Edward Lucas - Deception

Given that Russia emerged from communist dictatorship only twenty-one years ago, the right response, its advocates argue, is to be impressed that the country is so normal, rather than depressed that it is not better. Such special pleading makes it easy for foreigners to conclude that Russia, once you get used to it, is just another roughly hewn emerging market, more a source of opportunity than danger. In any case, Russia does not take much notice of outside strictures, so the best thing is to shut up. Critics of Russia’s domestic and foreign policy certainly need to be careful not to exaggerate their case. Some aspects of politics may be reminiscent of fascism, such as the personality cult of Mr Putin, the overlap between business and politics, and thuggish youth movements (as I note later, one of these now boasts Ms Chapman as a senior figure). But Russia is not a totalitarian country, or even a fully autocratic one. Vladislav Inozemtsev, an economics professor highly critical of the regime, concedes:

Contemporary Russia is not a candidate to become a Soviet Union 2.0. It is a country in which citizens have unrestricted access to information, own property, leave and return to the country freely, and develop private businesses of all kinds. 6

After an era where Russia resembled Weimar Germany in some respects, nothing like the Nazi Party or Hitlerian ideology is in sight.

The temptation among many Westerners, therefore, is to accept the superficial image of normality and cooperation, without digging too deeply into the violent, thieving and distorted mind-set and personalities behind it, or their pervasive incompetence and penchant for risky short cuts. A glimpse behind this veil of official timidity and self-interest came with the WikiLeaks revelations that started in November 2010. They exposed the almost panicky concern of American diplomats about the level of corruption in Russia, about the fusion between crime, business and government, and about its spillover into the West. America’s then Secretary of Defence Robert Gates observed in a secret cable that Russia was ‘an oligarchy run by the security services’. 7Britain’s Michael Davenport, a seasoned Russia-watcher in the Foreign Office, termed it a ‘corrupt autocracy’ when talking to his American colleagues. 8But that was mild by the standards of a more extensive analysis compiled in mid November 2009 by the American embassy in Moscow. Classified ‘secret’ (but now available at the click of a mouse on the WikiLeaks website), it was to prepare the director of the FBI, Robert Mueller, for a two-day visit to Moscow. It highlighted the real nature of his Siloviki interlocutors, the FSB director Aleksandr Bortnikov, the SVR director Mikhail Fradkov, and the Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev. It described them as:

Putin protégés who believe a strong state exercising effective political and economic control is the answer to most problems. They advocate tightening the screws against domestic opposition and their alleged external supporters – principally the US and its Western allies. 9

The diplomats went on to note that although the FSB and MVD [18] r Ministerstvo Vnutrennykh Del (Ministry of Internal Affairs). (as the Interior Ministry is known) nominally share the FBI’s responsibilities – criminal prosecution, organised crime, and counter-terrorism – they are also fully immersed in Russia’s political battles:

Russian security service leaders play a far more open political role than their counterparts in the West. Your three interlocutors accrue political power in the Russian system by using the legal system against political enemies – turning the courts into weapons of political warfare rather than independent arbiters. They control large numbers of men and resources – the MVD alone has more than 190,000 soldiers in its internal security divisions. Despite their similar outlook and background, they are often competitors for influence against each other – with shadowy conflicts occasionally bubbling to the surface.

It also revealed the security services’ role in pushing back against perceived outside interference:

After the ‘colour’ revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, Russian security services stepped up their efforts against the US and other Western powers, which they blame for inciting the protests and overthrowing the governments in Tbilisi and Kyiv [Kiev]. Their officers maintain constant vigilance against the US government representatives through active surveillance and they have sought to stifle US humanitarian programs in the North Caucasus. MVD forces harass and intimidate political opposition protests while ‘investigations’ against Western-supported NGOs [on] trumped up charges (like using pirated software) have hindered the work that those organisations seek to accomplish.

Concern about potential social unrest associated with the recent economic crisis provided justification for the security services’ push earlier this year to eliminate jury trials and to broaden the definition of ‘treason’ to include the organisation of protests against the government.

After linking Russian law-enforcement to organised crime, the cable concluded with a sharp indictment of the role played by the FSB in demoralising and persecuting American government employees in Russia:

While portions of the FSB are working cooperatively with US law enforcement, some sections, particularly those dealing with counter-intelligence, are not. Harassing activity against all embassy personnel has spiked in the past several months to a level not seen in many years. Embassy personnel have suffered personally slanderous and falsely prurient attacks in the media. Family members have been the victims of psychologically terrifying assertions that their USG [United States Government] employee spouses had met accidental deaths. Home intrusions have become far more commonplace and bold, and activity against our locally engaged Russian staff continues at a record pace. We have no doubt that this activity originates in the FSB.

This in itself is a kind of deception. American taxpayers foot the bill for these diplomats and analysts, for their allowances, salaries and expense accounts. But they do not get the truth. At the time that these telegrams were drafted, American officials were playing down the problems in relations with Russia, and trying to make a success of the so-called ‘reset’ in relations. Yet privately – as we can now read – they took a far more pessimistic (and realistic) view. Another leaked telegram painted a hair-raising picture of the corruption inside the Moscow city administration: it spoke of a ‘three-tiered structure in Moscow’s criminal world’ headed by Yuri Luzhkov (the then mayor, who denies any wrongdoing). ‘The FSB, MVD, and militia are at the second level. Finally, ordinary criminals and corrupt inspectors are at the lowest level,’ it claimed. 10The tone of such telegrams is far closer to the writings of outsiders such as Amy Knight, a top American analyst of the KGB’s lasting influence in modern Russia. She pointed out in 2011 that the FSB is not only an instrument of power; it determines who holds it. 11

Another deception was the earlier attempt to portray Russia in the 1990s as a democratic country, even though it was in that era that the current authoritarian system has its roots. As Mr Inozemtsev points out:

The quasi-authoritarian ‘superpresidential’ Russian political style arose in the ‘democratic’ period of the mid-1990s, when then-President Boris Yeltsin forcibly dissolved the legitimate Parliament and pushed through a new constitution under which the powers of the President were not balanced by any restraints. Indeed, his status resembled that of the Führer of the German nation, as… determined by the Ermächtigungsgesetz (Enabling Act) of 23 March 1933. Later, Yeltsin’s inner circle orchestrated his victory in the 1996 presidential elections. This derailed the country from the natural path of alternating power between liberal and socialist politicians that, however improbably, led Eastern Europe to its often anxious but successful development in the 1990s and 2000s. From that time on, the idea that ‘there is no alternative’ to the current leader or to his chosen successor has become a vital part of Russian politics.