Richard Rashke - Useful Enemies

“Did you, or any members or employees of IRO ever encourage or instruct an applicant to give incorrect information?” Moscowitz asked.

“To the contrary,” Segat said. “Our job was to elicit the truth.”

“If an applicant… was a citizen of the Soviet Union, would that fact… have any impact or effect on finding that he be eligible or ineligible?”

“No,” Segat said. “Not in itself.”

“If the applicant… became a German prisoner of war, would [that] have any impact on the applicant’s eligibility?”

“No bearing on his eligibility,” Segat said.

In a pretrial deposition, Demjanjuk admitted to being a soldier in General Vlasov’s liberation army. Moscowitz asked if membership in Vlasov’s army made him ineligible for a U.S. visa.

“It would make him prima facie ineligible ,” Segat said. “The burden of proof shifts to him…. We would listen to their appeal, and if we are satisfied that they are not volunteers , they are eligible.”

“What if… an applicant were a former Soviet soldier taken prisoner by the Germans who was later trained by the Germans at a training camp for concentration camp guards?” Moscowitz asked, referring to Trawniki. “What impact, if any, would that have on that applicant’s eligibility?”

“He would be declared prima facie ineligible ,” Segat said.

“If an applicant were a Soviet soldier, taken prisoner by the Germans, who served as a guard in a Nazi concentration camp or… extermination camp, what impact if any would that have on that applicant’s eligibility for IRO assistance?”

“He would be declared ineligible. ”

Segat’s damaging testimony presented Martin with a huge challenge in his defense of Demjanjuk, whose main argument was that he had lied out of fear of repatriation to the Soviet Union, where he would have been executed for serving in Vlasov’s army.

“Were you aware,” Martin asked Segat, “that Russian repatriation officials visited DP camps in the American zone, and that there was a time when they forcibly repatriated USSR citizens found in these camps?”

“I am aware that they were visiting camps,” Segat said. “But I am not aware of a Russian repatriation official forcibly taking anybody out of the camp.”

“Did you ever gain any knowledge of an executive order issued by President Truman putting a halt to forcible repatriation?”

“No, sir,” Segat said. He couldn’t have because Truman never issued such an order.

Since the refugees spoke more than a dozen different languages, the IRO hired hundreds of interpreters to interview them and record their answers. Martin tried to establish that refugees paid interpreters to falsify their applications by saying they were born in a country other than the Soviet Union, usually Poland, because they were afraid of being forcibly repatriated.

Did Segat know about any cases where interpreters forged applications for refugees?

“I know of many cases where that occurred, yes….If [we] found out that there was some forgery or something, we simply got rid of them.” The government called Leo B. Curry Jr. to the stand.

Like Judge Battisti, Leo Curry had landed on the beaches of Normandy. After the war, he served as an investigator for the war crimes trials tribunal in Manila. From 1948 to 1952, he worked with the U.S. Displaced Persons Commission, which reviewed the reports of the IRO and passed further judgment on the eligibility of applicants for U.S. visas. Curry’s job as a prosecution witness was to complement and reinforce Segat’s testimony. He had personally approved Demjanjuk for a U.S. visa in 1950.

“Mr. Curry, would you describe how an application arrived at your desk at the Commission?”

“The file or case history was prepared for the most part by the IRO and handed to the Commission,” Curry explained.

“Once the file reached the Commission, were there any other checks or inquiries made?”

“A great number of checks… to determine [the applicant’s] character, his history,” Curry said.

“What would you consider to be the majo r source of information about each applicant?”

“Affidavits, sworn statements.”

“Was the applicant interviewed?”

“In an instance where there may be an apparent conflict in time and place,” Curry said.

“Once the determination to immigrate under the Displaced Persons Act was made, would a report or recommendation of some sort be issued by the Commission?” Moscowitz asked.

“A final report of approval.”

“Who would make that report?”

“I, for one, as a case analyst.”

“What would be the next step?”

“The entire dossier would be forwarded to the U.S. Consular Service for their consideration of a visa.”

“What were the consequences to an applicant if he were found ineligible by the Commission?”

“He would be refused admission to the United States.”

As he did with Segat, Moscowitz went on to establish that being trained at Trawniki, serving in Vlasov’s army, and working as a death camp guard would each render an applicant ineligible according to the Displaced Persons Act, while merely being a Soviet POW would not.

Moscowitz asked: “Take the case of a Red Army [POW] who, at some point, served in a German-organized unit for Ukrainians for the purpose of fighting against the Soviets?”

“The Commission would want to know whether, in fact, this service was forced or whether it was voluntary.”

“Who would bear the burden of proving… this service was forced or voluntary?”

“The applicant.”

“How difficult… would it be for such an applicant to demonstrate involuntary service?”

“In my experience, highly unlikely,” Curry said.

“Why is that?”

“I have yet to recall anyone having stated that they voluntarily served.”

“Everyone claimed he had served involuntarily?”

“Everyone did.”

Martin began his cross-examination of Curry with the same line of questioning he had used on Daniel Segat.

“During your tenure with the Displaced Persons Commission, were you ever aware of any forced repatriations—prior to your arrival there or subsequent to your arrival there—of Soviet citizens by Russian officials?” Martin asked.

Curry had joined the commission in 1948.

“Prior to my arrival, yes.”

“Did you, or would you have had, access to a Presidential order… from President Truman regarding forceful repatriation?”

“If any such proclamation was made… during the time I was there, I would have been aware of it,” Curry said. Of course he wasn’t aware of it, because President Truman never issued such a proclamation.

“If in a concentration camp, there were Jewish inmates who were forced… by the Germans to guard prisoners… would they be eligible for immigration to the United States?”

Martin was referring to the SS practice of appointing Jewish Kapos to help supervise Jewish workers. Sometimes, they were ordered to lash fellow prisoners with a whip. It was a delicate line of questioning. The Jewish community greeted any attempt to compare Jewish Kapos to Trawniki men with outrage.

“My interpretation would be no,” Curry said.

The 1948 Displaced Persons Act did not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary persecution of civilians, as the Supreme Court had pointed out in its Fedorenko decision. The Displaced Persons Commission had come to that same conclusion in 1945.

Demjanjuk said on his visa application that he was born in Poland, not in Ukraine. Martin knew that the prosecution would try to turn that misrepresentation into another argument for why Demjanjuk should be stripped of his citizenship. Martin hoped to weaken that argument.