After some observations in regard to two exceptional cases—that of Gordon, on his first trial for engaging in the slave trade, 2 2 The second trial of Gordon, resulting in a conviction, took place before a full Court, Mr. Justice Nelson sitting with Judge Shipman.
and the case of the parties convicted of murder on board the ship "Gen. Parkhill," both cases having been tried before a District Judge sitting alone, the counsel for the defendant in each case making no request to have a full Court—Judge Shipman went on to say, that in consequence of Judge Nelson's engagements in another District, in September, and in view of his confinement with the effects of a fall from his carriage, which would prevent his sitting in August, he (Judge Nelson) could not probably hear this case until the October term. He therefore ordered the trial to be set down for the third Monday of October, at eleven o'clock.
The prisoners were remanded to the custody of the Marshal, and their manacles, which had been removed while they were in Court, being replaced, they were taken to the Tombs.
TRIALOF THEOFFICERS AND CREW OF THE SCHOONER SAVANNAH, ON THE CHARGE OF PIRACY
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Wednesday, Oct. 23, 1861.
The United States
against
Thomas Harrison Baker,
Charles Sydney Passalaigue,
John Harleston,
Joseph Cruse del Carno,
Patrick Daly,
John Murphy,
Martin Galvin,
Henry Cashman Howard,
Henry Oman,
William Charles Clarke,
Richard Palmer,
Alexander Carter Coid,
Albert G. Ferris.
Hon. Judges NELSON and SHIPMAN Presiding.
Counsel for the United States:
E. DELAFIELD SMITH, WM. M. EVARTS, SAML. BLATCHFORD, ETHAN ALLEN
Counsel for the Defendants:
BOWDOIN, LAROCQUES & BARLOW, DANIEL LORD, JAMES T. BRADY, ALGERNON S. SULLIVAN, JOSEPH H. DUKES, ISAAC DAVEGA, MAURICE MAYER.
E. Delafield Smith, Esq. , United States District Attorney, stated that he desired to use Albert Gallatin Ferris, one of the prisoners indicted, as a witness, and would therefore enter a nolle prosequi in regard to him.
The Court : Are the prisoners to be tried jointly?
Mr. Lord : I believe so, sir.
The Clerk called over the names of the prisoners, directing them to challenge the Jurors as called.
Judge Nelson : Those of the prisoners who desire to do so may take seats by the side of their counsel.
The Clerk proceeded to call the panel.
Edward Werner called, and challenged for principal cause by Mr. Smith:
Q. Have you any conscientious scruples that would prevent your finding a verdict of guilty, in a capital case, where the evidence was sufficient to convince you that the prisoner was guilty?
A. No, sir.
By Mr. Larocque , for the prisoners:
Q. Have you read the account in the newspapers of the capture of the Savannah privateers?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Have you ever formed or expressed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of these prisoners?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you ever formed or expressed any opinion as to whether they were guilty of piracy, if the facts were as alleged?
A. No, sir.
Challenge withdrawn. Juror sworn.
William H. Marshall called, and challenged for principal cause:
Q. Have you any conscientious scruples that would prevent your finding a verdict of guilty in a capital case, where the evidence was sufficient to convince you that the prisoner was guilty?
A. No, sir.
By Mr. Larocque , for the prisoners:
Q. You read the account of the privateer Savannah?
A. I believe I have.
Q. Have you formed or expressed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoners?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you ever formed or expressed any opinion as to whether they were guilty of piracy, if the facts were as alleged?
A. I have not formed any opinion as to these men.
Q. As to the general question, whether cruising under a commission from the Confederate States is piracy?
A. I do not think I have formed any opinion, or expressed one.
Challenge withdrawn. Juror sworn.
William Powell called, and challenged for principal cause by Mr. Smith:
Q. Have you any conscientious scruples that would prevent your finding a verdict of guilty, in a capital case, where the evidence was sufficient to convince you that the prisoner was guilty?
A. No, sir.
By Mr. Larocque , for the prisoners:
Q. Have you formed or expressed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of these prisoners?
A. I have not formed any opinion that would prevent me from giving a verdict according to the facts of the case. I have read the account, and I presume have formed such an opinion as most men do from reading an account, if the facts be so and so.
Q. Have you formed any opinion as to whether cruising, under a commission from the Confederate States, is piracy?
A. Yes, sir, I have.
Mr. Evarts objected that this was purely a question of law, and one jurors should not be inquired of.
The Court sustained the objection.
Q. Did you believe the accounts which you read of this transaction?
A. Well, it is difficult to say. There is so much published in the papers now-a-days that is not correct, that I am hardly prepared to say I believe anything I see, without palpable evidence. I believe the fact of the capture of the Savannah.
Q. Did you read what had been done by the Savannah before she was captured?
A. Well, I formed no opinion with regard to that.
Q. Did you form an opinion of the character of the act with which the defendants were charged?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you entertain the settled opinion that acting under a commission from President Davis, or the Confederate Government, constitutes piracy?
Mr. Evarts objected that this was a question of law.
The Court : I doubt whether that is a question that would be proper.
Mr. Larocque : This is a very peculiar case, as your honor is well aware. It is a case of first impression in the courts of the United States. It is a case in which, probably, there will be very little difference between the prosecution and the defendants as to the mere facts which are charged in this indictment, and it is a case in which jurors who present themselves to be sworn, if they have any bias or prejudice whatever, have it rather in reference to the character of the acts than as to the acts themselves having been committed or not having been committed. Now, we all know, if your honor please, that in all criminal trials a great deal of discussion has always taken place with reference to the jurisdiction of the jury over questions of law. The Courts have held that they are bound to receive their instructions on the law from the Court; but, at the same time, if they do not act in pursuance of the instructions which they receive, it is a matter between them and their own consciences, and it is a matter which no form of review in these Courts will reach. Now, one of my associates has handed to me an authority upon this subject from 1st Baldwin's Reports—that on the trial of Handy, in 1832, for treason, Judge Grier held that a juror who had formed an opinion that the riots in question did not amount to treason, was incompetent; and, in the case of the United States v. Wilson, it was held that a juror was incompetent who stated, on being challenged, that he had read the newspaper account of the facts at the time, and had come to his own conclusion, and had made up his mind that the offence was treason, although he had not expressed that opinion, nor formed or expressed an opinion that the defendant was or was not engaged in the offence. It seems to me that these authorities cover precisely the case before the Court, the only difference being that this is a charge of piracy, and the other a charge of treason.
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