Gianrico Carofiglio - Reasonable Doubts

“Could not the fact that Paolicelli was defended by the same lawyer as Romanazzi instead constitute a further indication that Paolicelli is part of a highly structured criminal organization, capable, like all such organizations, of providing legal assistance to its members when they are in trouble?

“Let me propose a different hypothesis. Paolicelli and Romanazzi travel together on the ferry, because they are accomplices in the cocaine smuggling operation. Passing through customs, Paolicelli is stopped and the drugs discovered. Romanazzi wants to help him and does it in the only way he can, given the way things are developing. He can hardly launch an attack on the customs police barracks and free his friend. Instead, he sends for a lawyer he trusts, a lawyer whose job it is, according to this hypothesis, to provide legal assistance to any members of the organization who are in trouble with the law.”

He stopped for a moment to catch his breath. I don’t think it was also to collect his thoughts. His thoughts seemed pretty lucid to me.

“Let me be clear about one thing. I’m not saying it happened like this, because I don’t have sufficient evidence to state that categorically. I’m saying it could have happened like this. I’m saying it is a reasonable conjecture, which encompasses the new evidence presented by counsel for the defence in the course of this hearing within the original prosecution hypothesis. It is a conjecture at least as reasonable as the one which I am sure counsel for the defence will propose to you in his closing argument.

“But when I say ‘at least as reasonable’, I am erring on the side of caution. In point of fact, it is a much more reasonable conjecture than the hypothesis that there was some kind of conspiracy, some fiendish plot to destroy Paolicelli.

“In conclusion, we have two hypotheses to explain the new evidence presented during this hearing. One, which is fully compatible with the overwhelming body of evidence presented in the original trial, would lead to the sentence being upheld.

“The other, of whose validity counsel for the defence will soon attempt to convince you, is based on a whole series of hypothetical and unlikely conjectures. What is being proposed as grounds for acquittal is not a reasonable doubt but, if you’ll pardon the expression, an improbable doubt. A doubt that derives from imagination, not from a strict application of evidential method.

“I am sure that counsel for the defence will be quite capable of presenting this improbable version of events in an appealing and persuasive way. I am also sure, however, that you will keep that rigorous evidential method constantly in mind, because without it there is only chaos.

“It is in the name of that method that I ask you to uphold the original sentence.”

Slow motion.

One frame at a time.

The prosecutor concludes his closing argument and sits down. Mirenghi tells me that I may proceed with my closing argument. I hesitate for a moment, then slowly stand up. I make my usual gesture of adjusting my robe around my shoulders. Then I straighten the knot in my tie. I pick up a sheet of paper containing my notes. Then I have second thoughts and put it back on the bench along with the other papers. I push my chair back, and move around the bench until I have my back to it.

The judges are there in front of me, looking at me.

I think about a lot of things that have nothing to do with this hearing. Or maybe they do, but in a way that’s hard to explain, even to myself.

Whichever way things go, I think, after this case is over I’ll be alone. I’ll never see that little girl again.

At least, not as a little girl.

It’s possible I’ll meet her again many years from now, in the street, by chance. I’m sure to recognize her. I’ll have white hair-I already have some now – and she will pass me by without even noticing me. Why should she?

Where is Margherita now? What time is it in New York?

Slow motion.

Mirenghi ostentatiously cleared his throat. And all at once time started moving normally again. The people and objects in the courtroom were once again solid and real.

I glanced at my watch and started to speak.

“Thank you, Your Honour. The assistant prosecutor is right. You must, as you always do, apply strict criteria for evaluating the evidence in order to come to a decision. He is right when he talks, in a theoretical way, about method. But now, in a concrete way, dealing with the specific case concerning us today, we must see if it is possible to arrive at an acceptable conclusion with which we can all agree.”

I turned back to the bench and again picked up the sheet of paper with my notes.

“The assistant prosecutor, quoting the higher appeal court, said

… I’ve noted down his words… the higher court of appeal has often stated that what is presented as evidence must allow for the reconstruction of the facts and the guilt or innocence of the defendant in terms that are so certain as to exclude the acceptability of any other reasonable solution. Not to mention other more abstract, more remote possibilities. Otherwise, it would no longer be a question of presenting evidence, but of making a demonstration per absurdum following rules borrowed from the exact sciences, which have no place in the exercise of the law.

“Correct.

“What that means, basically, is that it is not possible to disprove the validity of the prosecution’s hypothesis by presenting other alternatives based on imagination and conjecture. Developing this concept, the assistant prosecutor has asserted that, when faced with an abstract plurality of explanations, we have to choose the one explanation capable of encompassing all the evidence in a coherent way. In other words, leaving aside any improbable or merely conjectural explanations, on the basis – and let us take note of this, because this is where the weakness of the prosecution argument rests – on the basis of a criterion of plausibility that can be expressed in statistical terms, that is, in terms of probability.

“Plausibility, as the assistant prosecutor sees it, means compatibility with a kind of script of normality, developed on the basis of what usually happens.

“What usually happens, when certain given elements of fact are present, therefore becomes the criterion according to which we decide what may have happened in a specific case.”

All three were listening to me. Incredibly, Russo seemed the most alert.

I went over everything that had emerged during the hearings. It didn’t take long. They had already admitted all these things as evidence, they were as familiar with them as I was. This recap was only there to introduce my main argument.

“At the end of the day, what is it that we do in court? All of us, I mean. Policemen, carabinieri, prosecutors, defence lawyers, judges? We all tell stories. We take the raw material contained in the evidence, gather it together, and give it a structure and meaning in stories that present a plausible version of past events. The story is acceptable if it explains all the evidence, if it doesn’t leave anything out, if it forms a coherent narrative.

“And a coherent narrative depends on the reliability of the laws of experience, which we use to extract from the evidence those stories which present a version of past events.

“Stories that in a way – in an etymological way – we have to invent.

“Let us look briefly at the two stories which can be told on the basis of the material that has been presented to us.

“The story told in the sentence handed down in the original trial is a simple one. Paolicelli purchases a large quantity of drugs in Montenegro and tries to smuggle these drugs into the country hidden in his car. He is discovered and arrested. And even confesses his guilt.