harmful genes, e.g., genes that cause genetic diseases. We should also distinguish between state‐sponsored and parental eugenics: under state‐sponsored eugenics programs the government attempts to control the human gene pool; in parental eugenics parents exert control over the gene pool through their reproductive choices. 70

Parental eugenics occurs every time people select mates or sperm or egg donors. Most people do not find this kind of eugenics to be as troubling as the state‐sponsored eugenics programs envisioned by Aldous Huxley or implemented by Nazi Germany. Indeed, one might argue that this kind of eugenics is a morally acceptable exercise of parental rights. 71 Moreover, most parents do not make their reproductive choices with the sole aim of controlling the human gene pool; any effects these choices have on the gene pool are unintended consequences of parental actions. As long as we accept the idea that parents should be allowed to make some choices that affect the composition of the human gene pool, then parental eugenics is not inherently wrong.

But what about state‐sponsored eugenics? One might argue that state‐sponsored eugenics programs, such as involuntary sterilization of the mentally disabled or mandatory genetic screening, are morally wrong because they:

1 constitute unjustifiable violations of individual liberty and privacy;

2 are a form of genetic discrimination;

3 can have adverse evolutionary consequences by reducing genetic diversity; and

4 can lead us down a slippery slope toward increased racial and ethnic hatred, bias, and genocide.

Although these arguments do not prove that all forms of state‐sponsored eugenics are morally wrong, they place a strong burden of proof on those who defend these programs. It is not my aim to explore state‐sponsored eugenics in depth here. 72 However, even if we assume that state‐sponsored eugenics is inherently wrong, this still only proves that some forms of GLGE or GLGT are inherently wrong. There is nothing inherently wrong with parental choices to use GLGE or GLGT to help children achieve health, freedom, and other values. Thus arguments that appeal to our concerns about eugenics do not prove that genetic enhancement is inherently wrong. Some forms of genetic enhancement, e.g., state‐sponsored eugenics, are wrong, others are not.