Joachim Fest - Plotting Hitler's Death

If the records are not misleading, Oster finally agreed, although he knew that both Witzleben and Halder were opposed on principle to murdering Hitler. And thus a third conspiracy arose within the al­ready existing “conspiracy within a conspiracy.” It comprised the most determined core of conspirators-those who would stop at nothing. In hindsight, they were perhaps the only ones who might have been a match for the Nazis. All the others, including Halder, Beck, and even Witzleben, were impeded by their notions of tradi­tion, morality, and good upper-class manners, though there were con­siderable individual differences among them. The resistance was therefore never really able to match the ruthlessness of the regime. Indeed, a few days after this evening conference, Beck warned Oster that the conspirators should not defile their good names by commit­ting murder. The debate surrounding this issue would continue un­abated until July 20, 1944.

Nevertheless, all now stood ready for the coup. What remained was the signal from Halder, to be given as soon as Hitler issued the orders to invade. But on the evening of September 13 stunning news arrived. The British prime minister had declared his willingness to hold personal discussions with the Führer, immediately, at any location and without concern for protocol. Hitler is said to have com­mented later that he was “thunderstruck” by Chamberlain’s action. For the conspirators, it was as if the world had come crashing down around them. As one of their number later wrote, they each struggled to maintain their composure; those who had advocated a more cautious approach heaped scorn on the irresponsibility of the activists who once again had underestimated the genius of the Führer. Witzleben expressed doubts about the judgment of the conspirators who claimed to be political experts. Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt voiced his con­cern that the conspirators would now no longer be able to count on the army troops that were crucial to a successful coup. In a mood of glum uncertainty, most of the conspirators began to fear that the ground had been torn out from under them once and for all.

Ultimately, the overture to Hitler only proved something that Chamberlain had never been willing to acknowledge but that cer­tainly must have begun to dawn on him within a few bitter days: Hitler wanted not to resolve the crisis in Europe but to heighten it. The Führer felt confirmed in his belief that the Western democracies would yield in the end when Chamberlain accepted the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany, a decision endorsed by the British and French governments after nervous negotiations, and even accepted by Prague, though it consented only under great pressure.

Hitler was nevertheless surprised when, one week later, on September 22, 1938, the prime minister flew to Bad Godesberg, near Bonn, to deliver a copy of the agreement personally and to discuss the modalities of the transfer. Paradoxically, such eagerness to appease actually complicated Hitler’s plans for further annexations by ruining the triumphant march into Prague that he was already savoring. After an embarrassed pause, Hitler quietly informed Chamberlain that the agreement they had reached in Berchtesgaden just a week before was null and void. He now insisted not only on marching immediately into the Sudetenland but also on satisfaction of longstanding Polish and Hungarian claims on various border regions of Czechoslovakia. After an exchange of letters from the respective staffs failed to resolve these issues, the negotiations were broken off that evening. An enraged Chamberlain demanded a memorandum setting forth the new Germany requirements. According to Ernst von Weizsäcker of the Foreign Office, Hitler “clapped his hands together as if in great amusement” when he described the course of the conversations. Three days later he issued an ultimatum: he would only hold his divisions back if his new Godesberg demands were accepted by 2:00 p.m. on September 28. “If England and France want to attack,” he told the British emis­sary Sir Horace Wilson, who had come to Berlin on September 26 in a final attempt to reach an agreement, “then let them do so. I don’t care. I am prepared for all eventualities. Today is Tuesday. Next Mon­day we’ll be at war.” 30

Just as news of Chamberlain’s trip to Berchtesgaden had virtually paralyzed the conspirators, Hitler’s additional demands in Godesberg infused them with new life. When Oster heard the details from Erich Kordt, he said, “Finally [we have] clear proof that Hitler wants war, no matter what. Now there can be no going back.” 31

Everywhere in Europe war preparations began, accompanied by the darkest forebodings. By the time the first news arrived from Bad Godesberg, Czechoslovakia had already ordered its forces to mobi­lize, not without some sense of relief. Britain followed suit, ordering the navy to make ready for war. In London, slit trenches were dug, gas masks distributed, and hospitals evacuated. France called up the reserves. In Germany, Goebbels’s propaganda campaign about the suffering of the Sudeten Germans, which had been launched just weeks before, grew shriller and shriller. Hitler ordered the Wehrmacht attack units to advance from their assembly areas in the inte­rior to the launch points on the Czech border. In an attempt to stir up war fever in Germany, Hitler ordered the Second Motorized Division to pass through Berlin on its way to the border. It rumbled down the Ost-West-Achse boulevard, before turning into Wilhelmstrasse, where he reviewed it from the Chancellery balcony. Contrary to all expectations, however, no cheering throngs lined the streets. Hitler noted with annoyance the solemnity of the passersby and the glacial silence with which they observed the troops before turning away. Visibly upset, he withdrew into the middle of the room. The Ameri­can correspondent William Shirer observed that this was the most striking antiwar demonstration that he had ever seen. 32

What disappointed Hitler only encouraged the conspirators, who now moved to their starting positions. They carried out the final military and police preparations and checked over their proclamations to the German people. Equipped with firearms, ammunition, hand gre­nades, and explosives, Heinz’s task force waited at the ready in a number of private dwellings in Berlin, such as 118 Eisenacherstrasse. Helmuth Groscurth, who was spending the evening with his brother, suddenly broke off their conversation and asked him if he could keep a secret. After repeated assurances, Groscurth finally told him the news: “Tonight Hitler is going to be arrested!” 33

In fact, the ultimatum did not expire until 2:00 p.m. the next day. That morning Oster forwarded to Witzleben a copy of the note that Hitler had sent to Chamberlain in Bad Godesberg abruptly rejecting the British offers. Witzleben immediately took it to Halder. As Halder read it, “tears of indignation” welled up in his eyes, and together the two decided not to wait any longer. Halder offered to inform Brauchitsch and rally him to the cause, if possible, especially since he himself did not have direct command over any troops in his position as chief of general staff.

Commander in Chief Brauchitsch was also outraged by Hitler’s note. He, too, began to see through the Führer’s duplicity. “So he lied to me again!” he roared. But Brauchitsch was not yet prepared to commit himself to a coup at this point. He would “probably” partici­pate, Halder reported to the waiting Witzleben upon his return. Wit­zleben thereupon telephoned the commander in chief right from Halder’s office and appealed to him—“virtually begging him,” ac­cording to Gisevius, “to issue the order to go ahead.” The indecisive Brauchitsch said, however, that he wanted first to stop in at the Chan­cellery to assess the situation personally. Upon returning to military district headquarters on Hohenzollerndamm, Witzleben called out to Gisevius, “Any time now, Doctor!” 34