Anthony Summers - The Eleventh Day

8

contacts with Taliban/improved cooperation/​assistance/​threats:

Guardian

(U.K.), 9/22/01,

Le Monde Diplomatique

, 1/02,

Nation

, 7/12/02, BBC News, 9/18/01;

9

Simons pressed:

Guardian

(U.K.), 9/22/01,

Le Monde Diplomatique

, 1/02,

Nation

, 7/12/02, BBC News, 9/18/01;

10 Rice “whether any”:CR, 204.

11 major stories re Atta:e.g. Chicago Tribune , 9/16/01;

12 “had been trailing”:corr. Kate Connolly, 2009;

13 German intelligence interest/CIA/Joint Inquiry aired:Report, JI, 29–, 183–;

14 Commission Report ignored:CR, 495n81;

15 sequence of events/​Zammar/​Darkazanli/​card/​phone tapped:ibid., CR, 164, 495n81, McDermott, 71–, Chicago Tribune , 10/5/03, “Germany’s Imam Mamoun Darkazanli,” Vol. 1, No. 8, www.jamestown.org. See earlier references to Zammar and Darkazanli in Chs. 24 and 27 and their related notes;

16 incoming call/​“Marwan”/​second/​third calls:“Memorandum, Investigative Proceedings Against Mohmammed Haydar Zammar,” 11/19/01, Bundeskriminalamt ST 23–067–256/​01, authors’ collection, Report, JI, 185–, Der Spiegel , 11/23/06, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagzeitung , 2/2/03, CR, 495n81;

17 “particularly valuable”/CIA “didn’t sit”/“uncertain”: NYT , 22/24/04, 2/25/04, Testimony of George Tenet, Hearings, U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2/24/04, www.intelligence.senate.gov, Report, JI, 185–, Staff Statement 11, CO, Graham with Nussbaum, 61;

18 Volz:McDermott, 71–, 75–, 278n11, Stern (Germany), 8/3/03, & see Chicago Tribune , 11/16/02.

19 Landesamt:Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz translates in English as the State Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Each of Germany’s sixteen states has such an office, which in turn answer to the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, the federal body. Together, they function as Germany’s domestic intelligence service.

20 “had knowledge”/“turned”/tried approaching: Chicago Tribune , 11/16/02. In an extraordinary episode right after 9/11, German police raided Mamoun Darkazanli’s apartment only to find it empty of documents. The raid was followed, however, by the mysterious delivery to the authorities of a bag of Darkazanli’s papers—by a man claiming to be a burglar who had stolen them from the suspect. The “burglar’s” account, however, appeared to be bogus. In light of the earlier CIA insistence on trying to persuade Darkazanli to become an informant, one German investigator remembered, “We all thought, ‘CIA.’ ” As of this writing, Darkazanli was reportedly still in Hamburg and at liberty ( Chicago Tribune , 11/16/02).

21 Jarrah stopped Dubai/“It was”:Corbin, 179–;

22 “because his name”:McDermott, 294n3;

23 learn fly/spread Islam:Corbin, 180, McDermott, 186;

24 “What happened”:McDermott, 187.

25 item redacted:Ziad Jarrah chronology, “03009470—ACS Download Documents, Packet 6,” CF. The FBI’s “Hijackers’ Timeline [redacted]” has also been heavily censored at that point. Because the episode was first reported as having occurred in January 2001 —not, as was in fact the case, in 2000—U.S. sources were initially able to deny that Jarrah had been questioned at Dubai in response to a CIA request. They also denied ever having been told about it. Vanity Fair reported in 2004 that the CIA had merely asked foreign border agencies to “question anyone [authors’ italics] who may have been returning from a training camp in Afghanistan.” While acknowledging that U.S. officials said it was untrue that Jarrah had been stopped specifically because his name was on a U.S.-supplied watchlist, investigative reporter Terry McDermott noted in 2005 that Washington had abandoned its initial denial it had been advised of about the Jarrah stop. “The United States,” McDermott wrote, “has acknowledged in internal documents and in communications with German investigators that the Emiratis did contact them.… They decline to say what they told the Emiratis” (Timeline: “Hijackers Timeline [redacted],” 11/14/03, INTELWIRE; reported as 2001: CNN, 8/1/02, McDermott, 294n3, Corbin, 179–; deny: CNN, 8/1/02, Statement of Eleanor Hill, 9/20/02, JI; McDermott: McDermott, 186, 294n3).

26 DIA/disquieting claim/four on radar:Statement of Mark Zaid, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 9/21/05, MFR 04021341, 7/13/04, CF, MFR [names & number redacted], Defense HUMINT Service Officers, Bagram Base, 10/21/03, CF; WSJ , 11/17/05, NYT , 8/9/05, 8/11/05, Fox News, 8/28/05, Lance, Triple Cross , 330–;

27 “data mining”/“use of high-powered”/visa records:Anthony Shaffer, Operation Dark Heart , NY: Thomas Dunne, 2010, 17–,164–, 245–, 272–, Bergen Record (N.J.), 8/14/05.

28 evidence destroyed:Though the Able Danger claim had not yet emerged when Congress’s Joint Inquiry was at work, its staff did question Major Keith Alexander of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, and twice visited the unit from which much of the Able Danger material reportedly originated. On both occasions, asked whether they knew of any evidence that the government had prior knowledge or should have had prior knowledge of the attack, military personnel said they knew of none.

A Defense Department report, and a Senate Intelligence Committee review, were to conclude in 2006 that the Able Danger claims were unsupported by the evidence. It is clear from both documents that witnesses’ memories were confused, as one might expect so long after the fact. Relevant documentary material that existed in 2003 now does not. Some was inadvertently destroyed during an office move. Some duplicate documentation Shaffer kept at his office, his attorney told the Committee on the Judiciary, was “apparently destroyed—for reasons unknown—by DIA in spring 2004.” The DOD report says no such documentation was found at Shaffer’s office (Joint Inquiry: corr. Miles Kara, 2011; claims unsupported: Defense report: “Alleged Misconduct by Senior DOD Officials Concerning the Able Danger Program & Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer,” U.S. Dept of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, 9/18/06; Senate review: Roberts & Rockefeller to colleagues, 12/22/06,

www.intelligence.senate.gov

; had Commission followed/destroyed?: Statement of Mark Zaid, Judiciary Committee, U.S. Senate, 9/21/05, Shaffer, 164–, 246–, Kean & Hamilton, 114, 294–, MFR 04021341, 7/13/04, CF).

29 Grenzfahndung:The two known to have been under border watch were Said Bahaji and Mounir Motassadeq (ints. Mounir el-Motassadeq, Motassadeq’s lawyer Udo Jacob, Dr. Manfred Murck, Dr. Herbert Müller, McDermott, 73–, 297n23, Stern [Germany], 8/13/03, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung , 2/2/03).

30 officials unhelpful:The two other organizations that declined interview requests were the Generalbundesanwalt, or Public Prosecutor’s Office—which has responsibility for terrorist cases—and the Bundeskriminalamt, the Federal Criminal Police Agency. The latter was the source of most German-related information in the 9/11 Commission Report.

31 Müller “Atta was”:Dr. Müller serves with the Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz Baden-Württemberg—Stuttgart is the state capital of Baden-Württemberg;