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Ian Kershaw - The End

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Название:
The End
Автор:
Ian Kershaw
Издательство:
Penguin Press
Жанр:
nonf_military / История / на английском языке
Год:
2011
Город:
New York
ISBN:
978-1-59420-314-5
Рейтинг книги:
3 / 5. Голосов: 1
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The End: краткое содержание, описание и аннотация

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From the preeminent Hitler biographer, a fascinating and original exploration of how the Third Reich was willing and able to fight to the bitter end of World War II. Countless books have been written about why Nazi Germany lost World War II, yet remarkably little attention has been paid to the equally vital question of how and why it was able to hold out as long as it did. The Third Reich did not surrender until Germany had been left in ruins and almost completely occupied. Even in the near-apocalyptic final months, when the war was plainly lost, the Nazis refused to sue for peace. Historically, this is extremely rare.
Drawing on original testimony from ordinary Germans and arch-Nazis alike, award-winning historian Ian Kershaw explores this fascinating question in a gripping and focused narrative that begins with the failed bomb plot in July 1944 and ends with the German capitulation in May 1945. Hitler, desperate to avoid a repeat of the “disgraceful” German surrender in 1918, was of course critical to the Third Reich’s fanatical determination, but his power was sustained only because those below him were unable, or unwilling, to challenge it. Even as the military situation grew increasingly hopeless, Wehrmacht generals fought on, their orders largely obeyed, and the regime continued its ruthless persecution of Jews, prisoners, and foreign workers. Beneath the hail of allied bombing, German society maintained some semblance of normalcy in the very last months of the war. The Berlin Philharmonic even performed on April 12, 1945, less than three weeks before Hitler’s suicide.
As Kershaw shows, the structure of Hitler’s “charismatic rule” created a powerful negative bond between him and the Nazi leadership- they had no future without him, and so their fates were inextricably tied. Terror also helped the Third Reich maintain its grip on power as the regime began to wage war not only on its ideologically defined enemies but also on the German people themselves. Yet even as each month brought fresh horrors for civilians, popular support for the regime remained linked to a patriotic support of Germany and a terrible fear of the enemy closing in.
Based on prodigious new research, Kershaw’s
is a harrowing yet enthralling portrait of the Third Reich in its last desperate gasps.

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115. IfZ, ZS 1810, Bd. II, fo. 54, Dönitz interview with Barry Pree, 18.11.74.

116. Quoted Schwendemann, ‘Endkampf’, p. 20; also Schwendemann, ‘Tod zwischen den Fronten’, p. 45.

117. Goebbels thought Göring, when he spoke with him on 27 January, ‘almost defeatist’ and depressed, hoping even now that Hitler would try to find a political solution.— TBJG , 15/II, p. 250 (28.1.45)

118. DZW , 6, p. 572.

119. DRZW , 9/1 (Heinemann), p. 884.

120. DRZW , 9/1 (Heinemann), p. 882.

121. DRZW , 10/1 (Lakowski), p. 559.

122. DZW , 6, pp. 575, 591.

123. David K. Yelton, Hitler’s Volkssturm: The Nazi Militia and the Fall of Germany, 1944–1945 , Lawrence, Kan., 2002, p. 131.

124. Quoted DZW , 6, p. 513.

125. DZW , 6, pp. 513–14.

CHAPTER 6. TERROR COMES HOME

1. See in general, for a similar interpretation, Robert Gellately, Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany , Oxford, 2001.

2. For the malevolent depiction of Jews, which showed no diminution as Jews were deported from Germany, see Jeffrey Herf, The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during World War II and the Holocaust , Cambridge, Mass., 2006, and Herf’s contribution, ‘ “Der Krieg und die Juden”: Nationalsozialistische Propaganda im Zweiten Weltkrieg’, in DRZW , 9/2, pp. 159ff.

3. BAB, NS19/2454, fos. 1–3 v: SS-Kriegsberichter-Abteilung, SS-Standarte ‘Kurt Eggers’, 26–30.1.45.

4. 1945: Das Jahr der endgültigen Niederlage der faschistischen Wehrmacht. Dokumente , ed. Gerhard Förster and Richard Lakowski, Berlin, 1975, p. 144 (5.2.45).

5. NAL, WO219/4713, SHAEF reports, 15.2.45, 20.2.45. The threat of ‘family liability’ ( Sippenhaft ) against soldiers judged to be failing in their duty had been issued on numerous occasions by Wehrmacht commanders as a deterrent. It was indeed carried out in some cases, though these were exceptions rather than the rule. See Robert Loeffel, ‘Soldiers and Terror: Re-evaluating the Complicity of the Wehrmacht in Nazi Germany’, German History , 27 (2009), pp. 514–30.

6. Account (in English) of a prisoner of war, captured in the west, who had returned from the eastern front: LHC, Dempsey Papers, no. 273, pt. II, p. 7 (3.3.45).

7. BAB, NS6/135, fos. 44, 118–21, Gauleitung Mageburg-Anhalt, report of 16.2.45; report of Landratsamt in Mähr.-Schönberg, 17.2.45.

8. BAB, NS6/135, fo. 11, Auszug aus einem Bericht des Pg. Waldmann, Inspektion-Mitte, 7.3.45 (referring to impressions gathered in early February).

9. BAB, NS19/3705, fos. 6–13, ‘Beobachtungen im Heimatkriegsgebiet’, 22.2.45 and covering letter of Bormann to Himmler, 1.3.45.

