Charles Bradlaugh - The True Story of my Parliamentary Struggle

So much misapprehension and misrepresentation prevails as to what has really taken place in the House of Commons with reference to my Parliamentary struggle, that I reprint the Report of the Second Select Committee and the Evidence taken before such Committee, together with my three speeches at the bar and the resolutions of the House: these together giving the actual facts.

Ordered , – [Tuesday, 25th May 1880]: – That Mr. Bradlaugh, the Member for Northampton, having claimed at the Table of this House to make an Affirmation or Declaration instead of the Oath prescribed by Law, founding his claim upon the terms of the Act 29 & 30 Vict. c. 19, and the Evidence Amendment Acts of 1869 and 1870, and stating that he had been permitted to affirm in Courts of Justice by virtue of the said Evidence Amendment Acts: And it having been referred to a Select Committee to consider and report their opinion whether persons entitled, under the provisions of the Evidence Amendment Act, 1869, and the Evidence Amendment Act, 1870, to make a solemn Declaration instead of an Oath in Courts of Justice, may be admitted to make an Affirmation or Declaration instead of an Oath in this House, in pursuance of the Acts 29 & 30 Vict. c. 19, and 31 & 32 Vict. c. 72; And the said Committee having reported that in their opinion such persons cannot be admitted to make an Affirmation or Declaration, instead of an Oath in pursuance of the said Acts:

And Mr. Bradlaugh having since come to the Table of the House for the purpose of taking the Oath prescribed by the 29 & 30 Vict. c. 19, and the 31 & 32 Vict. c. 72, and objection having been made to his taking the said Oath, it be referred to a Select Committee to inquire into and consider the facts and circumstances under which Mr. Bradlaugh claims to have the Oath prescribed by the 29 & 30 Vict. c. 19, and 31 & 32 Vict. c. 72, administered to him in this House, and also as to the Law applicable to such claim under such circumstances, and as to the right and jurisdiction of this House to refuse to allow the said form of the Oath to be administered to him, and to report thereon to the House, together with their opinion thereon.

Ordered , – [Friday, 28th May 1880]: – That the Committee do consist of twenty-three Members.

Committee nominated of —

Mr. Whitbread.

Sir John Holker.

Mr. John Bright.

Lord Henry Lennox.

Mr. Massey.

Mr. Staveley Hill.

Sir Henry Jackson.

Mr. Attorney General.

Mr. Solicitor General.

Sir Gabriel Goldney.

Mr. Grantham.

Mr. Pemberton.

Mr. Watkin Williams.

Mr. Walpole.

Mr. Hopwood.

Mr. Beresford Hope.

Major Nolan.

Mr. Chaplin.

Mr. Serjeant Simon.

Mr. Secretary Childers.

Mr. Trevelyan.

Sir Richard Cross.

Mr. Gibson.

That the Committee have power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records.

That Five be the Quorum of the Committee.

THE SELECT COMMITTEE appointed to inquire into and consider the facts and circumstances under which Mr. Bradlaugh claims to have the Oath prescribed by the 29 & 30 Vict., c. 19, and 31 and 32 Vict., c. 72, administered to him in this House; and also as to the Law applicable to such claim under such circumstances; and as to the right and jurisdiction of this House to refuse to allow the said form of the Oath to be administered to him; and to Report thereon to the House, together with their Opinion thereon: – Have agreed to the following REPORT: —

In pursuance of the terms of the reference to your Committee, they have inquired into and considered (1) the facts and circumstances under which Mr. Bradlaugh claims to have the oath prescribed by the Parliamentary Oaths Act, 1866, and the Promissory Oaths Act, 1868, administered to him in the House, (2) the Law applicable to such claim under such circumstances, and (3) the right and jurisdiction of the House to refuse to allow the form of the said Oath to be administered to him.

In order to carry out such inquiry and consideration, your Committee thought it right to examine Sir T. Erskine May as a witness before them. Mr. Bradlaugh applied to be permitted to make a statement to your Committee, and the application was granted. After such statement had been made by Mr. Bradlaugh, he submitted himself for examination, and was examined by any Members of your Committee who desired to put questions to him. Under the circumstances appearing in the Evidence and in the Appendix to this Report, your Committee admitted in evidence a letter written by Mr. Bradlaugh to certain newspapers, dated 20th May, 1880. All the evidence taken by your Committee appears in the Appendix to this Report.

The facts and circumstances under which Mr. Bradlaugh claimed to take and subscribe the Oath are as follow: On Monday, the 3rd of May, Mr. Bradlaugh came to the Table of the House and claimed to be allowed to affirm, as a person for the time being by law permitted to make a solemn affirmation instead of taking an oath; and on being asked by the Clerk upon what grounds he claimed to make an affirmation, he said that he did so by virtue of the Evidence Amendment Acts, 1869 and 1870. Whereupon Mr. Speaker informed Mr. Bradlaugh, “that if he desired to address the House in explanation of his claim, he might be permitted to do so.” In accordance with Mr. Speaker’s intimation, Mr. Bradlaugh stated shortly that he relied on the Evidence Further Amendment Act, 1869, and the Evidence Amendment Act, 1870, adding, “I have repeatedly, for nine years past, made an affirmation in the highest courts of jurisdiction in this realm; I am ready to make such a declaration or affirmation.” Thereupon Mr. Speaker acquainted the House that Mr. Bradlaugh having made such claim, he did not consider himself justified in determining it; and having grave doubts on the construction of the Acts above stated, he desired to refer the matter to the judgment of the House. Thereupon a Select Committee was appointed to consider and report their opinion whether persons entitled, under the provisions of the Evidence Amendment Acts, 1869 and 1870, to make a solemn declaration instead of an oath in courts of justice, might be admitted to make an affirmation or declaration instead of an oath, in pursuance of the Acts 29 & 30 Vict. c. 19, and 31 & 32 Vict. c. 72; and on the 20th of May the Committee reported that, in their opinion, persons so entitled could not be admitted to make such affirmation or declaration instead of an oath in the House of Commons.

On the day after the receipt of this Report, Mr. Bradlaugh presented himself at the table of the House to take and subscribe the Oath; and was proceeding to do so, when Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, one of the Members for Portsmouth, objected thereto, and Mr. Bradlaugh having been ordered to withdraw, Sir H. D. Wolff moved, “That, in the opinion of the House, Mr. Bradlaugh, the Member for Northampton, ought not to be allowed to take the Oath which he then required to be administered to him, in consequence of his having previously claimed to make an affirmation or declaration instead of the Oath prescribed by law, founding his claim upon the terms of the Act 29 & 30 Vict. c. 19, and the Evidence Amendment Acts of 1869 and 1870; and on the ground that under the provisions of those Acts the presiding judge at a trial has been satisfied that the taking of an oath would have no binding effects on his conscience.” This Motion was superseded by an Amendment appointing your Committee.

Your Committee have been furnished by Sir T. Erskine May with a list of precedents which illustrate the jurisdiction and proceedings of the House in regard to the taking of Oaths. These precedents, and others which Mr. Bradlaugh placed before your Committee as bearing on the case, will be found in the Appendix to this Report. They may generally be divided into three classes: first, cases of refusal to take the Oath; secondly, claims to make an Affirmation, instead of taking the Oath; and, thirdly, claims to omit a portion of the Oath of Abjuration. Among them there is no precedent of any Member coming to the table to take and subscribe the Oath, who has not been allowed to do so, nor of any Member coming to the table and intimating expressly, or by necessary implication, that an oath would not, as an oath, be binding on his conscience. The present case is, therefore, one of first impression.