Henry Buckley - History of Civilization in England, Vol. 1 of 3

Compare Stewart's Philosophy of the Mind , vol. ii. p. 194, with Cousin , Hist. de la Philosophie , II. série, vol. ii. p. 92. Among the Indian metaphysicians, there was a sect which declared space to be the cause of all things. Journal of Asiatic Soc. vol. vi. pp. 268, 290. See also the Dabistan , vol. ii. p. 40, which, however, was contrary to the Vedas. Rammohun Roy on the Veds , 1832, pp. 8, 111. In Spain, the doctrine of the infinity of space is heretical. Doblado's Letters , p. 96; which should be compared with the objection of Irenæus against the Valentinians, in Beausobre , Histoire de Manichée , vol. ii. p. 275. For the different theories of space, I may, moreover, refer to Ritter's Hist. of Ancient Philosophy , vol. i. pp. 451, 473, 477, vol. ii. p. 314, vol. iii. pp. 195–204; Cudworth's Intellectual System , vol. i. p. 191, vol. iii. pp. 230, 472; Kritik der reinen Vernunft , in Kant's Werke , vol. ii. pp. 23, 62, 81, 120, 139, 147, 256, 334, 347; Tennemann , Geschichte der Philosophie , vol. i. p. 109, vol. ii. p. 303, vol. iii. pp. 130–137, vol. iv. p. 284, vol. v. pp. 384–387, vol. vi. p. 99, vol. viii. pp. 87, 88, 683, vol. ix. pp. 257, 355, 410, vol. x. p. 79, vol. xi. pp. 195, 385–389.

This is the title conferred by M. Cousin upon nearly all the greatest English metaphysicians, and upon Condillac and all his disciples in France, their system having ‘le nom mérité de sensualisme.’ Cousin , Histoire de la Philosophie , II. série, vol. ii. p. 88. The same name is given to the same school, in Feuchtersleben's Medical Psychology , p. 52, and in Renouard's Histoire de la Médecine , vol. i. p. 346, vol. ii. p. 368. In Jobert's New System of Philosophy , vol. ii. p. 334, 8vo. 1849, it is called ‘sensationalism,’ which seems a preferable expression.

This is very ably argued by Mr. James Mill in his Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind , vol. ii. pp. 32, 93–95, and elsewhere. Compare Essay concerning Human Understanding , in Locke's Works , vol. i. pp. 147, 148, 154, 157, and the ingenious distinction, p. 198, ‘between the idea of the infinity of space, and the idea of a space infinite.’ At p. 208, Locke sarcastically says, ‘But yet, after all this, there being men who persuade themselves that they have clear, positive, comprehensive ideas of infinity, it is fit they enjoy their privilege; and I should be very glad (with some others that I know, who acknowledge they have none such) to be better informed by their communication.’

Mill's Analysis of the Mind , vol. ii. pp. 96, 97. See also the Examination of Malebranche , in Locke's Works , vol. viii. pp. 248, 249; and Müller's Elements of Physiology , vol. ii. p. 1081, which should be compared with Comte , Philosophie Positive , vol. i. p. 354.

I speak of idealists in opposition to sensationalists; though the word idealist is often used by metaphysicians in a very different sense. On the different kinds of idealism, see Kritik der reinen Vernunft , and Prolegomena zu jeder künftigen Metaphysik , in Kant's Werke , vol. ii. pp. 223, 389, vol. iii. pp. 204, 210, 306, 307. According to him, the Cartesian idealism is empirical.

Thus, Dugald Stewart ( Philosophical Essays , Edin. 1810, p. 33) tells us of ‘the simple idea of personal identity.’ And Reid ( Essays on the Powers of the Mind , vol. i. p. 354) says, ‘I know of no ideas or notions that have a better claim to be accounted simple and original than those of space and time.’ In the Sanscrit metaphysics, time is ‘an independent cause.’ See the Vishnu Purana , pp. 10, 216.

‘As Space is a comprehensive word, including all positions, or the whole of synchronous order, so Time is a comprehensive word, including all successions, or the whole of successive order.’ Mill's Analysis of the Mind , vol. ii. p. 100; and on the relation of time to memory, vol. i. p. 252. In Jobert's New System of Philosophy , vol. i. p. 33, it is said that ‘time is nothing but the succession of events, and we know events by experience only.’ See also p. 133, and compare respecting time Condillac , Traité des Sensations , pp. 104–114, 222, 223, 331–333. To the same effect is Essay concerning Human Understanding , book ii. chap. xiv., in Locke's Works , vol. i. p. 163; and see his second reply to the Bishop of Worcester, in Works , vol. iii. pp. 414–416; and as to the idea of substance, see vol. i. pp. 285–290, 292, 308, vol. iii. pp. 5, 10, 17.

Reid ( Essays on the Powers of the Mind , vol. i. p. 281) says, that necessary truths ‘cannot be the conclusions of the senses; for our senses testify only what is, and not what must necessarily be.’ See also vol. ii. pp. 53, 204, 239, 240, 281. The same distinction is peremptorily asserted in Whewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences , 8vo, 1847, vol. i. pp. 60–73, 140; and see Dugald Stewart's Philosophical Essays , pp. 123, 124. Sir W. Hamilton ( Additions to Reid's Works , p. 754) says, that non-contingent truths ‘have their converse absolutely incogitable.’ But this learned writer does not mention how we are to know when anything is ‘absolutely incogitable.’ That we cannot cogitate an idea, is certainly no proof of its being incogitable; for it may be cogitated at some later period, when knowledge is more advanced.

This is asserted by all the followers of Locke; and one of the latest productions of that school declares, that ‘to say that necessary truths cannot be acquired by experience, is to deny the most clear evidence of our senses and reason.’ Jobert's New System of Philosophy , vol. i. p. 58.

To avoid misapprehension, I may repeat, that, here and elsewhere, I mean by metaphysics, that vast body of literature which is constructed on the supposition that the laws of the human mind can be generalized solely from the facts of individual consciousness. For this scheme, the word ‘metaphysics’ is rather inconvenient, but it will cause no confusion if this definition of it is kept in view by the reader.

What a celebrated historian of philosophy says of Platonism, is equally true of all the great metaphysical systems: ‘Dass sie ein zusammenhängendes harmonisches Ganzes ausmachen ( i. e. the leading propositions of it) fällt in die Augen.’ Tennemann , Geschichte der Philosophie , vol. ii. p. 527. And yet he confesses (vol. iii. p. 52) of it and the opposite system: ‘und wenn man auf die Beweise siehet, so ist der Empirismus des Aristoteles nicht besser begründet als der Rationalismus des Plato.’ Kant admits that there can be only one true system, but is confident that he has discovered what all his predecessors have missed. Die Metaphysik der Sitten , in Kant's Werke , vol. v. p. 5, where he raises the question, ‘ob es wohl mehr, als eine Philosophie geben könne.’ In the Kritik , and in the Prolegomena zujeder künftigen Metaphysik , he says that metaphysics have made no progress, and that the study can hardly be said to exist. Werke , vol. ii. pp. 49, 50, vol. iii. pp. 166, 246.