Joachim Fest - Plotting Hitler's Death

A far more typical example of human behavior, however, was the expedient set of actions taken by Kluge-though in his case it was writ particularly large. Late in the evening of July 20, shortly after dismissing Stülpnagel and Hofacker with a resounding “No!” he sent a telegram to Hitler expressing his devotion: “The attempt of villain­ous murderers to kill you, my Führer, has been foiled by the fortu­itous hand of fate.” 35Kluge knew full well that he still could not escape Hitler’s longstanding suspicions of him. Five days later, when the great Allied offensive in the West began with General Patton’s armored breakthrough in the area around St. Lô and Kluge could not be reached all day because he was directing the German troops from right behind the front, Hitler immediately suspected him of attempt­ing to negotiate a surrender. In any case, the Führer believed that kluge “knew about the assassination attempt,” as he remarked to Guderian. The reprimands and interference of a suspicious Führer soon culminated in Kluge’s being told where he should station him­self in battle. They continued with specific orders as to when to attack and where to hold the line-even though no troops were available for the maneuvers that were demanded. The ultimate humiliation came on August 17, after the fall of Falaise, when Field Marshal Walter Model suddenly appeared at Kluge’s headquarters and announced that he was the new commander in chief in the West. The letter from Hitler confirming Kluge’s dismissal ended with the ominous words “Field Marshal Kluge shall keep this office advised of where in Ger­many he intends to go.” 36

The “master of tactical improvisation,” as Kluge liked to be known, was forced into something he had always avoided: an irrevocable decision. He also had an opportunity to soften, at least for posterity, the memory of his indecisiveness, his pathetic “Children, I’m yours!” outburst, his constant evasion of and faithlessness toward Beck, Tresckow, Rommel, and Stülpnagel. Once again, however, he failed to take a stand, even though he had already resolved to put an end to fear and anxiety. He remained his guarded self in a farewell letter to Hitler and, while he did call for peace, he also wrote of the Führer’s “grandeur” and “genius” and concluded by writing, “I take leave of you, my Führer-to whom I have always stood closer than you per­haps realize-in the firm conviction that I did my duty to the absolute best of my ability.” 37Kluge then set out on the road back to Germany. Near the place where Stülpnagel had tried to end his life, Kluge ordered his car to stop and swallowed poison.

As it happened, only days before, Rudolph-Christoph von Gersdorff had visited Kluge, like a ghost from the past, and attempted to persuade him to negotiate with the Allies, withdraw his troops to Germany’s prewar borders and, with the help of a few reliable units, try to overthrow the Nazi regime. “If that should fail, Gersdorff,” the commander retorted, “Field Marshal Kluge will go down as the big­gest swine in world history.” Gersdorff continued to press, arguing that “every great man in world history” has faced a decision that would cause him to be remembered either as a criminal or as “a savior in times of dire need.” Kluge simply laid his hand on the colonel’s shoulder and remarked, “Gersdorff, Field Marshal Kluge is no great man.” 38

By the night of July 20, widespread manhunts were already under way. Besides those arrested on Bendlerstrasse, anyone who had had personal or professional dealings with the known conspirators or who had attracted the earlier attention of the security authorities was investigated. Around midnight Helmuth Stieff was taken into custody at headquarters. At about that time Erich Fellgiebel was engaged in a lofty philosophical debate with his adjutant, First Lieutenant Hellmuth Arntz, about the afterlife, which Fellgiebel did not believe in. When the long-awaited call came he replied simply, “I’m on my way.” Arntz asked if he had his pistol, but Fellgiebel said, “One doesn’t do that. One takes a stand.” 1

The next day SS Obersturmbannführer Georg Kiessel was appointed head of a special board of inquiry, which soon numbered four hundred people. Hitler held a briefing to announce guidelines for the judicial proceedings against those involved in the failed coup. Denouncing the conspirators as “the basest creatures that ever wore the soldier’s tunic, this riff-raff from a dead past,” he declared: “This time I’ll fix them. There will be no honorable bullet for… these criminals, they’ll hang like common traitors! We’ll have a court of honor expel them from the service; then they can be tried as civilians…. The sentences will be carried out within two hours! They must hang at once, without any show of mercy! And the most important thing is that they’re given no time for any long speeches. But Freisler will lake care of all that. He’s our Vishinsky.” 2

As the days passed, the number of suspects grew larger and larger. Witzleben was among the first to be arrested. Popitz was picked up in his apartment at about five o’clock on the morning of the twenty-first and was soon followed by Oster, Kleist-Schmenzin, Schacht, Canaris, Wirmer, and many others. Only shortly before July 20 the Gestapo officials responsible for surveillance of the military had reported no particular activity, noting only in passing a certain “defeatism” in the circles around Beck and Goerdeler. 3That was the reason Hitler apparently believed at first that the attack was the work of a “very small clique of ambitious officers,” as he said in his radio address to the German people. Now, to the astonishment of virtually everyone, it turned out that Stauffenberg and his immediate accomplices repre­sented only the tip of the iceberg. The conspiracy extended far be­yond the army to civilian circles on both sides of the political spectrum, even to groups presumed to be close to the Nazi Party.

On the evening of July 20 an overly confident Count Helldorf had averred that the police would not dare lay a finger on him. In fact, the investigators hardly hesitated before pouncing. Other conspirators, like General Eduard Wagner, escaped their fates by committing sui­cide. Major Hans Ulrich von Oertzen, who had urged the military district headquarters on Hohenzollerndamm to support the uprising, managed in the bedlam that surrounded his arrest to hide two gre­nades. Shortly before he was to be led away he held one to his head and detonated it. He collapsed on the floor, grievously wounded. With all his remaining strength, he dragged himself to where the second grenade lay hidden, shoved it in his mouth, and pulled the pin. Suicides such as this only extended the circle of suspects to include friends, relatives, and colleagues.

The code of personal honor, always a significant factor in the strange helplessness of the conspirators, influenced their behavior even in defeat. Very few conspirators actually attempted to escape. Most simply arranged their personal affairs and waited calmly for the knock on the door, ready, or so they believed, for anything that might befall them. Many refused to avail themselves of proffered hiding places or even asked to be arrested. Principally they wished to spare their friends and relatives interrogation by the police, but most of them were also operating out of the categorical morality that was the bedrock ol their thinking. “Don’t flee-stand your ground!” was how Karl Klausing rationalized his decision to give himself up; he did not want, he said, to leave his captured comrades in the lurch. Schlabrendorff also refused to flee, as did Trott, evidently “on account of his wile and children.” Tresckow’s brother Gerd knew about the conspiracy, but as a lieutenant colonel in a division on the Italian front he was too far away from the scene to arouse suspicion. Never­theless, he went and confessed to his superior officers and, when told lo forget about it, insisted on his culpability. He was finally arrested and incarcerated in the Gestapo prison on Lehrterstrasse, where, in a state of physical and mental depletion, he took his life in early September 1944. 4