Malcolm Nance - The Plot to Hack America

The skilled intelligence officer would have applied one of the universal agent recruitment evaluating tools on a potential recruit like Trump. The U.S. government uses a system called MICE. It is an acronym used by the CIA which stands for Money, Ideology, Coercion (or Compromise), and Ego or Excitement. 11Although a more in-depth alternative to this system called RASCLS (Reciprocation, Authority, Scarcity, Commitment/Consistency, Liking, Social proof) exists, we shall use MICE for this assessment.

The FSB’s chief spy-recruiting officers assigned to the SVR—the foreign intelligence collection directorate (or the GRU if it was military intelligence operation)—are trained to play to the desires of their potential assets. They watch carefully before ever making the approach. If the subject wants to feel important, then importance is stressed in all discussions.

Money is an incredible inducement for a potential recruit. If the subject wants to be impressed by promises of wealth and opportunity, then the oligarchs will be rolled out to make him feel as if he is or could be one of them. In Trump’s case, he may in fact have been unwittingly steered into positions sympathetic to Russia, such that he now thinks they are deeply-held beliefs, due to the flattering conversations with his Russian supporting friends and staffers concerning his heart’s desire: To be an oligarch playing on the global playfield on par with Putin.

The ideology of the individual can be a self-driving motivator for those who may offer their services to a foreign power, or who find their fortunes have great similarities. The FSB’s SVR recruiters will always attempt to enhance the subject’s prestige if that’s what it takes to keep him personally motivated. The craft of nudging a person to espouse a political position that is against the interests of the person’s birth nation requires the officer to be able to read the subject’s ideological belief system, and subtly maneuver them into agreement, or to at least be neutral to another, less-palatable belief system that just happens to be the path to treason.

Compromise (or coercion) is generally not a desired process, but where it is clear that a potential recruit has a secret that can be used against them, such as secretly embezzling government money, or sexual liaisons of an illicit nature, it can be useful for the purpose of blackmail. Compromise in these terms would be photographs or videos of “honeypots”—sexual traps laid by the hostile intelligence service—and then coercing the individual to begrudgingly betray their country. No one has ever publically accused Donald Trump of being susceptible to coercion, but there is the possibility of being personally compromised or finding oneself in a compromising position at, let’s say, a beauty pageant, in a nation where the intelligence service routinely uses beautiful women as sexual traps. Retired KGB General Oleg Kalugin once famously said “In America, in the West, occasionally you ask your men to stand up for their country. There’s very little difference. In Russia, we just ask our young women to lie down.”

Ego or Excitement (or both) is the last of the categories of basic recruitment. Bezmenov emphasized that there is an archetype of potential asset in the West that the service desired most of all—Egocentric narcissists, like Trump.

“Egocentric people who lack moral principles—who are either too greedy or who suffer from exaggerated self-importance. These are the people the KGB wants and finds easiest to recruit.” 12

If Putin so chose to develop him, only the highest-level state agents would be involved in a potential cultivation of Trump as an exponent of Russian interests. Putin himself, under advisement of the FSB management and SVR’s top human intelligence experts, would have to assess the suitability of the candidate and his potential to assist Russia, whether the candidate knew it or not. In Trump’s case, it would be very easy. At almost every turn, his “bromance” with Putin would potentially stand on a foundation of his desire for their riches, and to be universally recognized as a man of substance and stature. It would cost Russia nothing to entertain his desires while furthering their own.

A skilled autocrat such as Putin would easily understand how to play and manipulate Donald Trump’s ego. Putin would want Trump to feel as if he is truly qualified to be President, over the opposition of his American detractors who ridicule Trump as not being remotely qualified. Putin would know this from his intelligence collection apparatus that Trump would need strategically-timed compliments in an effort to foster his image and massage his easily-bruised ego.

Putin’s strategically-placed endorsement of December 2015 is a classic example of a “hands-off but actually hands-on” supporting statement to make the asset feel special. On Trump, Putin said: “[Trump] wants to move to another level of relations, a closer, deeper level of relations with Russia…How can we not welcome this? Of course we welcome this.” 13

“He is a bright and talented person without any doubt. He is the absolute leader of the presidential race…” 14

This statement and many others, as well as the largesse of attention and support from even average Russian citizens would make Trump feel indebted to Putin. Such indebtedness could even have contributed to Trump’s mistrust of the American system of government. The sentiment that Putin’s kind words were somewhat responsible for validating Trump on a world stage could explain Trump’s gushing admiration for Russia almost every time he speaks on the subject, much to the consternation of Trump’s staff. In his own mind, Trump may feel he received more support from Moscow than he did from the Republican Party, when Putin paid the compliment. For an unwitting asset “my friends [Putin] likes me,” this may be more than enough to maintain the bond between an active-measure handler and an unwitting asset.

A group of Russian-backed associates orbit Trump and have become known in some circles as “The Kremlin Crew.” It is not a problem for Trump to commune with money; the problem is his associates’ many disturbing connections to the Russian oligarchy and officers of the KGB/FSB. A wise businessman may seek out cash in the nouveau riche parts of the world. But add Russian oligarchy cash managed by FSB spies, and it adds up to the kind of relationships the FBI counterintelligence division routinely arrested people for during the Cold War—as espionage assets.

One of Trump’s most troubling intelligence connections was to the Bayrock Group. Trump first aligned with them to build a hotel in Moscow in 2005. When that didn’t happen, he partnered with them to build the Trump SoHo. Bayrock was chaired by Tevfik Arif, originally a Soviet Union commerce apparatchik from Kazakhstan, who worked to introduce Trump to Russian investors. Trump saw it as a chance to open Trump Hotels and Towers in Moscow, Kiev, Warsaw, and Istanbul. 15

Felix Satter also worked for Bayrock. He has been implicated in ties with Russian Mafia. Satter is also known for “using mob-like tactics to achieve his goals,” and was convicted of a stock fraud scheme. Satter made arrangements with Trump to develop projects in Russia and the U.S. He bragged in 2008 testimony, “I can build a Trump Tower, because of my relationship with Trump.” 16Trump denies knowing Satter. However, the relationship was significant enough that condo buyers in Trump International Hotel and Tower mentioned it in a lawsuit filed over construction. 17Trump sought to disassociate himself from the project, claiming he simply lent his name and denied knowing Satter. During his depositions, Trump said he knew neither Arif nor Satter. 18