Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

16. I. Aleksandrov, “Ataka protiv sotsialisticheskikh ustoev Chekhoslovakii,” Pravda (Moscow), 11 July 1968, p. 4.

17. See the retrospective comments of Jiří Hájek, who served as Czechoslovak foreign minister in 1968, in Dix ans après: Prague 1968–1978 (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1978), 110–15, 163–64, 172–79.

18. See Dubček’s comments on this matter in Hope Dies Last: The Autobiography of Alexander Dubček , trans. by Jiří Hochman (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 178–79.

19. Mark Kramer, “The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings,” Journal of Contemporary History 33, no. 2 (April 1998): 163–214.

20. See, for example, “Projev soudruha Alexandra Dubčeka,” Rudé právo (Prague), 25 April 1968, pp. 1–2.

21. “Dnevniki P. E. Shelesta,” in Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’noPoliticheskoi Istorii (RGASPI), F. 666, Tetrad’ (Te.) 6, L. 27.

22. See the interview with Josef Smrkovský in “Nedokončený rozhovor: Mluví Josef Smrkovský,” Listy: Časopis československé socialistické opozice (Rome) 4, no. 2 (March 1975): 17; and the interview with Oldřich Černík in “Bumerang ‘Prazhskoi vesnoi,’” Izvestiya (Moscow), 21 August 1990, p. 5. Both Smrkovský and Černík were members of the KSČ Presidium in 1968. Smrkovský was also president of the National Assembly and a leading architect of the Prague Spring; Černík was the Czechoslovak prime minister. Shelest describes an incident in his diary (“Dnevniki P. E. Shelesta,” in RGASPI, F. 666, Te. 4, L. 80) that suggests the overtures may have found a receptive audience in Smrkovský, but no further corroboration of this incident has emerged.

23. For a verbatim transcript of the meeting in Warsaw, see “Protokół ze spotkania przywódców partii i rządów krajów socjalistycznych—Bulgarii, NRD, Polski, Węgier i ZSRR—w Warszawie, 14–15 lipca 1968 r.,” Copy No. 5 (Top Secret), 14–15 July 1968, in AAN, Arch. KC PZPR, P. 193, T. 24, Dok. 4. See also the lengthy interview with the Hungarian leader János Kádár, who took part in these meetings, in “Yanosh Kádár o ‘prazhskoi vesne,’” Kommunist (Moscow), no. 7 (May 1990): 96–103.

24. “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 6 avgusta 1968 g.,” verbatim transcript (top secret), 6 August 1968, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 45, D. 99, L. 462.

25. A firsthand account of Brezhnev’s medical problems during the crisis can be found in the memoir by Brezhnev’s physician, Evgenii Chazov, Zdorov’e i vlast’: Vospominaniya “kremlevskogo vracha” (Moscow: Novosti, 1992), 74–76.

26. Quoted in an interview with Brezhnev’s closest aides in Leonid Shinkarev, “Avgustovskoe bezumie: K 25-letiyu vvoda voisk v Chekhoslovakiyu,” Izvestiya (Moscow), 21 August 1993, p. 10.

27. “Telefonický rozhovor L. Brežněva s A. Dubčekem, 9.8.1968,” verbatim transcript (top secret), 9 August 1968, in Ústav pro soudobé dějiny, Sbírka Komise vlády ČSFR pro analyzu udalostí let 1967–1970 (ÚSD-SK), Z/S 8.

28. “Rozgovor tovarishcha L. I. Brezhneva s tovarishchom A. S. Dubchekom,” verbatim transcript (top secret), 13 August 1968, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 91, D. 120, Ll. 1–18.

29. “Vypiska iz protokola No. 94 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 avgusta 1968 g.,” No. P94/101 (Top Secret), 13 August 1968, in APRF, Prot. No. 38.

30. Cited in Tibor Huszár, 1968: Prága, Budapest, Moszkva. Kádár János és a csehszlovákiai intervenció (Budapest: Szabad Tér, 1998), 180. For a translation into Czech, see “Vystoupení J. Kádára na zasedání ÚV MSDS a rady ministrů 23.8.1968 k mad’arsko-sovětskému jednání v Jaltě, 12.–15.8.1968,” in ÚSD-SK, Z/M 19.

31. Declassified documents reveal that Brezhnev met several times in the Crimea with Aleksei Kosygin, Nikolai Podgornyi, Petro Shelest, Mikhail Suslov, Aleksandr Shelepin, Arvı-ds Pel’she, Kirill Mazurov, Gennadii Voronov, Viktor Grishin, Dinmukhamed Kunaev, Pyotr Masherov, Sharaf Radishov, Vladimir Shcherbitskii, and Konstantin Katushev.

