William Craig - Enemy at the Gates

What is your estimate of the possibility of a sortie toward the west in the direction of Kalach?…It has been ascertained the enemy is consolidating his position vis-a-vis the south front….

[Confused, Paulus asked]: +++ Consolidation opposite which south front is meant? Opposite south front 6th Army or Group Hoth?

[Schulz hastened to clarify:] +++ Opposite south front 6th Army….

[Paulus hesitated to give a quick answer:] +++ [I will] Reply by radio…

[Schulz:] +++ Any further questions?

[The teletype operator answered for Paulus:] +++ The general said no and has gone….

But Paulus was back shortly with his opinion, sent on to Manstein by wireless.

Number 404

19 December 1942, 0135 hours

TOP SECRET

To Army Group Don

Sortie toward the south at present still easier, since Russians vis-a-vis south front of Army even less prepared for defense and weaker than in direction Kalach….[to the west]

Forty-five miles south of the Kessel, the German 17th Panzer Division rushed to position itself on the left flank of the 6th Panzer Division, trying to break through to Paulus. Finally released into action by Hitler, the 17th added the extra firepower needed to break down Russian resistance, and in the early afternoon of December 19, the German tanks went back to Verkhne-Kumski, where hundreds of Red Army men suddenly climbed from their rifle pits and raised their hands in submission. While the tankers waved these prisoners to the rear, the 6th Panzer Division received new orders: Strike quickly for the bridge at Vassilevska, fifteen miles northeast at the Mishkova River. The Stalingrad Kessel, its tanks and artillery readied, was only twenty-five air miles beyond that town.

As early winter darkness intruded, the rejuvenated Germans raced off on an ice-coated road. In front of them, the horizon began to blink with muzzle bursts from concealed Russian artillery emplacements.

At Novocherkassk, Erich von Manstein carefully prepared his summation on how Sixth Army might be saved. The plea was directed to Adolf Hitler.

Teletype!

19 Dec. 42, 1425 hrs.

TOP SECRET, “Chefsache,” Transmittal by officers only.

To Chief of General Staff of the Army for immediate submittal to the Führer.

The situation… has developed in such a manner, that a relief of the Sixth Army cannot be expected in the foreseeable future.

Because of the shortage of available aircraft as well as the inclement weather, an air supply and thus the maintenance of the Army…are not possible—as was proven during the four weeks since the encirclement….The Armored Corps alone evidently cannot clear a channel to the Sixth Army and can far less keep such a channel open.

I now believe that a sortie by the [Sixth] Army toward the southwest is the last possibility, to save at least the mass of the Army’s soldiers and still mobile weapons.

The immediate objective of the sortie will be the establishment of contact with the 57th ‘Armored Corps [6th Panzers, etc.] approximately on the… Mishkova river. This can only be accomplished by fighting their way free toward the southwest, and gradually shifting the entire Army in such a manner that section by section of the fortified area in the north is given up as ground is gained in the southwest. It is imperative that, in the course of this operation, the air supply of the Army by fighter and fighter-bomber forces is ensured…

In case of a further delay, before long the 57th Armored Corps will be stalled on or north of the Mishkova river and this would exclude the possibility of a simultaneous attack from within and without. Anyway, prior to assembling for the attack, the Sixth Army will need several days for regrouping and refueling.

Provisions in the pocket will last until 22 December. The men already show symptoms of debilitation….According to an Army report, the mass of horses cannot be used because they are starved or else have been eaten.

Manstein was almost demanding the evacuation of the Kessel and the complete withdrawal from Hitler’s “passion,” the city of Stalingrad.

Now less than forty miles south of the Kessel’s perimeter, the 6th Panzer Division was moving across unfamiliar terrain. Rushing ahead recklessly, it had no choice but to run a murderous gauntlet of armor-piercing shells. Tracer bullets reached out from both sides of the road and riddled the buttoned-up tanks. Inside the turrets, crewmen were dazzled by close bursts that flooded the tank interiors with intense light.

“Don’t stop!” The command echoed through the formation, and the panzers rammed ahead into the night. Finally they passed through the artillery zone and were cruising steadily into the unknown. Behind them, a swarm of German tanks burned and exploded.

Now the teleprinter linking Manstein and Sixth Army began tapping out the words of another conference:

19 Dec 42, 1750 hours

[Manstein:] +++ Are you gentlemen present?

+++ Yes, sir.

+++ Please give me a brief comment on report Eismann.

[Paulus began a meticulous analysis of his options:]

Case 1— Sortie [to the south] beyond Businovka with the objective of joining Hoth is possible only with armored vehicles. We are short of infantry forces and, otherwise, the defense of Stalingrad and long new flank are jeopardized.

If this solution is chosen, all reserves will leave the fortress….

Case 2— Breakthrough without establishing contact with Hoth only in an extreme emergency. Loss of large amounts of material must be accepted. Precondition is previous arrival of sufficient air supplies [provisions and fuel] in order to improve the state of health of the troops prior to the attack. It would facilitate this solution if Hoth should be able to establish contacts temporarily in order to pour in tractors. The Infantry Divisions at present are practically immobile and more divisions are becoming so every day because we are compelled to slaughter horses continuously.

Case 3— In view of the present situation, further defense depends on supplies and sufficient reinforcements. Supplies so far were absolutely inadequate. At the present supply rate it will not be possible to hold the fortress much longer….

[Manstein wanted more precise information:] +++ What would be the earliest date on which you could form up for solution 2 [Thunderclap]—the complete withdrawal from the Kessel?

+++ Preparatory period three to four days.

+++ How much fuel and provisions are needed? Objective Mishkova.

+++ One and a half times the normal fuel supply rate; let Chief Quartermaster Army Group Don figure it out. Reduced rations for about 10 days for 270,000 men….

[Manstein was finished:] +++ …Greetings. Do you have any more questions?

[Paulus had two major concerns:] +++ First question: May the Corps participate in the deliberation of preparations for case 2 [Thunderclap]? Second question: How is the situation with Group Hoth [to the south]?

[Manstein was brief:] +++ To (1): Wait for tonight’s conversation. To (2) …Hoth [the 6th Panzer Division] is attacking and advancing both sides of Verkhne-Kumski….

Moments later the two generals conferred again as Manstein received permission from East Prussia to give Sixth Army a partial clearance for breakout:

+++…Hello, Paulus.

Everything went all right with [6th Panzer Division] today, he gained the Mishkova section. After this conversation you will receive an order, but I want you to understand that… [Thunderclap] is a possible solution which becomes effective only upon special order. Eismann described the situation there to me and I am fully aware of the difficulties…. If you have any questions regarding the following order, let’s talk again tonight. I have nothing else. +++