Andreas Reckwitz - Society of Singularities

Like the shapes and colors in a kaleidoscope, the phenomena of present-day society discussed above, which at first seem to be highly heterogeneous, form a pattern, and it is this pattern that I intend to outline in the present book. My main thesis is as follows: in late modernity, a structural transformation has taken place in society, a transformation in which the dominance of the social logic of the general has been usurped by the dominance of a social logic of the particular . In what follows, this exceptionality or uniqueness – in other words, that which seems to be nonexchangeable and incomparable – will be circumscribed with the concept of singularity. 5My theory of late modernity, and of modernity in general, thus hinges on the distinction between the general and the particular. This distinction is not uncomplicated, but it opens up a perspective that helps us to unlock the present. Originally a philosophical matter, the difference between the general and the particular was subjected to a systematic analysis by Kant. 6Here, however, I would like to free it from the corset of epistemology and discuss it in sociological terms. In the human world, of course, the general and the particular always coexist; it is a matter of perspective. According to Kant, “concepts” are always general, whereas “intuition” ( Anschauung ) is directed toward the particular. Thus, it is possible to interpret every element of the world either as a specific individual entity or as an example of a general type. As far as sociology is concerned, this is trivial. The sociologically interesting question is entirely different: there are social complexes and entire forms of society that systematically promote and prefer the creation of the general while inhibiting and devaluing the particular. And, conversely, there are other social complexes and societies that encourage, value, and actively engage in the practice of singularization at the expense of the general. The general and the particular do not simply exist. They are both social fabrications.

Late-modern society – that is, the form of modernity that has been developing since the 1970s or 1980s – is a society of singularities to the extent that its predominant logic is the social logic of the particular. It is also – and this cannot be stressed enough – the first society in which this is true in a comprehensive sense. In fact, the social logic of the particular governs all dimensions of the social: things and objects as well as subjects, collectives, spaces, and temporalities. “Singularity” and “singularization” are cross-sectional concepts, and they designate a cross-sectional phenomenon that pervades all of society. Although the thought may seem unusual at first, it must be emphasized that singularization has affected more than just human subjects, and it is for this reason that the concept of individuality, which has traditionally been reserved for human beings, is no longer applicable. Singularization also encompasses the fabrication and appropriation of things and objects as particular. It applies to the formation and perception of spaces, temporalities, and – not least – collectives.

To be sure, the structure of the society of singularities is unusual and surprising, and it appears as though we are lacking suitable concepts and perspectives for understanding its complexity. How can a society organize itself in such a way as to be oriented toward the seemingly fleeting and antisocial factor of the particular? Which structures have given shape to the society of singularities, and which forms have been adopted by its economy and technology, its social structure and lifestyles, its working world, cities, and politics? And how can and should a sociological investigation proceed that wishes to subject the social logic of singularization to a detailed analysis? From the outset, it is important for such an investigation to avoid two false approaches: mystification and exposure.

Those who maintain a mystifying attitude toward singularities – which is widespread in the social world of art viewers, religious worshippers, admirers of charismatic leaders, lovers, music fans, brand fetishizers, and unwavering patriots – presume that the things that are valuable and fascinating to them are, in their very essence and independent of their observer, genuinely authentic and unique phenomena. In response to this tendency to mystify the authentic, the function of sociological analysis is to clarify matters. It should not be supposed that singularities are pre-social givens; rather, it is necessary to reconstruct the processes and structures of the social logic of singularities. “Social logic” means that singularities are not, without any ado whatsoever, objectively or subjectively present but are rather socially fabricated through and through. As we will see, that which is regarded and experienced as unique arises exclusively from social practices of perception, evaluation, production, and appropriation in which people, goods, communities, images, books, cities, events, and other such things are singularized . That it is possible to analyze general practices and structures, which themselves revolve around the production of singularities , is not a logical contradiction but rather a genuine paradox. That is precisely the objective of this book: to figure out the patterns, types, and constellations that have emerged from the social fabrication of particularities. Singularities are therefore anything but antisocial or pre-social; in this context, any metaphor suggesting that they are in some way isolated or separated from society would be entirely out of place. On the contrary, singularities are the very things around which the social revolves in late modernity.

To dissect the social logic of particularities without mystifying uniqueness is not, however, the same thing as denying the reality of singularities and revealing them to be mere appearances or ideological constructs. Such efforts at exposure can often be found masquerading as cultural critique. The critic will gleefully set out to demonstrate that the apparent particularities of others are in fact just further examples of general types, examples of popular tastes or of the eternal cycle of circulating of goods: Apple products, the films by the Coen brothers, and gifted children are not really extraordinary, and behind all purported originality there in fact lurks nothing more than conformist, average types. My analysis of the social logic of singularities will go out of its way to avoid such reductionism. As I mentioned above, it is not surprising that, as Kant proposed, everything particular can be interpreted from a different perspective as an example of something general. What appears to be particular can always be typecast. However, the fact that singularities are socially fabricated does not mean that their social reality should be denied. In this case, it might be best to recall the famous “Thomas theorem”: “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.” 7In our context, this means the following: in that the social world is increasingly oriented toward people, objects, images, groups, places, and events that are felt and understood to be singular – and is in part aimed at creating them as such – the social logic of singularities unfurls for its participants a reality with significant, and even dire, consequences.

The critique that denies individual singularities the value of the particular can itself be interpreted – and must be interpreted – in sociological terms. It is a characteristic component of the evaluative discourses of the society of singularities. These discourses derive their dynamics and unpredictability from the fact that the special value of goods, images, people, works of art, religious beliefs, cities, or events is often disputed and caught up in debates about what society considers valuable or not. 8In general, the social assessments of something as particular or as an example of the general are extremely volatile and have preoccupied late modernity to an enormous extent. Indeed, one could say that late-modern society has become a veritable society of valorization . That which is regarded as exceptional today can be devalued as early as tomorrow and reclassified as something conformist and typical. And whereas, despite all efforts, so many people and things never achieve the status of the extraordinary, others are catapulted into the sphere of singularity by one evaluation process or another. In such a way, a valuable piece of vintage furniture can be dragged out of a garbage heap, and a social misfit can become an accepted nerd. This is to say that, in the society of singularities, processes of singularization and de-singularization go hand in hand. Both processes, however, confirm what is valuable: not the general but the particular.