Stephen Fritz - Ostkrieg

Stalin was another matter. Although Goebbels conceded that the Soviet dictator had remained faithful to the spirit of the Nazi-Soviet Pact by rejecting British overtures in late May, he still brooded over his further actions in the Baltic and the Balkans. Goebbels noted anxiously on 16 June, “Lithuania has received a Russian ultimatum…. The Lithuanian answer did not satisfy Moscow. Russian troops marching into Lithuania.” Although Goebbels accepted with seeming equanimity Soviet demands on Latvia and Estonia and the growing pressure on Rumania to cede the provinces of Bessarabia and Bukovina, his tone changed in July as he realized just how thoroughly Stalin meant to benefit from German success in the west. “Slavism is spreading across the entire Balkans. Stalin is utilizing the moment,” he recorded on 5 July. He then added ominously, “Perhaps later we will once again have to take action against the Soviets.” In late July, on receiving news of the Soviet absorption of the Baltic states, Goebbels conceded grudgingly, “That is our price for Russia’s neutrality,” a price that seemed too costly. Add to these concerns growing irritations over persistent food and fuel shortages, the increasingly pesky nightly British air raids, and frustrations at the inability to solve the Jewish problem, and Goebbels’s diary presented a surprisingly gloomy view of the situation in the summer of 1940. 3

The German victory in the west had unquestioningly unleashed a wave of optimism, a feeling, as Goebbels put it, that “a new Europe is in being.” Despite this and his own newly confirmed opinion of his own genius, Hitler himself appeared uncertain and unsure how to proceed, especially since Great Britain continued to display a determination to fight on. “From all that he says it is clear that he wants to act quickly to end it,” noted Count Ciano, the Italian foreign minister, in his diary, adding astutely, “Hitler is now the gambler who has made a big scoop and would like to get up from the table risking nothing more.” The problem, however, was how to exit the game while ahead. Indeed, Goebbels admitted warily, “With England we still have a tough nut to crack.” On 29 June, the propaganda minister declared that “the decision whether war or peace must come soon” but conceded, “The Führer is not yet clear… whether he should develop a constructive peace program.” Goebbels again recorded Hitler’s doubts on 2 July: “He wants to speak to the Reichstag and give England one last chance. Would it then be accepted? Churchill probably not…. But perhaps other understanding elements.” Goebbels then noted, “But the Führer does not want to destroy the empire, for all that would be lost would in all probability not fall to us but to other foreign powers…. Therefore the Führer must make the effort and give England a last chance…. Where it might lead, no one knows.” 4

Hitler seemed genuinely disconcerted by British defiance, both ambivalent and frustrated at the course of events. Even though he had lost his gamble in 1939 on Great Britain staying out of the war, he refused to believe that his earlier assessment of the British could be so wrong and, thus, clung stubbornly to the conviction that they would soon “see reason” and agree to peace. On any number of occasions, and to a host of associates, he expressed his preference for peace with the English instead of a continuation of the war. Churchill’s actions, however, especially the British attack on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir on 3 July, forced Hitler to delay his speech, which he had just about finished, and reconsider his options. His uncertainty was reflected in a long talk with Goebbels five days later. Even as Hitler detailed postwar plans for the Germanization of Europe, the harsh treatment of France, and a new colonial policy, he vacillated with regard to Great Britain. “Despite everything the Führer still has a very positive attitude toward England,” remarked Goebbels. “He is not yet ready for the final blow. He wants to think over his speech again in peace so will go to the Obersalzberg…. If London rejects our last offer, then it will immediately be dealt a destructive blow.” Despite this outburst of bravado, however, Hitler continued to procrastinate and characteristically shrank from making a decision, much to Goebbels’s growing frustration. Not until 16 July did Hitler inform Goebbels that he intended to deliver his long-awaited speech to the Reichstag on Friday, 19 July. 5

In the meantime, Hitler summoned his military leaders to the Berghof for talks about the possibility of an invasion of Great Britain should his peace offer be rejected. On the eleventh, Admiral Raeder insisted that a landing could be attempted only if the Luftwaffe secured aerial superiority over southern England, while, the next day, Jodl laid out operational planning for any such invasion. The following day, Franz Halder, chief of the Army General Staff, journeyed to the mountaintop to brief the Führer, where he too discovered that Hitler regarded a landing as a last resort. “The Führer is greatly puzzled by Britain’s persistent unwillingness to make peace,” he noted in his diary on 13 July. “He sees the answer as we do in Britain’s hope on Russia, and therefore counts on having to compel her by main force to agree to peace. Actually that is much against his grain… [since] a military defeat of Britain will bring about the disintegration of the British Empire. This would not be of any benefit to Germany. German blood would be shed to accomplish something that would benefit only Japan, the United States, and others.” 6

This halfheartedness revealed itself again on the sixteenth when Hitler issued Directive No. 16, “Preparations for a Landing Operation against England,” a document that contained so many qualifications that it convinced many of his top commanders that he never seriously intended an invasion. Indeed, Hitler told Goering in confidence that he never meant to carry out the operation. In order to launch an invasion of Britain, Germany needed control of the Channel both by air and by sea. To those around him, it seemed clear that, given the strength of the British navy and the crippling of the already weak German navy by the Norwegian operation in April, Hitler regarded the risk of an invasion as unacceptably high. Instead, he would put his hopes in his peace proposal. 7

Perhaps Hitler never really expected the British to accept his offer, vague and imprecise as it was. The greatest part of a very long speech, over two hours, was, in fact, devoted to boasting about German military triumphs and praising the accomplishments of German commanders, a number of whom gained promotions. This latter was just as disingenuous as his peace proposal since Hitler believed that the army leadership had been found seriously wanting and that his own judgment had once more been proved correct. Only at the end did he make his brief appeal to common sense, declaring that his conscience forced him to offer the British one last chance to end a war that had no purpose. William Shirer, observing Hitler, thought it one of his best speeches:

The Hitler we saw in the Reichstag tonight was the conqueror, and conscious of it…. [H]e mixed superbly the full confidence of the conqueror with the humbleness which always goes down so well with the masses…. His voice was lower tonight; he rarely shouted as he usually does…. I’ve often admired the way he uses his hands…. Tonight he used those hands beautifully, seemed to express himself almost as much with his hands… as he did with his words…. I noticed too his gift for using his face and eyes… and the turn of his head for irony, of which there was considerable in tonight’s speech.

The great irony, which Shirer understood very well, was that Hitler offered peace not in the expectation that Churchill would accept, but to justify to the German people, who longed for it, the continuation of the war. He had given the British the choice; if they now rejected his offer, the war would go on, and it would be England’s fault. 8