P. M. S. Hacker - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience

Reviews of Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience:

‘This remarkable book, the product of a collaboration between a philosopher and neuroscientist, shows that the claims made on behalf of cognitive science are ill-founded. The real significance of impressive recent developments in the study of the brain, they allege, has been clouded by philosophical confusion in the way in which these results have been presented. The authors document their complaint in a clear and patient manner. . . . They disentangle the confusions by setting out clearly the contrasting but complementary roles of philosophy and neuroscience in this area. The book will certainly arouse opposition. . . . But if it causes controversy, it is controversy that is long overdue. It is to be hoped that it will be widely read among those in many different disciplines who are interested in the brain and the mind.’ Sir Anthony Kenny, President of the British Academy (1989–1993)

‘Overall the book provides the most thorough critical survey of the ruling theories of mental phenomena as they figure in contemporary science. The attention to detail is meticulous, and the philosophical analysis outstandingly lucid. Contemporary scientists and philosophers may not like Bennett and Hacker’s conclusions, but they will hardly be able to ignore them. The work is a formidable achievement.’ John Cottingham, Professor of Philosophy, University of Reading

‘Contemporary neuroscience is an exciting, ebullient field and its practitioners are not much given to self-doubt. This dissection of the field by Bennett and Hacker ought to provoke some misgivings. Arguing for a sharp distinction between conceptual analysis of our everyday psychological concepts on the one hand and empirical, neuroscientific investigation on the other, Bennett and Hacker conclude that many neuroscientists – and some of their philosopher friends – have ignored or muddied that distinction at their peril. In particular, they argue that the misuse of psychological concepts in the interpretation of neural processes does not lead to testable or even false claims, but to nonsense. Neuroscientists, psychologists and philosophers will be challenged – and educated – by this sustained and well-informed critique.’ Paul L. Harris, Professor, Human Development and Psychology, Harvard University

‘[It] will certainly, for a long time to come, be the most important contribution to the mind-body problem there is.’ G. H. von Wright (1916–2003), Research Professor, Academy of Finland and Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge, Cornell and Helsinki

‘Sweeping, argumentative, and brilliant, this book will provoke widespread discussion among philosophers and neuroscientists alike.’ Dennis Patterson, Notre Dame Philosophical Review

‘Devastating critiques of psychologists and neuroscientists. . . . Whether this book leads to a reconfiguring of contemporary neuroscience and the philosophy associated with it will tell us much about the dynamics of contemporary intellectual life.’ Anthony O’Hear, Philosophy

‘This book is a joy to read. . . . A model of clarity and directedness . . . [Bennett and Hacker] have produced that rarity of scholarship, a genuinely interdisciplinary work that succeeds. . . . This is a wonderful book that will illuminate, provoke and delight professional scientists, philosophers, and general readers alike.’ Damian Grace, Australian Book Review

‘Clinical precision and . . . relentless good sense . . . [a] thoughtful and useful treatise.’ Daniel N. Robinson, Philosophy

‘Mandatory reading for anybody interested in neuroscience and consciousness research. The vast spectrum of material in philosophy and neuroscience that Bennett and Hacker consider is impressive and their discussion is thorough and illuminating.’ Axel Kohler, Human Nature Review

‘A delicious cake of a book in which Bennett and Hacker guide the reader through a conceptual minefield of confusions repeatedly made by neuroscientists and philosophers alike.’ Constantine Sandis, Metapsychology

‘Anyone who has ever framed a theory or explained one should read this book – at the risk of forever falling silent.’ The Rector, University of Sydney, Obiter Dicta

‘Impressively lucid . . . Bennett and Hacker unquestionably succeed in challenging our own concepts, examine them for dross, and strive to home in on fundamentals.’ Neil Spurway, Journal of the European Society for Study of Science and Theology

‘The fruit of a unique co-operation between a neuroscientist and a philosopher. . . . An excellent book that should be read by all philosophers of cognition and all researchers in the cognitive neurosciences.’ Herman Philipse, ABG #2, De Academische Bockengids

‘This book is an intellectual delight to read, whatever one’s opinions on the subjects discussed, and it is impossible not to learn from it. Whether cognitive neuroscience is an appropriate method for a scientific psychopathology is an important question for psychiatry in the twenty-first century and this book raises critical issues in indirectly addressing this question and as such is important reading for psychiatrists, cognitive neuroscientists, psychologists and philosophers.’ Matthew Broome, International Review of Psychiatry

‘[T]here are, I think, grounds for hope that this book will do an enormous amount of good, both in correcting philosophical confusion within neuroscience and in promoting a new style of dialogue between neuroscience and philosophy.’ David Cockburn, Philosophical Investigations

‘Filled with pedagogical and constructive advice, this substantially new edition is the catalogue raisonné that many practising neuroscientists and neurologists had been calling for. By expounding them solely on their own merits, it makes clear why many of the propitious discoveries and theories about brain and mind that we live by shine imperial and how they – just as often – reveal themselves disquietingly unclothed.’ Juan M. Pascual, Professor in Neurology, Physiology and Pediatrics, University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center

‘No single work of neuroscience has a greater bearing on all others, or higher warrant to be read ahead of them. A peerlessly incisive analysis, ranging far across the domain, it lays bare the conceptual bedrock on which scientific enquiry rests and the claims of neuroscience ultimately stand or fall. It exposes a litany of errors that render empirical questions unanswerable by robbing them of the sense both truth and falsehood presuppose. It shows that though conceptual these errors have material, real-world consequences irremediable by empirical effort alone.’ Parashkev Nachev, Professor of Neurology, Institute of Neurology, UCL

‘The first edition of Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience was essential reading for cognitive clinical neurologists, and two decades later a second edition, which surveys and criticizes the conceptual forms of developments since the turn of the century, is most welcome.’ Martin Rosser, Professor of Neurology, Institute of Neurology, UCL

M. R. Bennett and P. M. S. Hacker

Second Edition

This edition first published 2022

© 2022 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Edition History

Second Edition © 2022 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

First Edition © 2003 M.R. Bennett and P.M.S. Hacker, Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.