William Craig - Enemy at the Gates

+++ We shall do our utmost.

Colonel von Kunowski, Paulus’s chief quartermaster, added a final comment: “No more from here. I never sat so deep in shit. Kind regards.”

Paulus had known for several days that he would have to cut rations again. But he had waited for Christmas to pass before announcing a near-starvation diet: bread, two ounces per day per man (a piece the size of a man’s thumb); soup without fat (one portion) for lunch; one can of tinned meat when available for dinner; otherwise, more watery soup.

The stringent rations struck a mortal blow at the stamina of his men. Painfully aware of that fact, Paulus, attempted once more to remind his superiors that an entire army was on the brink of extinction.

Erich von Manstein received his chilling words and passed them on to Hitler.

+++ Bloody losses, cold and inadequate supplies have recently made inroads on divisions’ fighting strength. I must therefore report the following:

1. Army can continue to ward off small-scale attacks and deal with local crises for some time yet, always providing that supply improves.

2. If enemy draws off forces in any strength from Hoth’s front and uses these…on Stalingrad Fortress, latter cannot hold out for long.

3. No longer possible to execute breakout unless corridor is cut in advance and army replenished….

I therefore request representations at highest level [Hitler] to ensure energetic measures for speedy relief, unless overall situation compels sacrifice of army….

For the first time, Paulus mentioned the nagging possibility that Sixth Army might be used as a sacrificial pawn in this maniacal game of chess in order to tie down as many Soviet units as possible while Manstein tried to stabilize his other fronts.

One of Paulus’s aides, Capt. Winrich Behr, broached the same opinion in a remarkable letter to Maj. Nikolaus von Below, who was Hitler’s adjutant at Rastenburg. The two men were old friends and were married to sisters. They had always been honest with each other and Behr now provided his comrade with a uniquely frank and intimate glimpse of the atmosphere at Sixth Army Headquarters in Gumrak:

Dear Klaus:

At the moment we feel somewhat betrayed and sold out….To wait and to persevere is a matter which goes without saying, even if no further orders come through. I just want to tell you quite simply that there is nothing here to eat, with the exception of a few thousand horses, which may last until January, but with which one cannot alone feed an army of 250,000 men. Now there is only bread for tomorrow…. With my knowledge of the German soldier we have to foresee…that their physical resistance will be lowered so much… the moment will come where each man will say: “I don’t give a shit about anything,” and will freeze to death or be captured. The men have the desire to hold fast and it is incomprehensible how they have held so far…. Heating is a very big problem. Everything has to be fetched from Stalingrad, but there is no gas available for that. In other words, the cat eats its own tail all around…. It may have been decided in view of the situation to give us up, which is not unthinkable—although it is hard to fathom the consequences. If so, I will live a few days more with Eichlepp [a fellow aide], thanks to your excellent chocolate!…

I write this to you, Klaus, so you don’t think that we are griping unnecessarily. What I am telling you is based not only on my personal experience—but also on messages and daily conversations with friends at the front. It is as bad as I say it is. No miracle in the steppe can help us here, only good old Aunt Ju and the He-111 [transport planes] if they come—and come often.

…Otherwise, the mood is and has been good here. A little running scared, but there is still hope amongst enlisted men and officers. “Stand fast—the Führer will get you out!” is the motto. Here at the top, especially on days like this one, looking into an empty barrel, the responsibility lies heavy….

Like the sudden rupture of an umbilical cord, the teleprinter link between Gumrak and Novocherkassk was torn asunder as, on the steppe west of the pocket, Soviet armor captured the decimeter relays maintaining the fragile semipersonal contact between Schmidt and Schulz, Paulus and Manstein. The severed connection left Sixth Army with a single thousand-watt transmitter, and several auxiliary sets of lesser strength, to communicate with Army Group Don.

Some German officers inside the pocket looked on the abrupt blackout as an augury of ominous days.

In Moscow, Stalin fumed at the delay in destroying Sixth Army. Though his front commanders continued to relay news of heady triumphs from other sectors of the battlefield, the premier refused to relax.

On December 28, General Vatutin at Soviet Southwest Front Headquarters along the upper Don contacted him with news of an overwhelming victory; “The Italian Eighth Army’s right wing had melted away… sixty thousand prisoners and about the same number… killed… their stores have been seized by our forces… the pitiful remains… are not putting up any resistance….”

Stalin absorbed this exhilarating report without much enthusiasm, and immediately pressed Vatutin on the one danger zone in his command region. Around the great German airfield at Tatsinskaya, where Gen. Martin Fiebig had fled the wreckage of his shuttle air force only four days previously, a Russian armored column was temporarily trapped by lead elements of the German panzers rushed from their aborted relief effort at the Mishkova River.

Stalin chose this moment to lecture Vatutin on strategy:

Your first task is to get Badanov, [commander of the encircled Twenty-fourth Tank Corps] out of trouble…. You were right in allowing [him] to give up Tatsinskaya in an emergency. We have already given you the Second and Twenty-third Tank Corps to convert Little Saturn into Big Saturn [the drive to Rostov and the Black Sea that Russian general Krupennikov hinted at to his interrogators on December 21]…. You should bear in mind that over very long distances tank corps are best launched in pairs rather than alone; otherwise .they risk falling into a situation like Badanov’s. Just remember Badanov; don’t forget Badanov. Get him out at any cost!

With that final admonition, Stalin left Vatutin to manage his own little war between the Don and Rostov, and went on to his most perplexing situation: Paulus’s Sixth Army, whose continued existence tied up seven Russian armies needed elsewhere.

Meeting with his senior generals, the premier came right to his major complaint: “Only one man should direct operations… the fact that there are two front commanders [around Stalingrad] is interfering with this.”

When everyone at the table agreed, Stalin asked: “Who gets the assignment?”

Marshal Georgi Zhukov remained silent as someone recommended Lieutenant General Rokossovsky.

“Why don’t you say anything?” Stalin prodded Zhukov.

“In my opinion, either commander is capable of doing the job. Yeremenko’s feelings would be hurt, of course, if you transferred his Stalingrad front to Rokossovsky.”

That point was shrugged off by Stalin. “This is not the time to worry about hurt feelings. Telephone Yeremenko and tell him about the decision….”

When Zhukov called Yeremenko and explained the situation to him over a high-security line, the pugnacious general felt his professional world crumbling around him as he heard, “Transfer the Fifty-seventh, Sixty-four and Sixty-second armies from the Stalingrad front to [Rokossovsky’s control]….” Yeremenko recovered enough to splutter: “What brought this on?”

Zhukov patiently explained the considerations but sensing the general’s outrage and humiliation, he quietly suggested that Yeremenko call back later.