Francis Duncan - History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, Vol. 1

Every difficulty was interposed by the French governors between the settlers and the New England merchants, who were mutually eager for trade. Exasperated by prohibitory duties on their wares, the latter first tried smuggling, and then hostile expeditions. One such was made from Boston in 1704; and although Port Royal made a successful resistance, much damage was done to the surrounding country.

In 1707, two expeditions were made from New England, and a large force of militia accompanied them. They were convoyed by a man-of-war, and would undoubtedly have captured the place, had it not been for the personal energy of Subercase, the French governor, who rallied the neighbouring inhabitants, and drove back the English, thoroughly dispirited. On the second occasion, the English attempted to float their artillery up the river with the tide by night, and attack the fort from the land side. The rise and fall of the tide in the Bay of Fundy and its inlets are very great, often reaching sixty feet. The French governor, seeing the enemy's design, lit large fires along the banks of the river, and exposed the drifting boats with the English guns on board to the view of the artillerymen in the fort, who opened a fire which utterly prevented the English from advancing further, or effecting a landing. By the 1st of September, the New Englanders were utterly foiled and dispirited, the object of the expedition was frustrated, and the fleet weighed anchor and returned to Boston. After these two attempts, rendered unsuccessful by the marvellous tact and energy of one man, Port Royal enjoyed comparative rest, and the leisure of the inhabitants was devoted to strengthening the works during the next two years.

Before describing the circumstances of its final capture, let some explanation be given of the incessant war which went on for so many years between the French and English colonists in North America. It was not a burning interest in the European questions agitating the parent countries that animated their Western children; the parent quarrels were an excuse, but not a reason, for their mutual aggression; and the absence of such excuse did not ensure peace in America. The cause lay in the two feelings which prompt most wars: thirst for revenge and love of trade. The way in which the last acted has already been hinted at. There was undoubtedly a market among the French colonists, which was all the New England merchants could desire; and so ready were the French peasants to trade, that no prohibitory action of their rulers could conceal their desire, although in a great measure it might prevent its gratification. The knowledge of this made the New Englanders frantic. They were men of immense energy, as they are now; they were of magnificent physique, made for war and hardship; and they rebelled against any obstacle to what they deemed their legitimate wishes. Their anger became intolerance; their intolerance became aggressive; and the result was first smuggling, then privateering, and finally war.

But another motive was thirst for revenge. And why? Was there not room on this vast continent for both nations to plant any wandering or surplus children, without the vile passions seeking place, which thrive in the hot-bed of crowded, neighbouring, and rival states? Here the old poet's words come in most truly: "Cœlum, non animum, mutant, qui trans mare currunt."

National jealousies were reproduced: the French allied themselves in Canada with the Indians, and incessant incursions were made thence by them on the English colonies. Hardly a child grew up in New England who did not know of some hideous tragedy in the domestic life of his immediate neighbours, if not in his own family; from infancy one of the articles of his creed was detestation of the French; and this feeling found ready and revengeful expression whenever opportunity offered. But revenge is not always true in its aim, is indeed often wofully blind; and too often when maddened with thoughts of cruelty and outrage on his wife or sisters – and what thoughts stir the Anglo-Saxon more fiercely? – he would avenge himself wildly and recklessly on victims who mayhap were innocent. And so the ghastly vendetta crossed from hand to hand, from one side to the other, and hardly a year passed without its existence being attested by tales of horror and of blood!

But the end for Port Royal was approaching, an end which was to mean defeat, but was to ensure a lasting peace. In 1709, news reached the Governor of an intended attack on a large scale in the ensuing spring by the English; and as his garrison had recently been much reduced by disease, he wrote, strongly urging its reinforcement either from France, or from the French post at Placentia, in Newfoundland. Apparently, his request was not complied with; and after a gallant, and almost heroic resistance, Port Royal capitulated in the following year to the expeditionary forces under the command of Colonel Nicholson, comprising regular troops from England, militia from New York, and a strong train of Artillery, – the whole being supported by a powerful fleet. On the 2nd October, 1710, the capitulation was signed; and, out of compliment to the Queen, the name of the village was changed to Annapolis.

A fortnight after the expedition left England for New York and Boston, en route to Port Royal, a Royal Warrant was issued establishing a Train of Artillery to garrison Annapolis . It will thus be seen that so confident was the English Government of the success of the expedition, that the new name for Port Royal had already been fixed, and arrangements made for a permanent garrison. The acquisition of Newfoundland followed; the French garrison of Placentia were allowed with many of the inhabitants to go to the Island of Cape Breton, where they fortified a place which will occupy a prominent part in this volume, Louisbourg; and the year 1713 saw, by the Treaty of Utrecht, Acadia or Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland formally surrendered to the English.

The train of Artillery formed to garrison Annapolis, and its adjunct ordered three years later for Placentia, were two of the permanent trains used as arguments in 1716 for establishing a fixed Artillery Regiment which could feed these foreign garrisons – arguments which in that year brought into existence the Royal Regiment of Artillery.

The Artillery garrison ordered for Annapolis in 1710, comprised a captain, a lieutenant, a surgeon, 4 non-commissioned officers, 11 gunners, 40 matrosses, an engineer, a storekeeper, 3 bombardiers, and 2 armourers.

That for Placentia was smaller and differently constituted. It consisted of an engineer, a master-gunner, 20 gunners, a mason, a smith, a carpenter, and an armourer.

The cost of the Annapolis train was 1964 l. 18 s. 4 d. per annum: that of the Placentia train was 1259 l. 5 s. After the Regiment was created, these two trains or garrisons were generally furnished by the same company, and mutually met each other's deficiencies or demands. For many years, these places appeared in the Ordnance estimates, not merely as items in the expense of maintaining the Artillery and Engineers, but also as requiring considerable sums for fortifications. Occasionally the number of men was reduced, as in 1725, when at Placentia there were only 1 lieutenant and 8 gunners; and at Annapolis, 1 lieutenant, 2 bombardiers, 4 gunners, and 7 matrosses. But the amount spent on the fortifications remained for years very considerable. Up to the year 1759, the average spent on this item annually at the two places was 3000 l. and 1000 l. ; but in 1747 and 1748, evidently exceptional years, the expenditure rose to 10,000 l. and 6000 l. respectively. In 1759, a large sum appears to have been spent in transporting to Nova Scotia the guns and stores taken from the French at Louisbourg. After 1759, Annapolis gradually dwindles down as a military station, being dwarfed by Halifax, whose Artillery expenses in that year alone amounted to nearly 40,000 l.