Janine Wedel - Unaccountable - How Elite Power Brokers Corrupt Our Finances, Freedom, and Security

None of this bodes well for accountability. Instead, it bodes ill, because the scholars’ activities are light years more effective—and insidious—than the antics of any celebrity, as we shall see. And it especially bodes ill because we scarcely even know it’s going on.

PRESTIGE PROFESSORS, SHADOW LOBBYING?

Have former basketball star Dennis Rodman’s visits to North Korea convinced us that Kim Jong Un, of mass starvation, concentration camp, and execution fame, is reforming? Or that he is somehow becoming a good guy? 1I don’t think so. We may not be persuaded by the likes of Rodman, but we are routinely swayed by the writings and appearances of certain elite academics who participate, either actively or unwittingly, in “reputational laundering” on behalf of unsavory regimes. And while Rodman’s “basketball diplomacy” has been subject to intense media scrutiny, not so these academics, who, trading on their prestige, air their favorable assessments of the regimes’ progress, without also airing that they receive pay or perks from them, albeit indirectly.

Without paying much attention, I—like many others, no doubt—developed during the mid-2000s a somewhat more favorable image of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. Unbeknownst to me or the public at the time, this was most likely the result of a campaign by a Cambridge, Massachusetts–based consulting firm, Monitor Group. The firm contracted with the Libyan regime between 2006 and 2008 and engineered a sweeping effort to influence public opinion regarding Gaddafi’s Libya. 2Using illustrious academics, public intellectuals from both sides of the Atlantic, and former government officials, the campaign burnished the leader’s image. Monitor, however, was not registered as a lobbyist for Libya, as any American organization lobbying on behalf of a foreign government is required to do. 3For this non-lobbying, Monitor commanded a retainer of three quarters of a million dollars per quarter. 4

The Monitor Group—now Monitor Deloitte after its purchase by Deloitte in 2012—from its inception has capitalized on its proximity and connections to the world’s most prestigious university. The firm was founded in 1983 by a handful of entrepreneurs connected to Harvard Business School, including one of its best-known professors, Michael Porter. 5The Boston Globe describes young HBS graduates eager to capitalize on “both Porter’s reputation and the Harvard ‘brand’” at a time that branding wasn’t yet au courant . Like the other new-style entities we’ve described throughout this book, Monitor seemed to avoid clear definitions, titles, and boundaries. 6A couple of those in control boasted that the firm was “less formal” and had “very little structural hierarchy.” 7And it was so secretive about its clients that even many within it didn’t know who all the clients were. As one 2001 profile of the company states, 8

Even in the buttoned-down world of consulting, Monitor Group is notable for eschewing the traditional corporate stratification. Instead of having a cadre of vice presidents and corporate spokespeople, Monitor defines people in a different way. In addition to having “thought leaders” in its continuing education division, Monitor University, the group also employs a “chief knowledge officer,” who works in marketing. . . . [Monitor] has such a hyper-confidentiality policy about not identifying clients that their names are not even mentioned in-house. Instead, Monitor consultants use acronyms when discussing clients so that others within the firm cannot figure out who the client is.

That secrecy and lack of definition seem to have provided some convenient cover when, in 2009, news trickled out through documents obtained by a Libyan opposition group detailing Monitor’s lucrative contract with the ruling regime. 9But it wasn’t until 2011, when Gaddafi began violently quelling the Libyan uprising, that anyone took much notice.

The documents show that Monitor sent hand-picked “thought leaders” to Libya to lend its client prestige. They also show that even though its elaborate plan looked, at best, like high-class whitewashing, and at worst, like straight-up lobbying, Monitor eschewed the label of “lobbying organization.” 10Indeed, the title of one of Monitor’s status reports makes it clear that the trips to Libya were part of a “Project to Enhance the Profile of Libya and Muammar Qadhafi.” To further this mission, the firm promised to 11

. . . provide operational support for publication of positive articles on Libya in these publications. For example: Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Washington Post, Economist, International Herald Tribune, Financial Times, Weekly Standard, National Interest, Public Interest, Foreign Affairs, etc.

Such articles required authoritative authors. Monitor, according to a self-described “action plan,” aimed to 12

. . . identify relevant policy-makers and influencers, politicians (both Democratic and Republican), government officials, thought-leaders and academics and journalists. These individuals will be of the highest caliber in their respective professions and circle of influence.

Monitor was evidently successful in its efforts. The public intellectuals it enlisted included former Harvard Kennedy School dean Joseph Nye; political scientist Robert Putnam, best known for his book Bowling Alone ; Princeton historian Bernard Lewis; famed End of History author Francis Fukuyama; political theorist and democracy advocate Benjamin Barber; and MIT Media Lab director Nicholas Negroponte, among others. 13

Gaddafi’s reputation benefited from the credibility the academics brought with them, the articles about their visits some of them wrote upon returning from Libya, and debriefings allegedly given to U.S. government officials.

Bernard Lewis is promoted in Monitor’s documents as having access to the “entire” Israeli embassy; Negroponte is valued in part because his brother, John Negroponte, was then Deputy Secretary of State. 14

Joseph Nye wrote an article in the New Republic about meeting Gaddafi and the possibility that he might be evolving into a more enlightened leader; the article does not say Nye was paid a fee by Monitor Group. 15Princeton professor Andrew Moravcsik penned a piece for Newsweek called “A Rogue Reforms,” with no mention of Monitor. 16Benjamin Barber wrote a similar piece in the Washington Post , also with no disclosure. 17The documents boast that Barber “writes frequently for Harper’s Magazine , The New York Times , The Washington Post , The Atlantic , and many other scholarly and popular publications[.]”

Not all were academics. I can’t say I was surprised to see Richard Perle’s name in the documents. A former assistant secretary of defense under President Ronald Reagan, Perle has long surfaced at the epicenter of a head-spinning array of business deals, consulting roles, and neoconservative ideological initiatives, consistently courting and yet skirting charges of conflict of interest. Perle’s name alone is his calling card: he had unimpeded access to the highest levels of power in the Bush White House. The documents state that he “made two visits to Libya (22-24 March and 23-25 July 2006) and met with Gaddafy on both occasions. He briefed Vice President Dick Cheney on his visits to Libya.” 18

The British sociologist Anthony Giddens, a well-known public intellectual, also visited Libya twice and published an article following each visit, making no mention of the Monitor Group. In the second piece, in the Guardian , Giddens asks whether “real progress [is] possible only when Gaddafy leaves the scene? I tend to think the opposite. If he is sincere in wanting change, as I think he is, he could play a role in muting conflict that might otherwise arise as modernisation takes hold.” 19