William Craig - Enemy at the Gates

They wondered openly whether the lathe could still be used. “Would it work again for the Russians if?…” Or, “Where is Reutlingen?” asked those from the Rhineland and further north.

Gustav Wagner’s lathe became a shrine.

Thirteen hundred miles to the northwest, at the Wolf’s Lair in East Prussia, a tragic war of nerves was being played out. Chief of Staff Gen. Kurt Zeitzler had dropped his role of sycophant as he desperately sought approval for Operation Thunderclap. Deeply committed to saving the Sixth Army, Zeitzler even insisted on reducing rations at the officers’ mess as both a tribute to the beleaguered men in the Kessel and a reminder that it was OKW’s responsibility to bring them out alive. In his daily conferences with the Führer, Zeitzler began acting like his predecessor, Franz Halder, badgering Hitler to endorse Thunderclap. When the annoyed dictator waved his entreaties aside, the frustrated Zeitzler often walked back to his office in a towering rage.

He and Manstein, at least, were of one mind on the issue, and he had promised the field marshal that Hitler would eventually relent. But when Gen. Arthur Schmidt’s figures on auto and diesel supplies landed on Hitler’s desk, Kurt Zeitzler lost his battle. Schmidt’s report of Sixth Army’s having only about 140 cubic meters of fuel, which he had given to General Schulz in the teleprinter conversation of December 21, had been forwarded quickly to East Prussia. And his statement that the Sixth Army could only move twenty kilometers (twelve miles) toward a linkup with the German relief force created a negative reaction to Zeitzler’s argument for Thunderclap. For if the Führer had ever entertained any thoughts of granting Paulus permission to pull back with his entire army, Schmidt’s report swept them away.

Facing the stubborn Zeitzler with the report in his hand, Hitler scornfully asked: “But what exactly do you wish me to do? Paulus can’t break out and you know it!”

Zeitzler had no rebuttal. The evidence was too damning and as he left the room, he thought about the tragedy that was developing. Now, at this very moment, Hitler was correct about Sixth Army’s inability to break out. But his earlier mistakes and adamant refusal to let Paulus escape when the Kessel was first formed thirty days earlier had created this disaster.

At Army Group Don Headquarters in Novocherkassk, Erich von Manstein prepared a final summation in hopes of changing Hitler’s mind.

Document Army Group Don 39694/5

Teletype

22 Dec. 42

TOP SECRET, “Chefsache,” transmittal by officers only

TO: Chief of General Staff of the Army

1. The development of the situation on the left flank [Italian sector] of the Army Group makes it necessary to move up forces there very soon….

2. This measure means that the Sixth Army cannot be relieved for some time and that, as a consequence, the Army must be adequately provided with supplies for a long time. In order to maintain the physical strength of the Army through adequate nutrition and to enable the Army to engage in defensive operations, an average daily supply of at least 550 tons is required…. According to the opinion of Richthofen [the Luftwaffe general] in this area we can but expect an average of 200 tons, considering the long distance to be covered by the aircraft…. Unless adequate aerial supplies can be ensured… the only remaining alternative is the earliest possible breakout of the Sixth Army.

In pointing out the patent impossibility of meeting the required air supply, Manstein was reminding Hitler once again that the total withdrawal of Sixth Army from the Kessel was the only alternative left.

Convinced he had made the options clear, the choice obvious, the field marshal ordered the message sent to East Prussia and turned to his other problems.

Meanwhile, the teleprinter from Novocherkassk to Stalingrad kept up a steady chatter. Its stark vocabulary failed to underline the fact that the hours left for deliverance had vanished.

Teletype: General Schmidt—General Schulz

22 Dec 42-1710 hrs. to 1945 hrs.

Here is General Schulz. Hello, Schmidt. I want to report on the situation:

Hoth’s 6th and 17th Armored Divisions at Vassilevska [on the Mishkova south of the Kessen ] were engaged all day today in repulsing strong enemy attacks from the southeast, east and north, so that the armored divisions were not able to make the intended thrust toward the north.

It is planned to make this thrust as soon as the impetus of the Russian attacks has been stopped. Developments will show whether that will already be possible tomorrow…. Unfortunately, during the last 24 hours weather conditions were such that no air supplies were made because of the danger of icing and fog. No air reconnaissance was possible either. We must hope for an improvement of weather conditions in the near future. The 175 “Ju” aircraft for an increase of air supplies are on their way. This much on the situation.

The field marshal requests that the following question, which is of importance for an estimate of the Army’s supply situation, be clarified. According to the report of the quartermaster Sixth Army, there are still about 40,000 horses in the pocket. This report is contradicted by Major Eismann, who reported that the divisions had only about 800 horses left. Can you tell me the exact number of existing horses; if possible state number of ponies [Panjes] and normal-sized horses separately? This is very important, and have steps been taken on your side to ensure that the horse meat is used sparingly for the provision of the troops?…

Schmidt had slightly more than 23,000 horses left, only enough to feed the Army until mid-January. The general soon gave Schulz this total. He had been giving other statistics to higher headquarters all day.

… Ration strength on 18 December: 249,600 (including 13 thousand Rumanians) 19,300 auxiliary volunteers [Russian Hiwi laborers] and approximately 6,000 wounded.

…Battle strength: In front line… infantry 25,000, engineers, 3,200….

… Ammunition: Stocks in Army reserve are low and include 3,000 rounds for light field howitzers, 900 rounds for heavy field howitzers, and 600 rounds for other guns….

… Health: Men have been on half rations since 26 November…. Under present conditions they are incapable of undertaking long marches or engaging in offensive action without a large number falling out….

End

At 6:30 A.M. on December 23, the 6th Panzer Division renewed its offensive to widen the bridgehead at Vassilevska on the Mishkova River south of the Kessel. Six hours later, at 12:30 P.M., 57th Corps commander, General Kirchner, arrived in the area “to obtain firsthand information…” on what was going wrong. For in the intervening time, 6th Panzer Division had been unable to move any closer to Stalingrad.

A short time later, at 1:05 P.M., the teleprinter clicked out a message from OKW in Rastenburg. Field Marshal Manstein expected it to be the answer to his plea for giving the code word Thunderclap. It was not.

PERSONAL AND IMMEDIATE

Following from Führer begins: The railway junction Morosovskaya and the two air bases at Morosovsk and Tatsinskaya will be held and kept in operation at all costs…. Führer agrees that units of 57th Panzer Corps be transferred across the Don…. Army Group Don will report measures being taken….

Hitler was ignoring Manstein’s carefully worded warning of the dangers of leaving Paulus inside the Kessel. In fact, Hitler had not even alluded to Operation Thunderclap. Instead he was telling Manstein to strip combat units from Hoth’s relief force and save the situation at the threatened Italian front.