Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

Shelest claimed that he was still hoping that “the healthy forces in the KSČ will be able to regain control of the situation and guide the country back onto the socialist path.” But he added that “in the event of danger,” the CPSU Politburo “will use all of our capabilities,” including military forces, “to thwart the intrigues of our enemies who want to rip fraternal Czechoslovakia out of the commonwealth of socialist countries.” 15

Shelest’s argument signaled a far-reaching change of policy that was later reflected in the Brezhnev Doctrine. The implication of his comments was that even if violence did not ever break out in Czechoslovakia, the peaceful “seizure of power” by “hostile forces” (supposedly “in collusion with Western imperialists”) could eventually pose the same sort of “mortal danger” that arose in Hungary in 1956, necessitating the same type of Soviet response. This line of reasoning was publicly codified in an article in the main CPSU newspaper, Pravda , in July 1968, a few days before Soviet leaders met in Warsaw with the leaders of East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary to decide what to do about Czechoslovakia. The article, titled “Attack against the Foundations of Socialism in Czechoslovakia,” asserted that “the tactics of those who would like to undermine the foundations of socialism in Czechoslovakia are even more cunning and insidious” than the “frenzied attacks launched by counterrevolutionary elements in Hungary in 1956.” 16Because the “champions of counterrevolution” in Czechoslovakia and their Western backers were aware that open revolt would provoke a Soviet military response, they were “carrying out a stealthy counterrevolution” that would peacefully “subvert the gains of socialism.”

The significance of this new Soviet rhetoric was not fully understood in Prague until it was too late. Although Dubček was well aware that internal reforms in Czechoslovakia had sparked consternation in Moscow, he assumed that he could offset this hostility by constantly reassuring Soviet leaders about the firmness of Czechoslovakia’s commitment to the Warsaw Pact and the “socialist commonwealth.” 17Looking back to the events of 1956 in Hungary, Dubček and other senior KSČ officials concluded that by upholding Czechoslovakia’s membership in the Warsaw Pact and maintaining broad control over the reform process, they could carry out sweeping domestic changes without provoking Soviet military intervention. 18This conclusion, as we now know, was erroneous even about the earlier case of Hungary. The CPSU Presidium’s decision at the end of October 1956 to quell the revolution in Hungary through a full-scale invasion predated Hungary’s announced intention to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. 19Whether valid or not, however, the “lesson” that Czechoslovak officials drew from the 1956 crisis—that internal reform would be tolerated so long as membership in the Warsaw Pact was not questioned—induced them to make frequent references to Czechoslovakia’s “unbreakable friendship and alliance” with the USSR. 20As domestic liberalization gathered pace, Dubček was particularly careful to issue repeated expressions of solidarity with Moscow and to pledge that Soviet interests would be safeguarded under all circumstances.

Although Dubček was undoubtedly sincere in his professions of loyalty to the Soviet Union, his statements failed to defuse the crisis. Not only did Soviet leaders worry that the Prague Spring would eventually undermine Czechoslovakia’s commitment to the Warsaw Pact, but they also believed that the internal changes in Czechoslovakia were themselves a threat to the “unity and cohesion of the Communist movement.” In the spring and summer of 1968, the Soviet Politburo consistently emphasized three main demands—that the KSČ reintroduce strict censorship over the Czechoslovak mass media; that Dubček remove the most outspoken officials, including Jiří Pelikán and General Václav Prchlík; and that the Czechoslovak authorities promptly disband and outlaw the unofficial political “clubs.” Soviet leaders brought up these points whenever they met or spoke by phone with their Czechoslovak counterparts, and they voiced similar demands in multilateral forums. Dubček could have been under no illusions about what the Soviet Union wanted, but he consistently tried to defer or avoid any concrete steps to fulfill the demands.

In the absence of a major turnaround in Czechoslovakia, analogies with the Hungarian Revolution, no matter how dubious, persisted in the Soviet Politburo’s deliberations. Even so, the lack of any violence in Czechoslovakia in 1968 meant that Brezhnev and his colleagues had more time to resolve the situation than was available to Soviet leaders in either 1953 (when an uprising broke out in East Germany) or 1956 (when violent protests erupted in Hungary). The violence that accompanied those earlier crises necessitated prompter action. In 1968, by contrast, the Soviet Politburo deliberated for several months before reaching a consensus about the best way to end the crisis. Shelest noted in his diary that as late as the summer of 1968, the differing approaches of Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgornyi, Suslov, and other senior officials “kept the Politburo from being firmly united about how to deal with the question of Czechoslovakia.” 21The declassified transcripts of the Soviet Politburo’s discussions and of other high-level meetings amply corroborate Shelest’s point. The transcripts show that some Politburo members, such as Andropov, Podgornyi, and Shelest, were consistent proponents of military intervention, whereas other members, particularly Suslov, were far more circumspect. The transcripts also indicate that several figures, including Kosygin, Aleksandr Shelepin, and Pyotr Demichev, fluctuated during the crisis, at times favoring “extreme measures” (that is, military action) and at other times leaning toward a political solution.

Nevertheless, even when the members of the Soviet Politburo disagreed with one another, their disagreements were mainly over tactics rather than strategic considerations or fundamental goals. All of the Politburo members agreed that the reform process in Czechoslovakia was endangering the “gains of socialism” and the “common interests of world socialism,” just as the Hungarian Revolution had in 1956. By the late spring of 1968, most of the Politburo members sensed that drastic Soviet action would be necessary to curtail the Prague Spring. Although some still hoped that Dubček himself would be willing to crack down, many had begun to suspect that it was no longer possible to count on a purely “internal” solution.

One of those who did still hold out at least some hope of achieving an internal solution was Brezhnev. In July and early August 1968, he and other Soviet officials repeatedly urged Dubček to clamp down on “antisocialist” groups, restore censorship of the mass media, and remove the KSČ officials who ardently supported “socialism with a human face.” The Soviet Union’s relentless pressure on the Czechoslovak authorities was reinforced by Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria, and antireformist members of the KSČ Presidium. Brezhnev used a variety of bilateral channels to exhort Czechoslovak officials to combat “antisocialist” and “counterrevolutionary” elements, and he even approached a few of Dubček’s reformist colleagues surreptitiously in the hope of finding a suitable replacement who would be willing to crack down. 22The Soviet government also convened multilateral Warsaw Pact conclaves to generate further pressure on Dubček. Highly publicized meetings in Warsaw in mid-July and in Bratislava at the beginning of August featured harsh criticism and threats of joint action to “defend the gains of socialism” in Czechoslovakia. 23