Robert Forczyk - Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942 - Schwerpunkt

The man standing in the cupola of the tank turret is usually divided into one of two types: a tank commander or a tank rider. The Wehrmacht was particularly adept in 1941–43 at putting the right officer or NCO in the cupola, a man with the training and proven leadership ability to aggressively lead his tank section, platoon or company into combat. A tank commander is bold and is trained to use the shock effect, firepower and mobility of armour to accomplish his mission. In contrast, the Red Army was very weak in junior officer and NCO training at the start of the war and few tank commanders displayed bold aggressiveness. A tank rider is a passive fellow, a follower, one who obeys orders but shows little initiative. Unfortunately, Stalin’s purges had stifled initiative at lower levels and encouraged a great deal of passivity in the ranks, which greatly undermined the combat value of Red Army tank units in the first year of the war. A common mishap – other than sudden death – for tank riders was to allow their tank to ram its gun tube either into the ground, or trees or buildings while moving, damaging the weapon. Eventually, by 1943–44, the Red Army began to gain experienced, aggressive junior leaders who could excel at small unit leadership in combat, while the quality of German junior tank leaders declined steadily after 1942.

In combat, the crew became a closed-off entity, with only fleeting awareness of friendly tanks and infantry around them. German tank commanders were trained to move and fight ‘unbuttoned’ (i.e. cupola hatch open and head out), which gave them better situational awareness in battle, but exposed them to the risk of injury from artillery, snipers or machine-gun fire. [11]Soviet tank commanders were taught to fight ‘buttoned-up’ and to rely upon their vision blocks, which proved totally inadequate. For a system that placed so little value on the lives of its soldiers, it is odd that the Red Army enforced ‘buttoned-up’ tank operations, since this sacrificed situational awareness and often enabled small numbers of German tanks to outfight superior numbers of Soviet tanks. Many of the accounts that extol the lethality of German tank gunnery fail to note the contribution of ‘buttoned-up’ tactics to these kill tallies; better situational awareness allowed the Germans to shoot first and inflict massive damage before the surviving Soviet tanks could even detect them. Inside the tank turret, experiencing the main gun firing is akin to a small explosion inside a building, and the turret quickly fills with choking ammonia fumes. A good crew turns on the turret blower before firing, which reduces the noxious gases, but it was not unusual for novice Soviet crews to be vomiting inside their turrets after half a dozen rounds were fired. German tanks normally did not fire their main guns while on the move as it was too inaccurate; they preferred to seek out good defilade positions, where terrain obscured the hull but allowed the turret to fire at approaching enemies. In contrast, the Red Army had attempted to develop gun stabilization systems before the war and often encouraged crews to fire on the move. Very little tank fighting occurred at night, since tanks could not effectively engage targets at ranges much beyond 100 meters unless flares were fired, but this tended to aid the defender more than the attacker.

Aside from maintenance and combat, the rest of a tank crew’s life was focused on getting adequate food and sleep. Compared to infantrymen, tankers are very comfort-oriented and this often led them to commit tactically imprudent actions. When panzers from Kampfgruppe Eberbach stormed into Orel in October 1941, one platoon from 6./Pz.Regt 35 left their vehicles unguarded so that they could go sleep in nearby buildings – and were then surprised when Soviet tanks counterattacked into the city during the night. [12]Semen L. Aria, a Soviet tanker, recalled that on a freezing night in the winter of 1942–43, his crew decided to sleep in a peasant hut without posting a guard over their T-34. In the morning, the tank had been stolen by another unit; Aria was sent to a penal unit. [13]During a big push, tank crews were usually given several days’ rations, but these were soon consumed and it could take days or even weeks for normal supply services to catch up. Both German and Soviet tankers often had to rely upon appropriating food from local civilians during mobile operations. Soviet tankers called this ‘Grandmother’s rations’. German tankers called it looting. Tanks were often required to move at night to avoid enemy aerial observation and sleep-deprived crews were more prone to road accidents. In moving through wooded areas at night, it was not unusual for tank commanders standing in a cupola to be abruptly woken up by tree branches across the face. Commanders had to constantly talk to their drivers over the intercom during night road marches, lest they nod off.

In combat, only about one-quarter of tanks hit by enemy action actually caught fire and burned out. Both sides tended to claim every enemy tank hit as a ‘kill’, but a good percentage of hits either bounced off the armour or failed to penetrate. Based upon post-battle analysis of both sides’ records, the Germans appear to have often exaggerated their tank ‘kills’ by up to 200 per cent and the Soviets by 500 per cent. Even those tanks that were considered ‘knocked out’ could often be repaired, since the damage inflicted by armour-piercing ammunition was usually not catastrophic. Crew casualties were usually limited to 0–2 fatalities per tank knocked out, with the rest of the crew wounded, so it was not unusual for a given crew to have been knocked out several times during the course of the war. In the early years of the war, Soviet tankers often abandoned their tanks if hit, and simply walked back to their own lines. The Red Army eventually issued a directive that tank crews that returned to their lines without their tanks would be sent to penal units, which forced Soviet tankers to stick with their damaged vehicles.

The Wehrmacht initially deployed seventeen panzer divisions against the Soviet Union, organized into four Panzergruppen. [1]Nine of the panzer divisions were less than a year old, having been formed from other existing infantry units between August and November 1940, when Hitler decided to double the number of panzer divisions. In practical terms, this meant that nearly half the panzer divisions involved in Barbarossa had no previous campaign experience in their current role. Nor was the internal structure of the panzer divisions uniform: eight were organized with two panzer battalions and nine divisions had three panzer battalions. The Panzergruppen were further divided into ten Armeekorps (mot.), later redesignated in early 1942 as Panzerkorps, with each controlling up to two panzer divisions and up to two motorized infantry units. The Panzergruppe (or Panzerarmee after October 1941) would be the primary German operational-level armoured formation of 1941–42, while the Panzerkorps would be the primary tactical-level formation. [2]Previous campaigns had taught the Wehrmacht the value of concentrating armour, so it was rare for individual panzer divisions, brigades or regiments to operate independently in the first year of the war in the East.

The bulk of the Panzerwaffe was massed with Heeresgruppe Mitte in the center, with Generaloberst Heinz Guderian’s Panzergruppe 2 and Generaloberst Hermann Hoth’s Panzergruppe 3. These two Panzergruppen had nine panzer divisions with a total of 1,786 tanks, or 57 per cent of the total available for Barbarossa. Guderian, who had fought so hard to promote the concept of an independent panzer branch before the war, now used the credibility that he gained as a corps commander in Poland and France to ensure that he was given the strongest panzer divisions for Operation Barbarossa. Panzergruppe Guderian would start the campaign with nearly 1,000 tanks in thirteen panzer battalions and all five of his divisions were fully equipped with Pz.III medium tanks. In contrast, Hoth’s Panzergruppe 3 had a total of twelve panzer battalions in four panzer divisions, none of which were equipped with Pz.III medium tanks. Instead, Hoth was provided with 507 Czech-made Pz.38(t) light tanks, equipped with the 3.7cm Skoda A7 cannon. The Pz.38(t) tanks were still in production by BMM in Prague and had better mobility than the Pz.III Aus F/G models, but significantly less armour and firepower. Indeed, Hoth’s Panzergruppe was primarily configured as a pursuit force and had negligible anti-armour capability.