10. BAB, NS19/2068, fos. 6–6 v, 20–20 v, ‘Meldungen aus dem Ostraum’, Müllrose, 16.2.45, Mark Brandenburg, 21.2.45. Reports of widespread looting in the Oder area as an indication of demoralization also in DZW , 6, p. 514. According to Goebbels’ aide, Wilfred von Oven, writing in mid-February, ‘the morale of the German soldiers on the eastern front is becoming worse by the day’.—Wilfred von Oven, Finale Furioso: Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende , Tübingen, 1974, p. 578 (11.2.45).

11. BAB, R55/601, fo. 284, Tätigkeitsbericht der RPÄ, 21.2.45.

12. Das letzte halbe Jahr: Stimmungsberichte der Wehrmachtpropaganda 1944/45 , ed. Wolfram Wette, Ricarda Bremer and Detlef Vogel, Essen, 2001, pp. 236–7 (7.2.45).

13. Das letzte halbe Jahr , p. 251 (23.2.45).

14. BHStA, MA 106695, report of RPvOB, 9.2.45. And see further examples in Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands , Munich, 1995, pp. 819–20, and Marlis Steinert, Hitlers Krieg und die Deutschen , Düsseldorf and Vienna, 1970, pp. 546ff.

15. BAB, R55/620, fos. 129–131 v, SD report to State Secretary Dr Naumann, Propaganda Ministry, ‘Situation in Wien’, 1.3.45. The popular mood in Vienna had been especially poor, according to a report the previous September, when it was claimed that there was widespread defeatism, making the population open to Communist agitation.—BAB, NS6/166, fos. 23–7, Kaltenbrunner to Bormann, 14.9.44. And see Ludwig Jedlicka, ‘Ein unbekannter Bericht Kaltenbrunners über die Lage in Österreich im September 1944’, in Ludwig Jedlicka, Der 20. Juli 1944 , Vienna, 1985, pp. 82–6; and Timothy Kirk, Nazism and the Working Class in Austria , Cambridge, 1996, pp. 130–32.

16. StAM, LRA 29656, fo. 573, SD-Außenstelle Berchtesgaden, 7.3.45.

17. NAL, WO219/1587, SHAEF summary of intelligence reports from informants, 20–25.2.45.

18. Goebbels noted that ‘the fiasco of the East Prussian treks is mainly put down to the Party, and the Party leadership in East Prussia is thoroughly lambasted’.— TBJG , II/15, p. 374 (13.2.45).

19. BAB, NS19/3833, fo. 1, Gottlob Berger to SS-Standartenführer Rudolf Brandt, 18.2.45.

20. BAB, NS6/135, fo. 44, report from Gauleitung Magdeburg-Anhalt, 16.2.45.

21. StAM, NSDAP 35, unfoliated, Gauorganisationsleiter München-Oberbayern to Kreisleiter, etc., 21.2.45. At the beginning of January, the Gauleiter had sharply criticized the wearing of ‘fantasy uniforms’ and ‘costuming’ as Party officials created their own colour or cut of uniform.—StAM, NSDAP 52, unfoliated, Gauorganisationsleiter München-Oberbayern to Gauamtsleiter and Kreisleiter, 3.1.45.

22. See Henke, p. 829.

23. Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe , London, 2008, pp. 528–9. Frank was eventually arrested by American troops on 4 May, tried at Nuremberg, and hanged for his part in war crimes and crimes against humanity.

24. IfZ, NO-3501, report of SS-Staf. Hübner, 16.3.45; National Archives, Washington, NND 871063, arrest and interrogation reports on Greiser, 17.5.45, 1.6.45; Jürgen Thorwald, Es begann an der Weichsel: Flucht und Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten , pb. edn., Munich, 1995 (1st edn., 1949), pp. 69–79; Catherine Epstein, Model Nazi: Arthur Greiser and the Occupation of Western Poland , Oxford, 2010, pp. 298–304.

25. TBJG , II/15, pp. 223 (25.1.45), 231–2 (26.1.45), 357 (11.2.45); von Oven, Finale Furioso , p. 551 (23.1.45)

26. BAB, R55/622, fos. 181–2, survey of letters sent to the RPÄ. And see BAB, NS6/135, fos. 30–32, report of 20.2.45 from Lieutenant Klein, NS-Führungsstab OKH Potsdam, on negative impressions of Party members, notably an SS-Obersturmführer, during treks from the Wartheland between 19 and 25 January. Remarkably, as late as 20 February, a month after he had fled, Greiser submitted a final report, from the security of Karlsbad, to Himmler and Bormann on the setting up and deployment of the Volkssturm in the Warthegau.—BAB, R43II/692b, fos. 109–24 (20–21.2.45).

27. BAB, NS6/353, fo. 30–30 v, PK Rundschreiben 65/45, 12.2.45. Only a few days later the Party Chancellery received another dismal report of the failings of the authorities in the Warthegau in January.—BAB, NS6/135, fos. 30–32, report by Lieutenant Horst Klein, NS-Führungsstab OKH Potsdam, with an attached recommendation for Pg. Willi Ruder for the Party, in order to restore confidence in it, to take drastic action against all leading Party members seen to have failed in their duties.

28. Von Oven, Finale Furioso , p. 572 (7.2.45).

29. IfZ, Fa 91/4, fos. 1075–8, GBV an die Obersten Reichsbehörden, 1.2.45; 1945: Das Jahr der endgültigen Niederlage der faschistischen Wehrmacht , p. 152.

30. 1945: Das Jahr der endgültigen Niederlage der faschistischen Wehrmacht , pp. 152–4.