Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

And Regulation of the land and naval forces. 32

Stennis was not prone to personal attacks, but he was no less disturbed by McNamara and his prosecution of the war. He called for an “all-out assault” by air on strategic targets in North Vietnam. Russell agreed. 33

In August 1967, just as Fulbright convened hearings on his commitments resolution, John Stennis of Mississippi held hearings of his own to suggest more hawkish policy alternatives. In August 1967, Stennis, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, convened seven hearings to discuss conflicting reports between civilian and military authorities as to the effectiveness of the bombing campaign. The prime “target” of these hearings was, predictably, Robert McNamara. The defense secretary had just sent a memorandum to Johnson suggesting no amount of bombing would force the North Vietnamese to negotiate. Members of the Joint Chiefs, who consulted regularly with Stennis and other military commanders, completely disagreed with the secretary, and the Mississippi senator set out to hear their side of the story. As historian Michael Scott Downs asserts, the hearings “had all the quality of a wild west lynching party, with Robert McNamara as a guest of honor.” 34Besides the defense secretary, only one nonmilitary man, a retired general, testified.

The hearings began with testimony by several top military officials who were allowed to make a formidable case against the administration’s bombing policies. They revealed that sharper more effective air attacks had been refused by the administration. They also asserted that any reduction of or suspension of the bombing would increase U.S. casualties and also result in the deployment of additional combat troops. On the other hand, the military officials concluded that if the administration allowed the Air Force to bomb Hanoi, Haiphong, and all the restricted targets, the North Vietnamese would surrender. The committee treated the military with the utmost respect when they testified. 35

The attitude of the senators changed when the troubled McNamara sat down to testify before the committee on 25 August 1967. The secretary had to endure a six-hour grilling from a hostile subcommittee. Thurmond, as usual, attacked the secretary in the most strident fashion. He suggested that the secretary cared more about North Vietnamese civilian casualties than U.S. casualties in South Vietnam. He also accused the secretary of placating and appeasing the Communists. “It is a statement of no win,” he continued. “It seems to me that if we follow what you have recommended that we ought to get out of Vietnam at once, because we have no chance to win, and I deeply regret that a man in your position is taking that position today.” 36

In the end, the subcommittee report, which Chairman Stennis quickly made public, made explicit both his and his constituents’ frustration with the concept of limited war:

The cold fact is that this policy has not done the job and has been contradictory to the best military judgment. What is needed now is the hard decision to do whatever is necessary, take the risks that have to be taken, and apply the force that is required to see the job through…. It is high time to allow the military voice to be heard in connection with details of military operations. 37

The president did add a number of bombing targets during the hearings to thwart the publicity of the hearings. Overall, however, he did not fully follow the advice of the subcommittee. Nevertheless, Stennis did illustrate the increasing divide between Johnson and the hawks, and in so doing, he expressed the opinion of, if not a majority of Americans by 1968, at the very least a majority of his fellow Southerners.

Despite the mounting criticism from congressional and other sources, the president, Secretaries McNamara and Rusk, and General Westmoreland had convinced most Americans that U.S. forces would prevail soon. The Tet Offensive in late January 1968 changed considerably both the course of the war and the length of Johnson’s presidency. On 31 January during a bombing halt to mark the Vietnamese Tet holiday, the Vietcong attacked almost every major city and provincial capital in South Vietnam, including Saigon. In the capital city they assaulted both General Westmoreland’s headquarters and, as U.S. television cameras recorded the event, the American embassy in Saigon. Though the Vietcong lost every battle, Tet shattered the illusion of the immanent victory that Johnson and the military had preached for quite some time. In the wake of Tet, Johnson’s approval rating on Vietnam dropped to 26 percent. 38

Southern members of Congress, as always, did not speak with one voice in response, but most believed that changes needed to be made in Johnson’s policies. “How is it that the Viet Cong [ sic ] could mount such a series of coordinated attacks against American bases and provincial capitals?” queried Senator Harry Byrd Jr. of Virginia. “Is it now not time,” he continued “for a reappraisal of our policies and procedures for obtaining our objectives?” 39Richard Russell, while publicly calling for increased attacks on the Vietcong and approval of additional bombing targets in North Vietnam, privately communicated to the administration his doubts on continuing the war. Hearing of Westmoreland’s pending request of up to 200,000 more troops, the Georgia senator advised the president that he should not grant the request “until there was a complete reappraisal of Vietnam, primarily on the will and desires of the people of South Viet Nam.” His comments centered mainly on his doubts of the will of the South Vietnamese to fight. “If they did not show more interest to defend [South Vietnam] we should consider getting out.” 40

Even southerners who had enthusiastically supported Johnson’s prosecution of the war harbored doubts after Tet. In a presidential briefing of some leaders of Congress on 6 February 1968, Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia charged that the administration had poor intelligence and was not prepared for the attacks. Furthermore, he felt the Americans both underestimated the “morale and vitality” of the Vietcong and “overestimated the support of the South Vietnamese government and its people.” When Johnson disagreed and insisted that the administration knew the Vietcong had been planning a general uprising, Byrd did not back down. “I have never caused you any trouble on this matter on the Hill,” he reminded the president. “But I do have serious concerns about Vietnam.” Johnson continued his denials, saying that he did not underestimate North Vietnamese and Vietcong strength. “Something is wrong over there,” Byrd accurately observed and pointed out that the Vietcong had achieved their objective. The Communists wanted “to show that they could attack all over the country and they did.” Johnson still dismissed Byrd’s criticism and said that he took more stock in the opinions of the military and diplomatic men than congressional carping. “Anybody can kick a barn down,” he said, quoting former Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn from Texas. “It takes a good carpenter to build one.” Byrd stood his ground. “I do not want to argue with the President,” he said. “But I am going to stick to my convictions.” 41

The Tet offensive marked the final straw for Stennis. Though, like Russell, he had publicly called for increased efforts to win the war, he had never attacked Johnson’s overall policy. In the aftermath of the Vietcong offensive, the Mississippi senator made a final break with the administration. Under Johnson’s policies, Stennis observed, the U.S. action was contained “by the boundaries of Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam.” At the same time, the enemy used the port of Haiphong and several other ports restricted from U.S. bombs to resupply and rearm its troops. Under those circumstances, Stennis reasoned, the United States could expect to wait a long time and lose more men in order to “force an honorable and effective solution” to the conflict. With the realization that after years of war Vietnam was no nearer to an acceptable settlement, Stennis posed a question: “Is it more men that we need for the present policy? Or is it more men that we need for a new policy?… In short, it is clear to me that we are now compelled to choose between a hard-hitting war or no war at all.” 42