Griffin W.E.B. - The Corps 08 - In Dangers Path

T O P S E C R E T – M A G I C

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

1635 GREENWICH 16 APRIL 1943

DUPLICATION FORBIDDEN

FROM COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC

PEARL HARBOR

TO CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEAHY

INFO SUPREME COMMANDER SOUTH WEST PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

BRISBANE

EYES ONLY GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

1. REFERENCE IS MADE TO TOP SECRET-MAGIC MESSAGE FROM SUPREME COMMANDER SOUTH WEST PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS TO EYES ONLY CHIEF OF STAFF US ARMY SUBJECT OPERATION FLYSWATTER, REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO EXECUTE DATED 16 APRIL 1943.

2. THE REFERENCED MESSAGES CONCERNING ADMIRAL YAMAMOTO WERE INDEPENDENTLY INTERCEPTED, DECRYPTED AND ANALYZED HERE. ANALYSTS HERE CONCUR THAT MESSAGES ARE GENUINE, AND SHARE CONCERN THAT THEY MAY BE A RUSE.

3. THE UNDERSIGNED SHARES GENERAL MACARTHURS CONFIDENCE IN BRIG GENERAL PICKERING'S DAMAGE ASSESSMENT REGARDING POTENTIAL BREECH OF MAGIC AT USMMCHI.

4. THE REMOVAL OF ADMIRAL YAMAMOTO FROM COMMAND OF THE JAPANESE COMBINED FLEET WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC TO JAPANESE MILITARY AND NAVAL OPERATIONS, AND HIS LOSS PER SE TO UNITED STATES ACTION WOULD SERIOUSLY DAMAGE JAPANESE NAVAL PRESTIGE AMONG THE JAPANESE PEOPLE.

5. THE UNDERSIGNED STRONGLY URGES THAT THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS RECOMMEND TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF THAT GENERAL MACARTHUR BE GIVEN AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE OPERATION FLYSWATTER.

CHESTER W. NIMITZ

ADMIRAL, US NAVY

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, PACIFIC

T O P S E C R E T – M A G I C

«Halsey thinks MacArthur is right,» the President said. «Is that a unanimous feeling here, too?»

He looked at Donovan, who was the junior man present, for an answer.

«Mr. President, I don't think I should second-guess either Douglas MacArthur or Admiral Nimitz,» Donovan said.

«Go ahead, Bill, second-guess them.»

«It boils down to a choice between a chance to eliminate Admiral Yamamoto or possibly, I emphasize possibly, compromise magic.»

«No, it doesn't,» the President said. «The choice is between sharing Fleming Pickering's belief that magic has not been compromised by those people in Chungking, or not believing him. I don't think we're in a position to cavalierly dismiss the possibility that the Japanese at least suspect we're reading their mail. A deception like this would be entirely appropriate if they did.»

«We have no reason to believe we have given them any reason to be suspicious, except for the Chungking business,» Donovan said.

«Do you think Pickering's right, or don't you?» Roosevelt asked, a tone of impatience in his voice.

«I'll go with Pickering's judgment, Mr. President,» Donovan said after a perceptible pause.

Roosevelt nodded and looked at General Marshall.

«If we didn't take advantage of the opportunity, Mr. President—« General Marshall began.

«Even at the risk of confirming to the Japanese that we've broken their codes?» Roosevelt interrupted.

«Yes, Mr. President,» General Marshall said.

«Admiral?» Roosevelt asked, turning to Leahy.

«This seems to be one of those very rare instances, Mr. President, where Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur seem to be in complete agreement. I don't want to challenge their judgment.»

«But, truth to tell, out of school, everybody's more than a little nervous with this, right?» Roosevelt said.

There were nods, and Donovan said, «Yes, sir, I am.»

«And so am I,» Roosevelt said. His cigarette had burned down close to his ivory holder. He snatched it out, dropped it into an ashtray, and stuffed a fresh cigarette into the holder.

«Okay,» he said, as Donovan walked up to him with a cigarette lighter. «We'll do it. Admiral Leahy, send Douglas MacArthur the following: Direction of the President. Execute Operation Flyswatter.»

«Aye, aye, sir.» Admiral Leahy said.

«If that offer of a drink is still open, Mr. President?» Donovan said.

«Of course it is, Bill,» the President said. «Now that we each can tell ourselves that when we made this decision we were stone sober.»

Chapter Twenty-Three

note 89

Somewhere in the Gobi Desert

Mongolia

1115 20 April 1943

The 32nd Military District supply column, sent to supply the patrols it was operating in the Gobi Desert, consisted of two jeeps (one at the head of the line of vehicles, the other bringing up the rear); two GMC six-by-six two-and-a-half-ton trucks, both towing five-hundred-gallon trailers; three Studebaker open-bodied trucks carrying, four to a truck, a dozen Mongolian ponies; and two Dodge three-quarter-ton weapons carriers.

All of the vehicles were grossly overloaded, and there had been frequent breakdowns during the six-day trip from Yümen, almost all of them due to blown tires. The repair technique was simple. The wheel with the blown tire was removed and replaced with a spare wheel from the half-dozen or so spares lashed to each vehicle. The wheel with the blown tire was then moved to one of the weapons carriers, now converted to a mobile tire-repair station. And the march was resumed. The blown tire was repaired, if possible, while on the march. But tires beyond repair were not without value in wartime China, and bad tires were lashed wherever space could be found.

The convoy stopped at nightfall. The Mongolian ponies were then encouraged—by the point of a bayonet—to jump from the Studebakers, and Chinese soldiers mounted four of them bareback and began a roving perimeter patrol. Other soldiers lit fires, and still others rigged pieces of canvas tarpaulin wherever they could, to provide shelter from the icy winds.

Breakfast in the morning was the same as dinner, rice with sweet peppers andonions and chunks of lamb and pork. after breakfast, bayonet jabs at their ribs— in the case of reluctant animals, at their genitals—encouraged the ponies to climb back on the Studebakers, and the march resumed.

The first day they met a Yumen-bound camel caravan. But after that, the convoy encountered no other travelers. After the second day, McCoy and the others in his party began to notice evidence of what they could expect to find farther into the Gobi. The desert all around them was windswept flat rock, huge sheets of it, with no landmarks at all. In some places large rocks were strewn about. But in most places the flat, indifferent landscape was broken by nothing at all but patches of snow where the wind had blown it.

There was, however—good news—very little ice. Probably, McCoy decided, because the snow would have to melt during the day and then freeze at night. But it was too cold during the day—and the wind was blowing so hard, keeping the snow moving—that the sun could not melt it.

The bad news was that the snow often covered the path they were following— it could not be called a road—making it frequently necessary for the convoy commander, a taciturn captain, riding in the lead jeep, to halt the convoy because he couldn't see the «road.» When that happened, the trailing jeep scouted ahead of the convoy, making wider and wider sweeps through the shallow snow, until he found the faint signs marking the «road.» Then the march resumed.

As they moved deeper into the desert—and this was also good news—McCoy and Zimmerman had both reached the conclusion that there was absolutely nothing suspicious about their ambulance and weapons carrier, which McCoy had put in the line of vehicles immediately behind the GMC trucks. They looked as if they were a perfectly ordinary part of the convoy.

When the convoy came to a halt on the morning of 20 April, McCoy expected that somebody had once again blown a tire or else that the «road» was again obscured by blown snow. But then Chinese soldiers started jumping down from the six-by-sixes and moving off to the side. When McCoy looked closer, he saw that they had stopped by fire-blackened rocks and were about to light fires.