32. For a valuable, firsthand account, see “Dnevniki P. E. Shelesta,” in RGASPI, F. 666, Te. 6, Ll. 190–91, 193. Evidently, no full transcript of the ad-hoc sessions was compiled.

33. “K voprosu o polozhenii v Chekhoslovakii: Vypiska iz protokola No. 95 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK ot 17 avgusta 1968 g.,” Resolution No. P95/1 (top secret), 17 August 1968, in APRF, Prot. No. 38.

34. “Stenogramma Soveshchaniya predstavitelei kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii i pravitel’stv NRB, VNR, GDR, PNR i SSSR po voprosu o polozhenii v Chekhoslovakii,” verbatim transcript (top secret), 18 August 1968, in Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii (RGANI), F. 89, Op. 38, D. 57, Ll. 1–22.

35. “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 19 avgusta 1968 g.,” 19 August 1968 (top secret), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 45, D. 99, Ll. 474–82.

36. Comments recorded in “Dnevniki P. E. Shelesta,” in RGASPI, F. 666, Te., 7, L. 213.

37. Cited in “Dnevniki P. E. Shelesta,” Ll. 213–14. See also the interview with Shelest in Leonid Shinkarev, “Avgustovskoe bezumie: K 25-letiyu vvoda voisk v Chekhoslovakiyu,” Izvestiya (Moscow), 21 August 1993, p. 10, and the recollections of Pavlovskii, “Eto bylo v Prage,” 5.

38. “Obdobie od 21.srpna do konca roku 1968,” from a report by Czechoslovak national defense minister General Martin Dzúr, 9 June 1970, in Národní Archiv České Republiky (NAČR), Archiv Ústředního výboru Komunistické strany Československa (Arch. ÚV KSČ), 4. oddělení (Spr. G. Husák).

39. See the “extremely urgent” ( vne ocheredi ) cable from Chervonenko to the CPSU Politburo, 21 August 1968, in ÚSD-SK, Z/S-MID, Nos. 37 and 39.

40. “Prohlášení předsednictva ÚV KSČ z 21.8.1968,” Rudé právo (Prague), 21 August 1968 (2nd ed.), p. 1. For Pavlovskii’s statement, see “Obrashchenie Chekhoslovatskoi narodnoi armii,” in Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVPRF), F. 059, Op. 58, Papka (P.) 127, D. 586, Ll. 33–35.

41. For firsthand accounts, see “Nedokončený rozhovor,” 16–18; Zdeněk Mlynář, Nachtfrost: Erfahrungen auf dem Weg vom realen zum menschlichen Sozialismus (Köln: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1978), 181–87; František August and David Rees, Red Star over Prague (London: Sherwood, 1984), 134–42; Dubček, Hope Dies Last , 182–84; and Historický ústav ČSAV, Sedm pražských dnu˚, 21.–27. srpen 1968: Dokumentace (Prague: ČSAV, 1968), 53–58. On Černík’s arrest, see the firsthand account by Otomar Boček, chairman of the Supreme Court, delivered to the 14th Congress in Vysočaný, in Jiří Pelikán, ed., Tanky protí sjezdu: Protokol a dokumenty XIV. sjezdu KSČ (Vienna: Europa-Verlag, 1970), 66–68.

42. The military operation itself, it should be noted, was not wholly flawless. See Leo Heiman, “Soviet Invasion Weaknesses,” Military Review 49, no. 8 (August 1969): 38–45. However, the same is true of almost any large-scale use of military force against a foreign country. Unexpected glitches are bound to arise.

43. “Shifrtelegramma,” 21 August 1968 (top secret), in AVPRF, F. 059, Op. 58, P. 124, D. 574, Ll. 184–86. For Mazurov’s retrospective account of his role in the invasion, see Pavlovskii, “Eto bylo v Prage,” 5.

44. “Prohlášení předsednictva ÚV KSČ z 21.8.1968,” 1.

45. “Shifrtelegramma,” 21 August 1968 (top secret), in AVPRF, F. 059, Op. 58, P. 124, D. 574, Ll. 184–86.

46. “Shifrtelegramma,” 7 August 1968 (top secret), from S. V. Chervonenko, Soviet ambassador in Czechoslovakia, to the CPSU Politburo, in AVPRF, F. 059, Op. 58, P. 124, D. 573, Ll. 183–85. For further relevant citations from the ex-Soviet archives, see Kramer, “The Prague Spring and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia,” 6–8, 13, 54. See also Zdeněk Mlýnář, Československý pokus o reformu, 1968: Analyza jeho teorie a praxe (Köln: Index, 1975), 232–33.