Oliver Stone - The Putin Interviews

VP:Not just the budget of Chechnya. This is a targeted approach the Russian government has taken. It’s aimed at redistributing our budget revenues with a view to leveling out the economic development all across Russia in all its constituent entities. We seek a situation in which all of the economies of all Russian regions are going to be self-sufficient, and in that case we will not have to grant them any support forever. Let me reiterate, this is not just about Chechnya. Out of 85 constituent entities across Russia, there are 10 who bring more money than they spend. But we use our federal budget to support many other entities—the Northern Caucasus, the Russian Far East, the Southern Federal District and some other regions. So the Chechen Republic is no exception.

OS:Did Chechnya have some troops or men inside Ukraine in this last conflict?

VP:They were volunteers. I know about that. That’s true.

OS:Let’s go—shifting subjects now. I mean you’ve talked about this in part, but I need to get it clear. Why did you, after 2001, acquiesce in the US military encroachment across Central Asia?

VP:We didn’t acquiesce. The US president asked me for support, and I also talked to some leaders of the Central Asian Republics and I asked them to respond positively to the request from the United States. [146] Background Information: After September 11, 2001, Putin offered the US support in terms of intelligence information as well coordinating with central Asian nations to allow US forces to use former Soviet Union military bases. See, “9/11 a ‘turning point’ for Putin,” Jill Dougherty CNN (September 10, 2002). Retrieved at: http://www.edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/09/10/ar911.russia.putin/index.html Partly to allow the United States to use their territory for stationing their troops and infrastructure and airports. I assumed that we had a common challenge before us—the threat of terrorism emanating from Afghanistan. And I thought that we had to work together to support the United States. Moreover, the US president told me that they’re not going to stay there forever. He didn’t say that they were going to stay for decades.

OS:He said that they weren’t going to stay forever?

VP:Yes, that’s exactly what he said. He said please help us—just for a few years. And we said all right we’re going to do that. We will support you. That’s what we said.

OS:So when was the wool pulled from your eyes? You know that expression? So, I mean, by 2006 right? 2007 in Munich you’re casting another eye on this relationship, correct? In 2008 you have the Georgian war? So what happens between 2002-3—there’s the Iraqi invasion, then you have the Ukrainian Orange Revolution in 2004. What did you think when the Ukrainian revolution went down?

VP:Nothing happened. Nothing changed and that’s what’s important. When I was speaking in Munich, I said that after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, when Russia turned full face to the United States to Europe, we were hoping for joint work, we were hoping that our interests would be taken into consideration so we could cooperate. But instead of that we saw the West expanding their political power and influence in those territories which we considered sensitive and important for us to ensure our global strategic security. [147] Claim: “ But instead of that we saw the West expanding their political power and influence in those territories which we considered sensitive and important for us to ensure our global strategic security.” After the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO began a progressively eastward expansion. the See, “Did the West Break Its Promise to Moscow?” Uwe Klussmann, Matthias Schepp, Klaus Wiegrefe, Der Spiegel (November 26, 2009). Retrieved at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nato-s-eastward-expansion-did-the-west-break-its-promise-to-moscow-a-663315.html

OS:Well, if the US was involved in Ukraine at all at that point, what were you thinking? That the US was provoking these independent movements?

VP:The answer is very simple. The philosophy of American foreign policy in this region consists of and I’m absolutely sure about that, the need to prevent, by all means necessary, Ukraine cooperating with Russia. Because this rapprochement is perceived as a threat. Some people think that would lead to an increase in Russia’s power and influence and they think they should use all means possible to prevent a rapprochement between Ukraine and Russia. I think it was based on this ideology and not about seeking freedom for the Ukrainian people. That was the basis for the actions of our partners in the United States and Europe. Supporting radical nationalist elements in Ukraine to create a split—a fissure—in relations between Russia and Ukraine. But if Russia starts responding to that, then it’s very easy to demonize Russia, to accuse it of all the deadly sins and to draw allies, because a visible adversary emerges. So in this sense those who were behind it have accomplished their goals and they did that impeccably. But we have a broader look at the picture. Not from the point of view of confrontation, of trying to draw satellites to your side on the basis of the external threat. If you look forward 25 years into the future, if you have a look at how the world situation is going to develop, then you need to change the philosophy, the approach you take with regard to international relations, including those with Russia.

OS:But then somewhere between 2004 and 2007 in Munich, the ball moves the other way. Iraq’s a disaster, Afghanistan’s a disaster. Somewhere in there you change your point of view.

VP:In Munich, I said how do we assess the situation? The Soviet Union collapsed. There is no longer a foe, an adversary to the United States and to the West as a whole. So what’s the point in expanding NATO? Against who? And after that there were two waves of NATO expansion following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, sort of this myth that every country can choose how they’re going to ensure their security. Well we’ve heard that on many occasions. But this myth is nonsense. In order to ensure the security of many countries, if they feel threatened, it’s not necessary to expand NATO. You can conclude bilateral agreements on mutual assistance and security. There is no need to create a false image of an adversary. There have been two expansion waves. But after that, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the ABM Treaty. That’s a very important issue. An essential one. And they are always saying to us that we are not concerned by that, this is not a threat to Russia. Allegedly they did that to counter the threat of Iran. But right now the Iranian issue has gone. A treaty has been signed. Iran has renounced any military nuclear programs. The United States has agreed to that. They have said they have signed the relevant document. But the ABM development program is still underway in Europe—some of its elements are to be stationed there. Against whom are they doing that? And this requires a response from Russia. There was a prominent world leader, Otto Von Bismarck, who said that in similar situations, conversations are not important—potentials are important. And a potential is being built up right next to our borders. What are we to do? But we have to give it some thought, but we can follow up on this conversation later.

OS:Yes, have a good night sir.

VP:Thank you. Did you like the game?

OS:Yes, it was fun, I enjoyed it. You must be tired in the muscles.

VP:No, it’s all right—I’ll try to catch up with my sleep.