Janine Wedel - Unaccountable - How Elite Power Brokers Corrupt Our Finances, Freedom, and Security

Amplifying their influence, such generals are also in hot demand as media analysts. And according to a 2008 New York Times report, “[m]ost of the analysts have ties to military contractors vested in the very war policies they are asked to assess on air.” 52Journalist David Barstow painted an indelible portrait in the Times of retired four-star Army General Barry McCaffrey, his swirl of defense-consulting activities, and his success in promoting his interests on television: Barstow called it “One Man’s Military-Industrial-Media Complex.” 53

Lest one think the “rent-a-general” phenomenon, as Bender puts it, is winding down, his Globe investigation shows that this longtime trend has been accelerating: 54

From 2004 through 2008, 80 percent of retiring three- and four-star officers went to work as consultants or defense executives. . . . That compares with less than 50 percent who followed that path a decade earlier, from 1994 to 1998. . . . In 2007, thirty-four out of 39 three- and four-star generals and admirals who retired . . . are now working in defense roles—nearly 90 percent.

Not only do these generals and admirals profit from their years of privileged access to vital information and connections, they are also afforded deference because of their service and those stars. This deference tends to continue after retirement, according to the Globe investigation, with generals often treated in advisory meetings as if they still held official roles. 55

As noted, generals and admirals and other senior military officers typically retire at a relatively young age, and it’s understandable that many want to continue working. 56But the form this work takes often gives them the opportunity to flout the public trust—and many do so, however unwittingly. They can easily convince themselves that they are continuing to “serve,” using their information and skills for the public good while being handsomely compensated. What they may not realize or choose to ignore is the corrupting influence of their migration.

They aren’t sneaking around. Reporting (from the Globe , the Times , USA Today, and others) finds that the Pentagon either ignores their behavior, accepts that this is how business is done these days, or, at times, actively encourages it. And while the retired officers’ new ventures are no secret, we, the public, have no way of knowing specifically where accountability is being breached. As they put the information gleaned in their government roles to use in their new roles, they can do so in a way that makes it very difficult for us, the public, to know whether they are more concerned about their own and their companies’ financial interests or ours, let alone whether they are pushing a self-serving lucrative project that may even compromise national interests.

Consider the process of vetting defense projects, which should be, at least in theory, unimpeachable. First and foremost, countless lives are on the line. Second, these projects carry staggering price tags, and they can last for decades. Such investment of taxpayer dollars and time means that the process of allocating these precious public resources should be as fair and free of corruption as possible. That is hardly the system now in place.

Given the astronomical money involved in weapons systems and other big-ticket defense projects, there’s plenty of lobbying to go around. And while conventional lobbying, say, of Congress by defense companies is still paramount, today’s full-service influence effort embraces shadow lobbying, including sometimes by rent-a-generals. In its investigation of retired officers, the Globe reported on two decisions—whether to keep buying Humvees, and whether to make a new surveillance helicopter.

With regard to the first, the vehicles’ manufacturer, AM General, enlisted three retired generals to make sure the Army kept buying new Humvees rather than fixing up old ones. Retired Army General Jack Keane spoke with a top-ranking Army official and helped persuade Congress; but, as is common these days, he did not register as a lobbyist. Devoting less than twenty percent of his time to such activity, he need not register; and after all, as he said, “he only helps clients reach the right decisionmakers in the Pentagon or on Capitol Hill,” the Globe reports. 57

Two other retired generals used by AM General in the late 2000s had deep ties to defense acquisitions from their time in the Army: one had been in charge of buying ground-combat vehicles, including the Humvee; the other had been chief of the Army Materiel Command, which is effectively in charge of buying everything. As we saw with the top intelligence officers, these men were performing work similar to what they had done in the Army—choosing equipment—except now the people paying them, well, were the ones actually making the equipment. 58

In 2010, the Army decided to keep buying Humvees.

The other case is that of an unmanned surveillance helicopter called the Fire Scout that Northrop Grumman hoped to sell to the Army. But before the Army could buy the helicopters, it needed to know how it would use them and whether it wanted them. To help the Army make its determination, Bender notes, Northrop Grumman engaged the longtime “rent-a-general outfit” Burdeshaw Associates Ltd. That move would serve the company well. Burdeshaw not only opened doors to key Pentagon officials, but they also drafted an official government procurement document, “concept of operation,” which detailed the functioning of the helicopter and its purpose. This document provided the justification the Army required to develop the weapon system. 59Presumably, like a good marketer, Burdeshaw also included the needs of Northrop Grumman in the “concept of operation,” which potentially would give Northrop an edge in any competitive bid. 60The Army accepted the idea for the weapon system and subsequently placed an initial order with Northrop for eight Fire Scouts, at a cost to taxpayers of more than $100 million.

The rent-a-general trend remains alive and well. A subsequent investigation by the watchdog group Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics found that seventy percent of the 108 three- and four-star newly retired generals and admirals they tracked ended up at defense contractors or as consultants. They found, too, that some were still advising the Pentagon while working for contractors. 61

Senior Military Mentors

Retired senior officers often argue that they can police themselves. Their expertise, aura of rectitude, and decades in military service foster this belief. They can also argue that they have the crucial expertise needed to make these enormous decisions, and that, once they retire, the military is depleted of that expertise.

So, in an ostensible effort to regain some of that know-how, the military set up a “Senior Military Mentor” program. 62What could sound more innocuous?

The mentors, retired officers, were enlisted to advise their former colleagues in defense agencies, as a 2009 USA Today exposé details. 63It’s one of those ideas that might seem sensible at first glance. Only on closer inspection are the potential conflicts of interest revealed: eighty percent of the retired officers were also working in some capacity for defense contractors, advising on military services even as they were consulting for companies seeking to sell military products, and these same officers might also have financial ties to the company peddling the services. 64

Since the mentors were part-timers, they were not subject to the same rules as full-time federal employees. The selection of mentors, the identity of their defense clients, and the mentors’ pay levels were beyond government and public scrutiny. While contributing their invaluable experience, these officers also gleaned invaluable inside information. It is hard to imagine that they erased what they learned as mentors when they worked as defense industry executives or consultants, and vice versa. But imagine trying to figure out if important information had made its way back to those defense contractors, or how to trace possible influence in what to buy. USA Today makes it clear that it was no easy task even ascertaining from the military the average hourly rate these generals were earning. (As much as $440 an hour, many times what they would earn in active duty.) 65