Various - The Bay State Monthly. Volume 2, No. 6, March, 1885

We are near the end of a story which it has been a pleasure to tell. Vastly more could be told. A volume of incidents could be written. There are precious secrets of every generous and noble man's life which no pen may profane by giving them publicity. These are the choice treasures reserved only for those who know him best, and live nearest his heart. But the writer desires, as Mr. Wallace's pastor, to add the testimony of observation and personal knowledge to the rare purity and uprightness of character, to the generosity of spirit, to the thoughtful kindness, and to the deep and reverent regard for spiritual things, of his distinguished parishioner. As an example of untiring energy, of probity of character, of cleanness of soul, of uprightness of life, of sincerity of purpose, of firmness of moral principle, he may safely be held up as a model for young men.

[Author of "Battles of the American Revolution."]

It seems common to all great wars that the true version of leading actions is rarely assured by the immediate reports of commanders. Many causes secure to such reports substantial accuracy, but the development of details seldom fails to show that justice to subordinates cannot be done by the simple statement of general plans and general results. There are historians who still claim that Arnold had no part in the battle of Freeman's Farm, September 19, 1777; and many other battles of the Revolutionary war lacked clear definition until nearly a century had passed and the records were supplemented by careful examination of the battle-fields and a more thorough scrutiny of British, French, and Hessian archives, thereby to correct topographical data and harmonize conflicting statements.

The case of General Fitz John Porter forcibly illustrates the difficulty of changing public opinion, once formed, even when supplemental data enforce military recognition of their value. The Battle of Franklin, which secured to General Thomas the opportunity to fortify Nashville and ultimately defeat Hood, and the battles of Stone River, Gettysburg, Chicamauga and Monocacy, are among the actions of the late war in which differences of statement as to positions and movements have greatly qualified first estimates of the relations which various officers sustained to those actions.

The battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing, has been the latest under scrutiny. It is not the purpose to consider whether the action of the day was influenced by the arrival of Buel's army, or by the non-arrival of General Lew Wallace's division; nor whether General Wallace did, or did not, march by scientific methods, when he moved for the nearest firing. Among voluminous papers touching the civil war are the copies of original papers received from General Wallace himself, and of present interest. These papers received notice from the Western press at one time, but seem to demand a more formal record, as essential factors in the better understanding of the Battle of Shiloh.

The following outline is suggested by these documents:

1st. That the Federal line of battle, early in the morning, stretched out from Pittsburg Landing nearly to the Purdy Road, with General Sherman's division on the right, within about a mile of that road.

2nd. That General Wallace's division was at Crump's Landing, not more than five miles from Pittsburg Landing; it being then uncertain which of the two would be the objective of attack.

3d. That General Grant visited General Wallace at Crump's Landing and ordered him to hold his command subject to orders, and then steamed onward to Pittsburg Landing.

4th. That before 6 o'clock, A.M., the sound of firing had led General Wallace to put his command under arms; and he was prepared to move wherever active work should demand, even before he was ordered to be thus ready.

5th. That he concentrated his brigades, then in three camps, into one mass, at the forks of the Purdy Road and the road to Pittsburg Landing, so that he might take either road, as orders should decide.

6th. That he understood the original line of battle and the disposition of its divisions, and knew that General Sherman held the right.

7th. That the order received by him, before 12 o'clock, M., from Captain Baxter, staff officer of General Grant, was in writing; and while pronounced verbally, at first, the form it assumed, when reduced to writing and subsequently delivered to General Wallace, was a direct order to "unite with the right," and that involved the march on the Purdy Road.

If the verbal order of General Grant to Captain Baxter, to hasten General Wallace's Division to Pittsburg Landing, was reduced to writing by that officer, after he noticed the early success of the Union Line, he would have shaped the approach of the fresh division to the best possible advantage, to join the army , not the precise Landing , if the army was not there; since General Grant, still being on crutches from a sprained ankle when his horse fell under and upon him, on the fourth, was compelled to depend largely upon staff-officers for judicious action, in exigencies which fell under their eyes, and where his riding was greatly limited. There is full harmony of events, by giving full credit to all the data which seem, at first, to work conflict.

8th. That the Staff Officer who delivered the order assured General Wallace and his staff that the Federal line was successful and driving the enemy at every point.