Charles McCarry - The Miernik Dossier

1. In accordance with Headquarters’ instructions, we have briefed Chief Inspector Aly Qasim of the Sudanese Special Branch with regard to “Golgotha” and the broader question of the sponsorship, membership, and objectives of the Anointed Liberation Front. As we expected, Qasim already had in his possession a good deal of information, but he expressed appreciation for the facts this station made available to him.

2. The Sudanese security authorities are anxious to move against the ALF in a shorter time frame than the one we had envisaged. Qasim is under orders from his superiors to prevent any additional kidnappings, executions, and/or public crucifixions of government officials. He is determined to carry out this order, and he made it obvious that the value of any future relationship between Special Branch and this station will depend on how effectively the two are able to cooperate during the next few days.

3. Qasim considers that the only feasible way to prevent the success of “Golgotha” and other terrorist activities on the part of the ALF is to destroy the leadership of that organization, together with as much of the membership as possible. We pressed the view that the capture of leading ALF figures, and their subsequent trial, would be of great value in terms of the political education of the citizenry, but Qasim was only marginally interested in this point. “I am not a lawyer or a propagandist,” Qasim stated. “I am a policeman, and it is my duty to kill this ALF as I would kill a poisonous snake in my garden.”

4. Qasim, who is a fervent Muslim and a loyal servant of the Prime Minister, is particularly incensed that the ALF should style itself as a Mahdist movement. He regards this manipulation of the religious faith of the country by the Soviets as particularly reprehensible. “We will show them what a real holy war is,” Qasim stated. He is particularly anxious to lay hands on Miernik, after the latter has made contact with the leadership of the ALF and is proved to be a Soviet agent. We expressed an interest in having access to Miernik for debriefing purposes following his arrest, and Qasim assured us that this would be possible.

5. Qasim suggested the use of Prince Kalash el Khatar as an agent provocateur before we could lay this possibility on the table. He flew to El Fasher immediately and obtained the permission of the Amir of Khatar to employ Prince Kalash in this capacity. Qasim shares Headquarters’ reluctance to expose the prince to personal danger, and we are confident that he will find a formula that will produce the desired operational results with a minimum of risk to young Khatar. (Qasim, incidentally, is a nephew of the Amir, so he has family as well as professional reasons for caution and concern.)

6. Qasim is hopeful that Prince Kalash will be able to learn the identity of the next set of victims before the date of their murder. Once in possession of this knowledge, he believes that he can protect the lives of the government officials involved, and either capture or kill their would-be assassins. We are putting pressure on Firecracker to report the names of the next group of victims, but he has not as yet succeeded. “Ahmed,” the ALF leader in charge of the terror campaign, refuses to divulge details on security grounds. We are hopeful that Firecracker will be able to break down Ahmed’s reluctance. If in fact he does so, we will hand over the information to Qasim without delay.

1. Christopher reported to me at 0300, 6 July, in my room at the Grand Hotel. He arrived in Khartoum at approximately midnight-July. Christopher’s condition and morale are excellent.

2. Christopher was fully briefed in accordance with Headquarters’ instructions. The information imparted to him seemed to stimulate his competitive instincts, and I was left in no doubt that he will carry out his assignment with efficiency and enthusiasm.

3. Christopher has come around to the view that Miernik is an opposition agent. Lacking Headquarters’ distance from the subject (and lacking also some of the information available to Headquarters) he was understandably less quick to fit the puzzle together. The briefing given to him by this officer, combined with his own observation of Miernik’s use of a book code and his display of expert marksmanship, enabled Christopher to reconcile his personal regard for Miernik with intelligent suspicion about Miernik’s auspices and probable purposes.

4. Christopher expressed a willingness to reveal himself to Prince Kalash el Khatar for the purpose of providing a direct channel to the prince during the remainder of this operation. I support Khartoum’s veto of this proposal. However, I endorse Christopher’s recommendation that Prince Kalash be advised to use extreme caution in his contacts with the ALF. Christopher suggests that Prince Kalash hold no meetings with ALF personnel on their own ground, but that he meet them at all times in the palace of the Amir, where he can be properly protected.

5. Christopher has proposed an ingenious plan to confirm the identities of Miernik and Ilona Bentley as opposition agents. Before departing Khartoum he will confide to Bentley that a friend of his in the American Embassy has told him that an ALF leader called “Ahmed” is in fact an agent of the U.S. intelligence. If Bentley is an agent, she will certainly communicate this information to the Soviets, and any action they take with respect to “Alamed” will constitute confirmation that Bentley is reporting to them. Secondly, Christopher suggests that we pass the word on Miernik’s arrival in Sudan, together with the exact route of the Cadillac in the days ahead, to Firecracker, with instructions that this information be communicated by radio to Soviet control in Dar es Salaam. The Soviet response can then be read for reactions that may confirm opposition interest in Miernik. At a minimum, this device will win points for Firecracker with the Soviets, who ought to be impressed by his ability to locate and identify Miernik before they have made Firecracker aware of his existence.

6. Christopher and his traveling companions depart Khartoum shortly after dawn 7 July. They will follow the White Nile south to Kosti, then turn west on the main highway to El Obeid. From El Obeid they will take the road through En Nahud to El Fasher. Estimated date of arrival: 12 July.

7. This officer will proceed to El Fasher on 11 July to provide support to Christopher after his arrival there.

6 July. This situation certainly has a tendency to unravel. This afternoon Kalash phoned and asked me to come to his room. When I arrived he told me that he had just been visited by Chief Inspector Qasim (“a cousin of mine who is some sort of policeman”) who had asked him to get in contact with the Anointed Liberation Front as an agent provocateur. This man wants me to play spy to a lot of Communist cutthroats,” said Kalash. “He told me it was my duty to Sudan. He has already taken the liberty of getting my father’s permission. I suppose my father thought it would be a good substitute for war. He certainly doesn’t have much interest in the fate of Sudan. I’m too old now to go out and kill lions with a spear as I was made to do when I was a boy. Really, Paul, these people never tire of their games.”

I asked if he had agreed to help Qasim. “Agreement doesn’t enter into it. He handed me a letter from my father. I am ordered to go through with this nonsense. It’s most inconvenient.”

Then Kalash dropped the following bombshell: “I think it will be better if you and the others go back to Europe at once. Have a sail on the Nile if you like, but then get a plane to London. I shall be occupied with plots and disguises, I expect. There will be no time for hospitality, and my father is certain to be in a mood over this. I can’t think what he might say if I showed up with a Cadillac full of foreigners at a time when he’s arranged for me to help kill these Communists. Best for you to leave.”