Alex Josey - Cold blooded murders

The judge told the jury that these were matters selected at random, as instances, ‘instances only’, of Ang’s lack of regard for the truth. Justice Buttrose told the jury that when they came to consider Ang’s evidence they must take these matters into consideration. “How much reliance can you place on his evidence? That is the question you must ask yourselves. How much weight can you attach to his evidence that Jenny had made amazing progress in her swimming and scuba-diving? That he and Jenny had been to the Sisters Islands two days before with the boatman Yusuf? That he had his tank on his back when Jenny went down a second time, and was ready to go down with her? That he had sold Jenny his chicken farm?”

The judge instructed the jury that if they were in any reasonable doubt as to whether Jenny was dead, or that Sunny Ang murdered her, they would resolve that doubt in favour of Ang and acquit him. “But equally, gentlemen of the jury, on the other hand, if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Jenny is dead, and that the accused murdered her, you will, of course, do your duty and return a verdict of guilty accordingly.”

The jury retired at 12:13 PM and luncheon was sent in. They were out for less than two and a half hours. At 2:38 PM they returned with a unanimous verdict. They found the accused guilty.

Ang stood stiffly in the dock, his hands clasped before him as the judge sentenced him to death. It was the 13th day of the trial.

Ang showed no emotion when he was taken in a green prison van for the 10-mile ride to Changi Jail. He was checked in at the main gate. His details were recorded in the normal manner. He asked for a meal and then listened impassively as the prison routine was explained to him. Prison officials told a Straits Times reporter that the calmest prisoner in the prison that day was Sunny Ang. He was still supremely confident he would not hang. There were 18 other condemned prisoners in the prison, and ‘an air of tension prevailed within the prison walls’.

A medical officer examined him after his personal clothing and other articles were taken away from him. He had a bath and a shave, in accordance with prison regulations. Escorted to his sparsely furnished cell in a concrete block, Ang looked around as the door slammed behind him. He was told that he would be allowed newspapers, books and periodicals; relatives and friends could visit him. He would be allowed to write and to receive letters. His day, officials told him, would begin at 6:30 AM every morning with a cup of tea, but he would not be wakened if he was still asleep. There would be three meals a day, and twice a day he would leave his cell, for a bath and for exercise. Lights out at 10:00 PM.

Five months after his trial, Sunny Ang’s appeal against conviction and sentence opened on 25 October 1965, before Justice Tan Ah Tah, the Acting Chief Justice, Justice Chua and Justice Winslow. The defence presented eighteen principal grounds of appeal. The hearing lasted nine days. In a few words the Acting Chief Justice delivered the judgment of the Court. He said, “Although Jenny’s body has never been found, there is overwhelming evidence on the record that the appellant murdered her. In our judgment no miscarriage of justice has occurred in this case. The appeal is dismissed.”

Ang was in court. He showed no emotion.

In his petition, put forward by his counsel, Mr Coomaraswamy alleged that his conviction was a ‘substantial miscarriage of justice’ on the following grounds.

· The trial judge erred in law in allowing the prosecution to tender irrelevant evidence of a collision involving a car, which the appellant was driving and in which Jenny Cheok was a passenger. · The trial judge erred in law in permitting the prosecution to adduce this evidence at the preliminary inquiry, notwithstanding that the notice under a section of the Criminal Procedure Code was not served on the accused or his advocate before the trial. · The trial judge erred in law in permitting the prosecution repeatedly to abuse the provisions of a section of the Criminal Procedure Code by adducing evidence of witnesses who did not give evidence at the preliminary inquiry, on the prosecution serving notice three minutes before the commencement of the trial, notwithstanding that the evidence of such witnesses was available to the prosecution long before and during the preliminary inquiry. ·

The trial judge erred in law in allowing evidence of inadmissible hearsay, in particular, evidence relating to the circumstances in which Jenny Cheok was alleged to have taken out insurance policies. · The trial judge erred in law in permitting the prosecution to adduce irrelevant evidence, in particular, (a) evidence of alleged attempts to suborn a witness, (b) evidence of a proposal form which Jenny Cheok was alleged to have submitted to the Prudential Assurance Company Limited, there being no evidence whatever to connect the accused with the proposal form. ·

The trial judge erred in casting unnecessary and unwarranted aspersions on the conduct of the appellants’ advocate and others associated with the accused. Further, having made them of the appellant’s advocate, the trial judge failed to give the appellant’s advocate an adequate opportunity to explain himself before the jury. ·

The trial judge erred in law in rejecting admissible evidence of statements made by Jenny Cheok to her sister as to her intentions to go to Britain, and as to her intention that she would be going away for a long time. · The appellant was throughout the trial subject to such prejudice that he could not in the circumstances be said to have had a fair trial. · The trial judge erred in law in permitting the deputy public prosecutor to suggest to the jury that a flipper used by Jenny Cheok was cut by the appellant between her first dive and her second dive, notwithstanding that no such suggestion was made in the course of the deputy public prosecutor’s opening address. Nor was this suggestion put to any witness who could have given evidence on the matter. · The trial judge in his summing up to the jury was so biased against the appellant and implied, or suggested as proved, facts which were challenged, with the result that the appellant could not be said to have had a fair trial. · The verdict of the jury was wrong and against the weight of evidence. · The trial judge erred in law in failing to direct the jury on a possible verdict of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. · The trial judge in his direction to the jury erred in law in using, upon the facts of the case, the analogy of a person being induced to walk to a cliff top to illustrate the necessary intention for the offence of murder, and the trial judge generally failed to direct the jury adequately on intention. · The trial judge erred in failing to direct the jury adequately on causation, in particular, he failed to direct the jury that if Jenny Cheok was dead, (a) she significantly contributed to her death by voluntarily going into the water, and (b) a number of possible causes for which the appellant was not legally responsible could have caused her death. · The trial judge erred in law in failing to direct the jury adequately on certain questions of law relating to the offence of murder. · The trial judge did not at times clearly distinguish between prosecution allegations, evidence and his own views thereon. · The trial judge erred in law in failing to direct the jury adequately on the burden of proof on the prosecution. · The trial judge was wrong in his direction to the jury on circumstantial evidence and erred in law in failing to direct the jury adequately on the dangers of convicting an accused person on circumstantial evidence.

Mr Coomaraswamy’s first ground of appeal was based on the admission of evidence relating to the accident when Ang was driving a car with Jenny as passenger near Seremban. He said the accident happened a full two weeks before the alleged murder. He submitted that what happened, on 13 August could not be said to be ‘part of the same transaction’ or ‘closely associated in time, place and circumstances’-which, he argued, were the conditions laid down in law for such evidence to be admissible.