Our suspicions about SORM deepened on April 8 when Gus Hosein, director of Privacy International, forwarded us a US State Department warning for Americans wanting to attend the Olympics in Sochi. The document, issued by the department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, carried the title, “Russian SORM Factsheet, Winter Olympics; Surveillance; Cyber,” and it warned that when traveling to Russia, people “should be aware that their telephone and electronic communications may be subject to surveillance, potentially compromising sensitive information.” The warning then went into details describing SORM, stating that the system “permits the monitoring, retention and analysis of all data that traverses Russian communications networks.” The document warned people heading to Sochi to be extremely careful:
Consider traveling with “clean” electronic devices—if you do not need the device, do not take it. Otherwise, essential devices should have all personal identifying information and sensitive files removed or “sanitized.” Devices with wireless connection capabilities should have the Wi-Fi turned off at all times. Do not check business or personal electronic devices with your luggage at the airport…. Do not connect to local ISPs at cafes, coffee shops, hotels, airports, or other local venues…. Change all your passwords before and after your trip…. Be sure to remove the battery from your Smartphone when not in use. Technology is commercially available that can geo-track your location and activate the microphone on your phone. Assume any electronic device you take can be exploited…. If you must utilize a phone during travel consider using a “burn phone” that uses a SIM card purchased locally with cash. Sanitize sensitive conversations as necessary. [2] The copy is in authors’ possession.
When we read this, we wondered what the Americans knew about SORM that we didn’t.
A year before, in August 2012, the Americans were the most numerous spectators at the London Olympics, with over sixty-six thousand Americans attending the games. [3] UK Office of National Statistics, “Visits to the UK for the London 2012 Olympic Games and Paralympics,” April 19, 2013, www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/ott/travel-trends/2012/sty-visits-to-the-uk.html .
It was clear that Americans would come by the thousands to Russia in February 2014.
Although we worried about the use of surveillance and interception in Sochi, it had a legitimate purpose in fighting terrorism. The threat and the reality of terrorism cast a long shadow over Sochi, and then it happened.
On April 15, 2013, Boston hosted its annual marathon, and 23,000 runners took part. About two hours after the winner crossed the finish line but with more than 5,700 runners yet to finish, two bombs detonated on Boylston Street. Three people were killed and more than 250 injured. The same day, using surveillance cameras, police identified two brothers as suspects, Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. After a manhunt, the older brother, Tamerlan, was killed, and Dzhokhar captured. It was soon discovered that over a decade before the attack, their parents, ethnic Chechens, had moved the family to the United States from Dagestan, a Russian internal republic in the North Caucasus.
The terrorist attack had a lasting impact on the way the terrorist threat to the Sochi Olympics was viewed in the United States and around the world. It was long assumed that the militants in the North Caucasus were not interested in attacking Western targets. Since the 1990s the Chechen movement shifted from a nationalist agenda to make Chechnya independent, to one embracing radical Islam. The Chechen’s top commander, Dokku Umarov, proclaimed an Islamic state in the North Caucasus, the Caucasus Emirate, in October 2007, and since then militants spread across the republics of the North Caucasus, but primarily in Dagestan. They continued to attack Russians—developing a clear terrorist strategy, attacking civilians on the Russian mainland, including in Moscow, and killing law enforcement personnel in the North Caucasus. But foreigners were not in their crosshairs.
The Boston bombing raised questions about whether that had changed. To make things worse, in a few months thousands of Americans would fly close to the Islamists’ stronghold; Sochi, one of the most beautiful places in South Russia, on the coast of the Black Sea, is geographically located at the foot of the Caucasus Mountains.
Soon it became known that the Russian FSB had sent messages in 2011 to the FBI and CIA about Tamerlan Tsarnaev. [4] Eli Lake, “Why the FBI Didn’t Make Much of Russia’s Request to Probe Boston Bomber,” Daily Beast , April 22, 2013, www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/04/22/why-the-fbi-didn-t-make-much-of-russia-s-request-to-probe-boston-bomber.html .
Though these letters were not real warnings—rather, the FSB asked for information on Tsarnaev, fearing he could join the militants in Dagestan—this information inflamed public opinion in the United States, and there were calls for more cooperation between Russian and American security services. Putin and Obama spoke twice by phone in the wake of the marathon bombing. [5] “Kremlin: Russia, US to Step Up Counter-Terrorism Cooperation,” Reuters, NBC, April 20, 2013, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/04/20/17836295-kremlin-russia-us-to-step-up-counter-terrorism-cooperation .
A White House statement said Obama praised the “close cooperation” Washington received on counterterrorism from Moscow, stating, “Both sides underlined their interest in deepening the close cooperation of the Russian and US special services in the fight against international terrorism.” [6] David Wise, “The FBI-Russia Connection,” Reuters, May 9, 2013, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/05/09/the-fbi-russia-connection .
On May 11 British prime minister David Cameron said that the Russian and British security services would cooperate in the build-up to the Winter Olympics in Sochi after his talks with Putin, adding that Britain would be providing “limited” security support at the Olympic Games. “We both want the Sochi Games to be a safe and secure Games,” he said. [7] “Britain to Provide Security for Sochi Olympics,” News24 Online, May 11, 2013, http://news24online.com/britain-to-provide-security-for-sochi-olympics .
This was a bad time to be asking questions about surveillance at the Olympics. The bombings in Boston made many people more tolerant of surveillance because of tangible fears of terrorism.
Six months before the Olympics were to open, on August 19, 2013, Putin signed an executive order, No. 686, that effectively turned the Olympics venue into a fortress. [8] The Presidential Executive Order No. 686, “On Peculiarities of Applying Enhanced Security Measures During the XXII Winter Olympic Games and the XI Winter Paralympic Games in Sochi in 2014.” On January 4, 2014, Putin signed Executive Order “On Amendments to the Order 686,” and the amendments allowed the protests during the Games but in a specially designated place—in the park twelve miles from the city and only after they agreed with the Interior Ministry and the FSB. See Kremlin, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6491 .
It banned the entry of all vehicles and cars apart from those specially registered to Sochi from January 7 to March 21, 2014. Putin’s order also prohibited any protests in the area of the Games during this period. But some of the fortress wasn’t visible.
All those who wanted to visit the Olympics were required to pass through advance screening by the security services. The Russian authorities introduced a new security measure, a spectator pass that all visitors of the Games would need to have. To get it, a visitor was required to post his or her passport data and photo on a special website and wait for the FSB to check their information. If there were no suspicions, an applicant could receive a spectator pass, which bore his or her photo and name. Only with the spectator pass in hand could a visitor buy tickets to the Olympic competitions. The procedure was clearly aimed at gathering data on tens of thousands of people from across the globe.
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