On every occasion, it was the words of the prelate Schreiber that enabled him to orient his compass: “Do not leave Germany! Fight against the Nazis with the resources that you have.” On one occasion, he attempted to establish contact with an American diplomat posted in Berlin whose name had been given to him by a friend. But with the American entry into the war in December 1941, the United States embassy closed its doors and the American diplomatic corps left the capital of the Reich. On two or three occasions in 1941 and 1942, Fritz tried to secure a mission as diplomatic courier in order to go to Switzerland. He explained first that he wanted to take a well-deserved leave, then he claimed that he had to go to Switzerland to settle the formalities of his divorce, since his second wife—who had remained in Africa and from whom he was de facto separated—was from Zurich. This was only a pretext: Once in Bern, he would have tried to speak to his old friend Ernst Kocherthaler, who knew many people and who would no doubt have been able to help him contact the Allies. It was a wasted effort: every time, the request was refused without explanation, and in fact, Fritz learned that his refusal to join the party was the real reason for the rejection. He did not insist, for fear of awakening suspicion, but, weary of the battle, he was once again tempted to flee the country. Fritz was torn between his desire for exile, his will to resist, and his new passion for Maria.
What he did not know was that at the same time some Nazi leaders themselves were discreetly beginning to doubt Germany’s victory. Of course, German offensives on the Russian front continued to be victorious. The Wehrmacht had reached the Volga, in the heart of the Caucasus, and was approaching the oil wells of Baku. In North Africa, Rommel’s troops marched into Egypt and were preparing to advance toward the Suez Canal. In the Atlantic, Allied convoys were suffering heavy losses because of German submarines. But the most perceptive minds did not allow themselves to be blinded by these events and made longer-term calculations. Well-informed Germans (of whom Karl Ritter was one) knew that the economic and military potential of the United States was at least comparable to that of the Axis powers. They knew that there was a tendency to overestimate the power of Japan and to underestimate American power. The proliferation of fronts was making a German victory increasingly problematic. And since Hitler had had to give up his plan of taking Moscow before the winter of 1941–42, it was clear that Russia would not fall “like a house of cards.” The likelihood of a long war was now in everyone’s mind. The theater of operations was beginning to shift dangerously toward Germany itself, with the increase of bombing by the Royal Air Force of major German cities (Cologne had been very severely damaged in May 1942). Paradoxically, lucidity was greatest in Heinrich Himmler’s circle. The regime’s principal killers were the first to sense the wind shifting, toward the middle of 1942.
Unlike the SS leaders, Kolbe wanted to see the Nazi regime disappear and not merely limit the damage of a foreseeable defeat. Kolbe wished for the total defeat of his own country. Once this had been accomplished, it would be possible to sweep away the past and contribute to the birth of a new, more just, and more democratic Germany. As for the means of getting there, he merely dreamed of them. He had contacts with none of the small German opposition groups. He had not yet heard of Goerdeler or of the Kreisau Circle. He had no concrete plan. In the spring of 1942, he wanted to leave Karl Ritter’s staff and find a post abroad, but he was made to understand that there was no point in trying.
He continued to perform his duties conscientiously. After his first visit to the führer’s headquarters in East Prussia, Fritz returned there several times in the course of 1942. The mission became routine: He had to transmit to Karl Ritter the documents that Ritter did not want to entrust to the official mail services. Fritz went to the “wolf’s lair” between late January and early February, in early April, and shortly before Christmas.
Every time, Fritz took the train at the Grunewald station. One day in the spring of 1942, looking out the window of his special compartment, he saw a train into which the police were forcing dozens of Jewish families (recognizable from their yellow stars). In October 1941, the government began deporting the Jews of Berlin to the East. At the time, the Reichsbahn was not yet using freight cars for deportations; this was a perfectly ordinary passenger train. No one knew where exactly they were going—nor did Fritz Kolbe, but he knew that the passengers in that train would not be coming back to Germany.
Berlin, February 1943
In early 1943, Fritz Kolbe awaited a call from destiny. He did not know what to do and yet he wanted to take action. He sensed a reason for existing. He was no longer satisfied with “peddling his principles without taking the trouble to, or even dreaming of, put them into practice…. Great things are not done only on impulse, and they are a sequence of little things combined into a whole.”
Others than he had for a long time been attempting the impossible. Resistance networks had been set up. Kolbe had no precise knowledge of the existence of these little groups, even though he was vaguely aware of the fact that “actions” were being plotted here and there. Allied bombs were now threatening all of Germany. The reign of violent death had been decreed everywhere. Sirens were now heard night and day in Berlin. At the Foreign Ministry, their sinister wail was blended, oddly, with the sound of a large gong that was used during every air raid (after the war, Fritz would not be able to hear the sound of a gong without shivering in fear).
During this time, far from the bombs, another war was going on, much less noisy, much more discreet, and yet decisive: the intelligence war. Fritz was waiting only for the opportunity to join it. He imagined it in a rather fuzzy way, not knowing what the “great game” looked like. What he knew boiled down to two or three simple ideas: neutral countries (like Switzerland, but also Sweden, Ireland, Portugal, and Turkey) were, as between 1914 and 1918, hotbeds of espionage. If you had good information in wartime, you had more power than an ambassador. Whether you were a banker, an industrialist, or even an obscure nonentity, you had every likelihood of influencing the course of events.
The time was, less than ever, one for hesitation. Fritz Kolbe felt in the air a call for the impossible and the incredible. Eager to act, he felt prepared to commit unprecedented deeds. “Treason? So be it,” he said to himself after a point that cannot be precisely located (probably late 1942 or early 1943). Fritz described this personal transformation in a document written just after the war: “I had reflected inwardly on this question (treason or Verrat ) and I had ended by overcoming it. Hitler had come to power through force and deception and had plunged Germany and the entire world into war. From my point of view, no one was obligated to loyalty and obedience to the Hitler regime.”
From the beginning, Fritz had thought that the only way of acting effectively was through intervention from outside. The Allies had the power necessary to get rid of the regime. This force, he told himself, must be supported by well-placed elements at the heart of the system.
This prospect was beginning to give him the strength to act, because he, the solitary minor official, could now make himself useful, if he was able to make contact abroad, to gather trustworthy friends around him, and above all if he was lucky. From chess, Fritz had learned two lessons: A straight line is not necessarily the shortest path between two spaces, and a pawn used advisedly can sometimes transform a game.
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