Robert Service - Spies and Commissars

Meet Winston Churchill in the hotel passage. ‘Hello,’ I say to him. ‘Have you come over to hurry us up?’ Things are very slow at the Paris Peace Conference.

‘No,’ Churchill answers. ‘I have come to get myself an army.’ 17

Towards the end of that long day at the conference, Churchill caught sight of Wilson rising to leave for the Gare du Nord and asked: ‘Could we not have some decision about Russia?’ 18Wilson rested his hand on Clemenceau’s chair and said that he was putting his hopes in holding peace talks off the Turkish coast. He was willing to go there in person. Although his priority was to get out of Russia entirely, he commented that if his Russian initiative came to nothing he would ‘do his share with the other Allies in any military measures that they considered necessary and practicable to help the Russian armies now in the field’. 19

Even Churchill still stopped short of calling for an Allied crusade — the quips he made in conversation tended to disguise this. His preferred alternative was to give aid to the Whites while forming an alliance of the states on Russia’s borders, and General Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, supported him on this. Wilson was strongly suspicious of Lloyd George, sometimes finding him ‘pronouncedly Bolshevist’. 20Careful husbandry of resources would be essential for Churchill’s scheme and he suggested withdrawing British forces from the south Caucasus and assuring Turkey of London’s friendly intentions. The United Kingdom’s huge post-war surplus of munitions should be delivered to the Whites along with a contingent of British officers. 21

Churchill aimed to get the Allies to establish a Council on Russian Affairs and ascertain what resources could be made available for action of every kind — military, political and economic — in Russia. Balfour liked the idea, and Churchill went back to Lloyd George to argue that, if the Prinkipo project fell apart, the Allies would be in a position ‘to take a definite decision’. 22Behind this measured statement lay Churchill’s desire for action. If the Bolsheviks rejected the call for an armistice in their Civil War, he wanted the Allied powers to declare and increase military support for the Whites. Lloyd George wrote to his private secretary Philip Kerr expressing displeasure. Churchill was becoming a pest. The Prime Minister wanted to avoid political trouble and an unsustainable budget at home; he required proper evidence that the Russians wanted foreigners to interfere in matters relating to their governance. He probably also felt the need to guard against Churchill trying to increase the size of the Allied forces in Russia; and he knew his friend too well to believe that he would quietly abide by whatever policy emerged from the Allied Supreme Council. 23

On 22 February 1919, Bullitt set off for Russia with his friend Lincoln Steffens. Both were pro-Soviet and had grandiose ideas about what they could achieve, even though Lansing’s letter of assignation specified only ‘the purpose of studying conditions, political and economic’ — Wilson had characteristically left the drafting to the State Department. 24Bullitt was anyway not of a mind or character to defer to Lansing. His ambition was to settle the Russian question on terms acceptable to the Soviet authorities, and he thought well of Lenin even before encountering him. In his pocket he had Colonel House’s written assurance that if the Sovnarkom agreed to the American terms, the US would resume trade with Russia, institute a food-relief scheme and withdraw Allied troops. Bullitt had orders to avoid discussing the paying off of Russian state loans. The British were to be informed of the negotiating tactics but not the French. Wilson and Lansing knew that Clemenceau would make a fuss about the need to raise the grievances of French investors. 25Bullitt consulted Philip Kerr before departing. In this way he felt satisfied that whatever he accomplished would enjoy endorsement from Lloyd George and Balfour. 26

It was Bullitt’s first trip to Russia; he spoke no Russian and his understanding of Russia’s politics was less than deep. Yet he suffered no deficit of confidence in his talks with the Soviet leadership. With his flimsy acquaintance with Bolshevik history he was convinced that they were men of their word and open to peaceful compromise. 27Lenin and Chicherin warned that if they were to sign an armistice, they needed ‘a semi-official guarantee’ that the Americans, British and French would enforce it on the White side as well. 28The week of conversations was thrilling for Bullitt, who thought he had obtained a watertight deal he could take back to Wilson and Lloyd George in Paris. He and Steffens left Moscow on 15 March, escorted by Arthur Ransome and Bill Shatov. 29

But back in Paris things did not turn out as Bullitt expected. George Hill was there on a Secret Service Bureau assignment, under orders to put his special knowledge of Russia at the disposal of the British delegation. 30When he discovered that Bullitt was pressing the case for recognizing the Soviet government, Hill contacted the anticommunist reporter Henry Wickham Steed — and the two of them conferred with Sidney Reilly, who was in France after a brief trip to Russia. 31Steed had information that Lloyd George was close to approving Wilson’s ideas on Russia. He was determined to thwart such an outcome. On 28 March 1919 the Daily Mail published an editorial by him fulminating against Lloyd George for betraying the White Russians and falling victim to a conspiracy by ‘international Jewish financiers’ and Germans to assist the communists in holding on to power in Moscow. 32The tirade shook Lloyd George. When he breakfasted with Bullitt that morning, he said that the Mail ’s editorial made it impossible for him to support the proposals he had brought back from Russia: ‘As long as the British press is doing this kind of thing how can you expect me to be sensible about Russia?’ 33Bullitt had no greater success with his patron Woodrow Wilson. The Prinkipo project was scuppered before ever coming before the Allied Supreme Council.

Bullitt had overestimated his right to speak in the President’s name. He was also credulous about Moscow. If Lenin was willing to call a truce in the Civil War and attend a conference, it was only because the Red military position was bad at the time. Sovnarkom would have benefited from another breathing space. Only a fool could believe that Lenin would not rip up an agreement when it suited him. It was equally unlikely that Kolchak would remain content with what he held in the Urals or that Denikin would stay put in southern Russia; and the National Centre leaders had no hesitation in rejecting ‘artificial’ attempts at peace-making. 34They knew their Lenin and Trotsky better than Bullitt did.

Wilson was not without his devious side and was already giving consideration to Kolchak’s request for military supplies. William Phillips, Assistant Secretary of State during Lansing’s absence in Paris, wanted to take the side of the Whites and help them to victory. Wilson and Lansing asked for time to consult General William S. Graves who led the US expeditionary force that had landed in eastern Siberia in August 1918. When Graves answered positively about Kolchak, Wilson authorized financial credit to be provided to the White Army for 260,000 rifles on condition that Kolchak pledged to prevent a return to power of the Romanovs, hold free elections and honour Russian state debts. Kolchak gave his assent, and weapons, clothing and food were shipped to Siberia, albeit surreptitiously since Republican Congressmen were already criticizing the administration for interfering in the Civil War. The US administration hit on the device of using Boris Bakhmetev, the Provisional Government’s ambassador to Washington. Bakhmetev retained the right of access to the bank accounts of the Provisional Government. Collaboration with him obviated the need to apply for funds and permission from the US Congress. 35