Haggai Harmon - The Chameleon Conspiracy

“I know the routine,” I said patiently. “While outside Iran, some of their agents operate out of the Iranian embassies to enjoy diplomatic immunity.” I remembered a case I’d been involved in earlier where Iranian agents in Europe had tried to shield themselves from arrest by using their diplomatic immunity. But they’d made one mistake: they’d worked at the embassy in Rome and operated in Munich. That transborder mistake had rendered their immunity worthless.

“Correct. They also started the ‘Foundation of the Oppressed and Dispossessed,’ or Bonyade-e-Mostafazan, used for infiltration into and then subsequent control of Islamic charities in many countries. Another clandestine unit of the Guards is the Qods-Jerusalem-Force. Our sources estimate that their size exceeds ten thousand men. They’re assigned to foreign activities, which include terror. The Qods Force maintains training facilities in Iran and in Sudan for the terrorists of the next generation. In addition to training, they also gather intelligence on potential targets for terror attacks and monitor dissidents of the Iranian regime.”

“Some of them sometimes mysteriously disappear,” I added cynically.

John smiled. “And some not so mysteriously. Tehran continues to provide logistic support and training to Lebanese Hezbollah and a variety of Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. What we need to discuss is the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, or MOIS, also known as Vezarat-e Ettela’at va Amniat-e Keshvar, or VEVAK. It’s the successor to SAVAK, the Shah’s notorious internal-security agency. Religious leaders had recruited former SAVAK agents to help the regime eliminate domestic opposition. Consequently, some intelligence officers and low-ranking SAVAK and army-intelligence officials were asked to return to government service because of their specialized knowledge of the Iranian left, which emerged as the only opposition. VEVAK extends its hold outside Iran as well. Its agents are disguised as diplomats in Iranian embassies and consular offices, or as employees of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance representatives. Light covers include employees of Iran Air, students, or businessmen. We even saw Iranian agents holding themselves out as members of the opposition groups.”

I could only imagine what happened to the poor souls who believed them and talked against Iran or participated in any anti-Iranian activities.

John continued with a thorough lecture on the other military and security organizations for three more hours. He poured coffee from a large thermos into a white mug and waited for my reaction. I was tired and becoming restless, and John could tell.

“OK. You’ll be picked up tomorrow morning for more Mossad briefing. At a later time I’ll give you reading material.”

I knew a fair amount of what they were telling me. But then again, knowledge was power, especially on these kinds of missions. It would up my odds of returning home alive.

In the morning I returned to the safe apartment for an additional session with Reuven. The street next to the safe apartment was congested; a car with its hood open was idled in the middle of the road. That backed up traffic for the entire street. I entered the apartment. Reuven was wearing the same clothes as yesterday, and smelled of a good aftershave lotion.

“Let’s begin,” I said. I was alert and eager.

Reuven started. “The leaders of the Iranian Islamic Revolution set the agenda for state-sponsored terrorism, making Iran the world’s most active sponsor of terrorism. Their strategy is first, to hit their political opponents-there were at least eighty assassinations of Iranian dissidents who fled Iran, mostly to Europe. Next, to expand their influence throughout the Gulf region and the Islamic world.”

“And then?”

“The world. We have already heard the Iranian president saying that. The regime has planned or encouraged suicide bombings of American military targets. But recently they have changed course. Sensing the world’s growing disgust with state-sponsored terrorism and an increased political pressure by foreign countries, Tehran’s official new line is that they provide only humanitarian and cultural assistance to radical movements such as Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, and Hamas.”

“Do you believe them? I don’t,” I said.

“Of course not,” said Reuven. “These are empty statements. In fact nothing has changed. Nonetheless, they vehemently deny any military or financial assistance to these organizations. They apply Taqiyya and kitman.”

“You mean religious and historical concepts?” I asked, remembering learning about it at the Mossad Academy. Taqiyya is a precautionary dissimulation or deception and keeping one’s beliefs secret, and kitman means more mental reservation and disguising malicious intentions. Taqiyya and kitman, or “holy hypocrisy,” were used by Shiite Muslims centuries ago in their conflict with Sunni Muslims. Hundreds of years ago Taqiyya had been used by Persian warriors to confuse the enemy. One tactic was “deceptive triangulation”: to make your enemies believe that jihad wasn’t aimed at them, but at another enemy.

“Yes,” he said. “The Iranian government has turned them into political tools. By applying it to their plan of plausible denial, present-day clerics resurrected a theological doctrine to make it a tactical political tool. We’ve found Al-Qaeda training manuals with instructions on the use of deception to achieve terrorist goals.”

“I read in a brief I received last week that Iranian government spokesmen commonly use Taqiyya as a form of ‘outwitting,’ ” I said. “The rule is, if you’re faced with an unpleasant situation or with damaging facts, avoid the debate. You should ‘outwit’ your opponent through the use of Taqiyya, diverting your opponent and obfuscating the issue being discussed. Another form of distraction and ‘outsmarting’ is claiming to be the ‘victim’ of religious discrimination and intolerance during debate or discussion.”

“Right,” said Reuven. “You will see it in practice everywhere you go in Iran, in the bazaar or in daily conversations, and of course by government officials.”

“I already have,” I said. “In previous cases when I had contacts with Iranian officials, it was abundantly clear that they were employing manipulative ambiguity tactics. Rather than admit that some of the things you say can be true, they adamantly denied it. They used double-talk that left me with no answer, even to the simplest of my questions,” I concluded, remembering how frustrated I’d become.

We continued talking for two more hours. During lunch break I decided to walk to my hotel. The stranded car was gone, and traffic was flowing. I suddenly sensed that a late-model Japanese-made car was slowly following me. At the next street corner I “dry-cleaned” it, intel lingo for maneuvering tactically to shake off a follower, by entering a one-way street, and the car disappeared. To be on the safe side I changed my plans. Instead of returning directly to my hotel, I entered a cafe, ordered hot chocolate, left a a5 bill on the table, and went to the men’s room before my order came in. I used the service entrance and went out to the street. When I arrived at my hotel, I entered through the service entrance at the back.

In the late afternoon I used the service entrance again and took a cab, telling the cabby to take me for an hour tour of Vienna, and when I was sure we weren’t followed, I told him to take me to a street adjacent to the safe apartment. I walked a block and entered the building. I rang the doorbell, but nobody answered. I took out my mobile phone to call. The display showed that I had two missed calls. I dialed the most-recent number. It was John. “Ian, I’m glad you called back. Don’t go to the safe apartment.”