Vince Houghton - Nuking the Moon - And Other Intelligence Schemes and Military Plots Left on the Drawing Board

Another possibility that required sufficient early warning was Orbital Based. The concept behind this idea was to place all or a fraction of the total U.S. nuclear force into orbit, upon warning, or maybe even during a period of increased geopolitical tension. There they could stay there for up to fifteen days, or until the missile is deorbited onto Soviet targets, as commanded by the president. If tensions deescalate, or if the warning of a Soviet missile launch was actually a false alarm, the warheads could be deorbited into the open sea. These warheads possibly could even be recovered afterward, although the Pentagon acknowledged that “this is a difficult and complex problem which has not been satisfactorily worked.”

So… we’re gonna lose the warheads, and those aren’t exactly cheap. But it’s still a marked improvement over the LUA. The ability to send the missiles up into space based on early warning or increased international tensions would provide decision makers with time to figure out what was going on. Is this a real attack? Is this a false alarm? We can take time to make our decision without actually executing a full-scale apocalypse.

That is, if the Soviets don’t misconstrue our orbital pre-positioning as an actual attack. A protective launch into orbit could trigger the Soviets into launching their missiles against the United States. They’d have no way to know the difference between these preparations and the beginning of the end. For the sake of their national survival, the Soviets would have to assume this was the real deal. Sure, we could tell them what it was. But why the hell would they believe us?

Then there was the slight issue of missiles orbiting over the United States every ninety minutes or so, every day, for the duration of the time the ICBMs are in space. The Pentagon was aware of this potential concern. “Safety issues associated with nuclear warheads orbiting the earth with periodic passes over the U.S. are not clear [really?]. Special precautions would be definitely needed [you think?].”

Finally (and likely what doomed this idea before it really got started), the deployment of nuclear weapons into space is prohibited by the Treaty on Principles Governing Actions of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the “Outer Space Treaty”), which the United States signed and ratified in 1967. Remember criterion 11?

Another idea, less fraught with diplomatic difficulties, was called the Shallow Underwater Missile, or SUM. This was essentially two MX missiles (or even four older Minuteman missiles) mounted on the side of a submarine. The sub, a West German–built diesel submarine designated HDW-600, would be smaller than the standard American ballistic missile submarine, and would loiter in shallow waters near U.S. coastlines. It’s not… entirely clear why they chose this particular type of submarine. The HDW was not designed for this kind of mission. It was too small to have sonar, internal missile control and support, or even navigation and communications. You know, important stuff, if you want a submarine to do… submarine stuff.

Speaking of submarine stuff, the HDW-600 couldn’t even maintain safe ballast and buoyancy with the two MXs attached to its side. And no one disputed this fact. Even the HDW designers acknowledged that it would likely take years to redesign the submarine to make this idea remotely operational. The biggest problem, however, is that analysis of the idea concluded that there was no reason to believe the SUM would be any more survivable than any of the existing ballistic missile submarines (criterion 2).

It wasn’t. In fact, the analysis concluded that the SUM would be less survivable than the U.S. Navy’s Trident submarines. Since the HDWs would be operating in a much smaller part of the ocean compared to Trident (just the American coastal areas versus… you know, 70 percent of the Earth’s surface), SUM would be easy pickings for Soviet antisubmarine warfare forces. It would also cost billions of dollars for the Navy to dedicate enough ships to protect the SUM submarines. According to the analysis, “The consequences of deploying SUM would thus represent a step backward in U.S. sea based missile system capability [emphasis mine].” So much for that idea.

Another water-based proposal was the Hydra, which I’m surprised even made the final list (except maybe it had a cool name?). The Hydra system consisted of waterproof missiles with attached flotation devices designed to be launched by remote signal while floating in the water.

Yeah, just floating there. Like a baby with water wings.

The goal of the concept is to create uncertainty as to the location of the missiles (for the Soviets, that is). The U.S. military would secretly drop their MX missiles into the ocean from naval ships or submarines—or maybe even a naval ship disguised as a civilian craft. The missiles would float vertically until launch time. According to the plan, “Only an inconspicuous part of the missile front end is visible above the surface.”

Inconspicuous? When’s the last time you’ve gone boating and seen a ballistic missile nose cone bobbing in the water? I think I would notice.

Perhaps others might notice too. Like the Soviets, who could either pre-target the missiles for destruction in case of war, or simply pluck them out of the water whenever they felt like it.

Then there’s the really scary part: “Moreover, it is possible that a third-nation, or paramilitary groups, would also be engaged in a hunt for the Hydras. Not under our direct control, any missile can be destroyed or towed away (stolen) at leisure.” Just think of the possibilities. Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Hamas, the Aryan Nation, Somali pirates, or the Irish Republican Party with an easily accessible arsenal of multi-warhead thermonuclear ballistic missiles. Here you go. We’ll just leave them sitting out for you. Enjoy.

But even if the missiles weren’t located and stolen, the Hydra would present unprecedented safety problems: “The idea of missiles with nuclear warheads floating unattended in ocean waters introduces an unacceptable hazard to navigation for the world’s shipping.”

I would say something derisive, but I think this speaks for itself.

Some of these major problems were solved by another proposal, called Orca. The Orca concept prevents the someone-can-steal-the-missile-if-you-don’t-run-into-the-missile-first issues plaguing Hydra by anchoring the MX to the ocean floor. When the missile is needed, a command could be sent via sonar to activate the warhead, release the anchor, and allow the weapon to float to the surface (from where it would be launched). That’s the good news.

The bad news: Although Orca would be harder to find than Hydra (really, what wouldn’t?), it could still be discovered using sonar from Soviet surface ships or submarines. It would be hard to hide the sonar signature of a massive ballistic missile, even one just sitting quietly. It has a very recognizable profile. It’s not like the Soviets would mistake it for frolicking seahorses or libidinous humpback whales.

And if they discovered our missiles, they would be apoplectic. So would the international community, and rightly so. The deployment of nuclear weapons on international seabeds is prohibited by an international treaty we signed more than a decade ago at this point (the Treaty on Prohibition of Employment of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof).

But potential diplomatic snafus aside, it was a technical issue that made this idea problematic. To maintain the secrecy of its location, the missile needed to be completely dormant—it conceals its location by emitting no signals. Any active communication with the missile risks giving away its location. But this means no one can test the readiness of the missile’s systems and mechanics, or, far more important for command and control purposes, to test if you can even communicate with the missile in the first place. We would have no idea if we could talk to the missile, release the missile from the seabed, or if it would launch when it reached the surface— until the president ordered a nuclear strike. That’s not the best time to find out whether your missiles work… or don’t.