Reinhard Scheer - Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War

Reinhard Scheer

Historical Account of Naval Warfare in the WWI

e-artnow, 2021

Contact: info@e-artnow.org

EAN: 4066338129659

Preface Preface Table of Contents The victor has the privilege of writing the story of the war; for one mistrusts the vanquished, because he will try to palliate and excuse his defeats. But we are victors and vanquished at one and the same time, and in depicting our success the difficult problem confronts us of not forgetting that our strength did not last out to the end. Exceptionally tragic is the fate of our Fleet. It embodied the sense of power resulting from the unification of the Empire, a sense which was conscious of its responsibility to provide for the suitable security of our immensely flourishing political and economical ex- pansion. By creating a fleet we strengthened our claim to sea-power, without which the Empire must wither away, we remained a thorn in the side of the British, and their ill-will was the constant accompaniment of our growth. The freedom of the seas, which we strove for in line with our evolution, England was never willing to grant, even if it had to come to a world-War on the point. In the four years' struggle which Germany waged against the desire of its enemies to destroy it, the Fleet was able, beyond all foreign expectations, to hold its own, and what is more, it was our conduct of the naval war that succeeded in forcing the stubborn enemy to the brink of destruction. But, nevertheless, we have lost the war, and with the surrender of the German Fleet the expectations of an independent shaping of our destiny have vanished for long enough. To the history of the naval war, as it presented itself to me and was for some years carried on under my guidance, this book will add a contribution. I should like, however, along with the description of my war experiences, to give the assurance to the German people that the German Fleet, which ventured to boast of being a favourite creation of the nation, strove to do its duty, and entered into the war inspired only by the thought of justifying the confidence reposed in it and of standing on an equal footing with the warriors on land. The remembrance of the famous deeds which were accomplished on the sea will henceforth preserve over the grave of the German Fleet the hope that our race will succeed in creating for itself a position among the nations worthy of the German people. SCHEER. Weimar, September, 1919.

Introduction

Chapter 1. The Outbreak of the War

Chapter 2. Relative Strengths and the Strategic Situation

Chapter 3. Awaiting the Enemy's Offensive

Chapter 4. The English Break into the Heligoland Bight

Chapter 5. The Autumn and Winter Months of 1914

Chapter 6. Bombardment of Scarborough and Hartlepool, and the Battle of the Dogger Bank

Chapter 7. The Year of the War 1915

Chapter 8. Preparations for Increased Fleet Activity

Chapter 9. Enterprises in the Hoofden, and Bombardment of Yarmouth and Lowestoft

Chapter 10. The Battle of the Skagerrak

Chapter 11. After the Battle

Chapter 12. Airship Attacks

Chapter 13. The Military and Political Significance of the U-boat Campaign

Chapter 14. Our U-Boats and their Method of Warfare

Chapter 15. Activity of the Fleet During the U-Boat Campaign

Chapter 16. The Conquest of the Baltic Islands and the Capture of Helsingfors

Chapter 17. Our Light Craft in Action, and Advance of our Fleet to the Norwegian Coast

Chapter 18. The Navy Command

Conclusion

Table of Contents

The victor has the privilege of writing the story of the war; for one mistrusts the vanquished, because he will try to palliate and excuse his defeats. But we are victors and vanquished at one and the same time, and in depicting our success the difficult problem confronts us of not forgetting that our strength did not last out to the end.

Exceptionally tragic is the fate of our Fleet. It embodied the sense of power resulting from the unification of the Empire, a sense which was conscious of its responsibility to provide for the suitable security of our immensely flourishing political and economical ex- pansion. By creating a fleet we strengthened our claim to sea-power, without which the Empire must wither away, we remained a thorn in the side of the British, and their ill-will was the constant accompaniment of our growth. The freedom of the seas, which we strove for in line with our evolution, England was never willing to grant, even if it had to come to a world-War on the point.

In the four years' struggle which Germany waged against the desire of its enemies to destroy it, the Fleet was able, beyond all foreign expectations, to hold its own, and what is more, it was our conduct of the naval war that succeeded in forcing the stubborn enemy to the brink of destruction. But, nevertheless, we have lost the war, and with the surrender of the German Fleet the expectations of an independent shaping of our destiny have vanished for long enough.

To the history of the naval war, as it presented itself to me and was for some years carried on under my guidance, this book will add a contribution. I should like, however, along with the description of my war experiences, to give the assurance to the German people that the German Fleet, which ventured to boast of being a favourite creation of the nation, strove to do its duty, and entered into the war inspired only by the thought of justifying the confidence reposed in it and of standing on an equal footing with the warriors on land. The remembrance of the famous deeds which were accomplished on the sea will henceforth preserve over the grave of the German Fleet the hope that our race will succeed in creating for itself a position among the nations worthy of the German people.

SCHEER.

Weimar, September, 1919.

Table of Contents

The origin of the world-war lies in the opposition between the Anglo-Saxon and the German conceptions of the world. On the former side is the claim to the position of unrestricted primacy in sea-power, to the dominion of the seas, to the prerogative of ocean-trade and to a levy on the treasures of all the earth. "We are the first nation of the world" is the dogma of every Englishman, and he cannot conceive how others can doubt it.

English history supplies the proof of the application - just as energetic as inconsiderate - of this conception. Even one of the greatest eulogists of the English methods in naval warfare - which best reflect English history - the American, Captain Mahan, made famous through his book, " The Influence of Sea Power upon History," characterises it in his observations on the North American War of Independence, which ended in 1783": " To quote again the [French] summary before given, their [the Allies - America, France and Spain] object was ' to avenge their respective injuries, and to put an end to that tyrannical Empire which England claims to maintain upon the ocean.' The revenge they had obtained was barren of benefit to themselves. They had, so that generation thought, injured England by liberating America; but they had not righted their wrongs in Gibraltar and Jamaica. The English fleet had not received any such treatment as would lessen its haughty self-reliance, the armed neutrality of the Northern Powers had been allowed to pass fruitlessly away, and the English Empire over the seas soon became as tyrannical and more absolute than ever." Still, England has in process of time understood how to create an almost universal recognition of its claim. Its whole policy, based on the authority of its Fleet and the favourable situation of the British Isles, has always been adapted to the principle that all that may contribute "ad majorem gloriam Britanniae" is of advantage also to the progress of mankind.