Lucas Delattre - A Spy at the Heart of the Third Reich

On the other hand, McCormack did not think the remainder of the Kappa material was of much use: “Because of the time lag between the date of origin and date of receipt here, information that might have been of interest had either been obtained from other sources or had become stale. As is usual with diplomatic communications, a good deal of the material is second-hand information upon subjects on which first-hand information is available, or it relays expressions of opinion made for diplomatic purposes or made by people whose opinions on the particular subjects are of no great consequence.”

At the same time, the British began to take an interest in the “George Wood” file. An investigation in London in April revealed that only 4 percent of the information supplied by Wood was false or incorrect. On May 12, 1944, David Bruce, chief of the OSS in London, transmitted to Allen Dulles “special congratulations” from his British colleagues for the material on Japan. On his own initiative, Kim Philby of MI6 had sent a copy of Fritz’s documents concerning the order of battle of Japanese troops to Alistair Denniston, the head of Bletchley Park, the agency charged with deciphering enemy messages. Denniston’s services were enthusiastic and asked for more. Soon the heads of the Army, Navy, and Air Force “all three howled for more,” as Philby was to write in his memoirs. Claude Dansey, the number-two in MI6, was absolutely furious that one of Dulles’s agents was having such success in London. But he calmed down when Philby explained that he had done everything possible to conceal the American origin of “Wood.” “Not even our own circulating sections, let alone the departments, knew that OSS were involved. They regarded it as our stuff, they were asking us for more. It seemed that the credit would be ours.” From that moment on, Dansey rubbed his hands and congratulated his young colleague (Philby was then thirty-two). Philby’s career progressed, and his reputation grew in the British intelligence community. No one knew that he was working for Moscow. Philby was later to recall fondly in his memoirs: “Our German friend proved to be an intrepid operator, and paid several more visits to Bern with his useful suitcase.”

In Washington, as in London, they were beginning to abandon the hypothesis of a ‘trap” in the course of the spring of 1944. In the last delivery from “George Wood,” there was much information that was harmful to German interests. Dulles’s German informant was finally becoming a source worthy of belief.

In a message sent on April 26, 1944 to one of the heads of the OSS (Whitney H. Shepardson, known as “Jackpot”), Dulles wrote:

I appreciate danger of becoming so enamored with one’s own sources that one falls into such traps. While possibility you suggest should never be excluded my present views are:

1. As yet no evidence of plant in material itself.

2. Having critically examined hundreds of these documents internal and external evidence has persuaded me of their genuineness.

3. Local intermediary is I believe above question though of course he might be fooled also.

4. Have analyzed entire scheme under which material procured and transmitted and it is logical and feasible.

All of foregoing while persuasive is not conclusive and agree with you on importance of continuing critical examination. So far only disturbing element has been some evidence of recklessness on Wood’s part but this is quite usual in conspirators.

Berlin, late April 1944

When Fritz returned to Berlin, the city was bathed in magnificent sunlight. The official forecast for the third week of April predicted “weather fit for the Führer [ Führerwetter ].” The capital was nearly empty, notably on Hitler’s birthday, April 20, a holiday in Nazi Germany. Goebbels’s propaganda machine poured forth factitious celebrations, overblown pronouncements, and unshakable convictions. Everything was “fanatical,” “heroic,” or “tragic.”

Fritz was bitter, almost enraged. For the first time he felt useless. The role of spy no longer suited him. He wanted to take some action. He may well have anticipated that he would be criticized after the war for having been the agent of a foreign power. Armed resistance was much nobler, but he had just grasped that the Americans would not help him go down that path. In Bern, he had proudly presented to Allen Dulles a plan that was very dear to his heart: the creation of a “people’s militia” [ Volksmiliz ] assembling Germans opposed to Nazism, with himself as troop leader. He had anticipated enlisting all his friends in these shock troops. But, most important, he wanted to mobilize everyone he knew in the Social Democratic networks and those close to the old unions. The idea behind the plan was to revive the defense leagues of the Weimar Republic. In Fritz’s plan, “his” militia would be able to control a certain number of nerve centers in the capital of the Reich (the airports, and some lakes in the vicinity of Berlin, such as the Wannsee and the Schlachtensee) in support of a large-scale parachute operation carried out by the Allies. The members of the brigade were to recognize each other by an armband with the initials VM (for Volksmiliz ). The network would have been mobile, Fritz having thought of distributing bicycles to its members. “We would need machine pistols, ammunition, food rations, signal flares, helmets, and bracelets with the insignia VM,” he had told Dulles. For communications, a secret code had been worked out (the password was to be George 25900). Walter Bauer’s office at Unter den Linden 28 was to be the headquarters of this small underground army.

“What do you think, Mr. Douglas?” Fritz had asked Allen Dulles, his eyes glowing with enthusiasm. The American had not answered immediately. He had puffed on his pipe in silence, then he had quickly changed the subject. The only thing that had seemed to interest him in the whole story was the identity of the conspirators in the “people’s militia” led by Fritz Kolbe. Fritz, a little disconcerted by his proposal’s lack of effect, provided a list of his “comrades in arms”: Walter Bauer, Paul Löbe, Alfred Graf Waldersee. Allen Dulles had advised Fritz to do nothing that might put his life in danger: “We need you where you are. Keep telling us what you find out at the Foreign Ministry; that is really where you are most useful for us.”

Very disappointed by this rejection, Fritz had returned to Berlin with the feeling that he had been “dropped.” But he had nonetheless decided to continue the game of espionage, since he had no other means of acting. Perhaps, he told himself, I just have to wait a little longer and have the patience to convince the Americans of the need for a joint action in Berlin. He was not ready to give up his idea of a “people’s militia.”

On his return to the capital of the Reich, Fritz Kolbe was informed (probably by Gertrud von Heimerdinger) that he would have no opportunity to return to Switzerland for a long time. New arrangements had been made to reduce to a minimum the list of people authorized to travel abroad. He also learned that the Swiss authorities were now making difficulties over granting him a visa. Fritz wondered what had happened. It was impossible to know for sure. Perhaps his nocturnal visits to certain dens of iniquity had been observed. In the worst case, the Swiss were aware of his contacts with the Americans and wanted to avoid any problem with the authorities of the Reich. After a few moments of anxiety, Fritz finally learned that the Swiss authorities had generally become fussier and that the restrictions applied to everyone.

Fritz was trapped in Berlin. If he couldn’t go to Bern, he would have liked to go to Stockholm or Lisbon, but those trips were not authorized either. He would have liked to send messages through Albert Bur in Alsace (proposed password: “foie gras of Strasbourg”), but this system didn’t work. That did not keep him from continuing to work for the Americans. He took some time to learn how to use the camera he had been given and continued working on paper until the fall of 1944. To send documents to Bern, he always had alternative solutions. Some of his friends were still carrying the diplomatic mail to Bern—such as Willy Pohle and a certain Hans Vogel. On other occasions, Professor Sauerbruch went to Switzerland (for example, at Pentecost in 1944).