William Bradford - The Mayflower Voyage - Premium Edition - 4 Book Collection

We have seen that Bradford notes the purchase and refitting of this “smale ship of 60 tune” in Holland. The story of her several sailings, her “leakiness,” her final return, and her abandonment as unseaworthy, is familiar. We find, too, that Bradford also states in his “Historie,” that “the leakiness of this ship was partly by her being overmasted and too much pressed with sails.” It will, however, amaze the readers of Professor Arber’s generally excellent “Story of the Pilgrim Fathers,” so often referred to herein, to find him sharply arraigning “those members of the Leyden church who were responsible for the fitting of the SPEEDWELL,” alleging that “they were the proximate causes of most of the troubles on the voyage [of the MAY-FLOWER] out; and of many of the deaths at Plymouth in New England in the course of the following Spring; for they overmasted the vessel, and by so doing strained her hull while sailing.” To this straining, Arber wholly ascribes the “leakiness” of the SPEEDWELL and the delay in the final departure of the MAYFLOWER, to which last he attributes the disastrous results he specifies. It would seem that the historian, unduly elated at what he thought the discovery of another “turning-point of modern history,” endeavors to establish it by such assertions and such partial references to Bradford as would support the imaginary “find.” Briefly stated, this alleged discovery, which he so zealously announces, is that if the SPEEDWELL had not been overmasted, both she and the MAY-FLOWER would have arrived early in the fall at the mouth of the Hudson River, and the whole course of New England history would have been entirely different. Ergo, the “overmasting” of the SPEEDWELL was a “pivotal point in modern history.” With the idea apparently of giving eclat to this announcement and of attracting attention to it, he surprisingly charges the responsibility for the “overmasting” and its alleged dire results upon the leaders of the Leyden church, “who were,” he repeatedly asserts, “alone responsible.” As a matter of fact, however, Bradford expressly states (in the same paragraph as that upon which Professor Arber must wholly base his sweeping assertions) that the “overmasting” was but “partly” responsible for the SPEEDWELL’S leakiness, and directly shows that the “stratagem” of her master and crew, “afterwards,” he adds, “known, and by some confessed,” was the chief cause of her leakiness.

Cushman also shows, by his letter,—written after the ships had put back into Dartmouth,—a part of which Professor Arber uses, but the most important part suppresses, that what he evidently considers the principal leak was caused by a very “loose board” (plank), which was clearly not the result of the straining due to “crowding sail,” or of “overmasting.” (See Appendix.)

Moreover, as the Leyden chiefs were careful to employ a presumably competent man (“pilott,” afterwards “Master” Reynolds) to take charge of refitting the consort, they were hence clearly, both legally and morally, exempt from responsibility as to any alterations made. Even though the “overmasting” had been the sole cause of the SPEEDWELL’S leakiness, and the delays and vicissitudes which resulted to the MAY-FLOWER and her company, the leaders of the Leyden church—whom Professor Arber arraigns —(themselves chiefly the sufferers) were in no wise at fault! It is clear, however, that the “overmasting” cut but small figure in the case; “confessed” rascality in making a leak otherwise, being the chief trouble, and this, as well as the “overmasting,” lay at the door of Master Reynolds.

Even if the MAY-FLOWER had not been delayed by the SPEEDWELL’S condition, and both had sailed for “Hudson’s River” in midsummer, it is by no means certain that they would have reached there, as Arber so confidently asserts. The treachery of Captain Jones, in league with Gorges, would as readily have landed them, by some pretext, on Cape Cod in October, as in December. But even though they had landed at the mouth of the Hudson, there is no good reason why the Pilgrim influence should not have worked north and east, as well as it did west and south, and with the Massachusetts Bay Puritans there, Roger Williams in Rhode Island, and the younger Winthrop in Connecticut, would doubtless have made New England history very much what it has been, and not, as Professor Arber asserts, “entirely different.”

The cruel indictment fails, and the imaginary “turning point in modern history,” to announce which Professor Arber seems to have sacrificed so much, falls with it.

The Rev. Dr. Griffis (“The Pilgrims in their Three Homes,” p. 158) seems to give ear to Professor Arber’s untenable allegations as to the Pilgrim leaders’ responsibility for any error made in the “overmasting” of the SPEEDWELL, although he destroys his case by saying of the “overmasting:” “Whether it was done in England or Holland is not certain.” He says, unhappily chiming in with Arber’s indictment: “In their eagerness to get away promptly, they [the Leyden men] made the mistake of ordering for the SPEEDWELL heavier and taller masts and larger spars than her hull had been built to receive, thus altering most unwisely and disastrously her trim.” He adds still more unhappily: “We do not hear of these inveterate landsmen and townsfolk [of whom he says, ‘possibly there was not one man familiar with ships or sea life’] who were about to venture on the Atlantic, taking counsel of Dutch builders or mariners as to the proportion of their craft.” Why so discredit the capacity and intelligence of these nation-builders? Was their sagacity ever found unequal to the problems they met? Were the men who commanded confidence and respect in every avenue of affairs they entered; who talked with kings and dealt with statesmen; these diplomats, merchants, students, artisans, and manufacturers; these men who learned law, politics, state craft, town building, navigation, husbandry, boat-building, and medicine, likely to deal negligently or presumptuously with matters upon which they were not informed? Their first act, after buying the SPEEDWELL, was to send to England for an “expert” to take charge of all technical matters of her “outfitting,” which was done, beyond all question, in Holland. What need had they, having done this (very probably upon the advice of those experienced ship-merchants, their own “Adventurers” and townsmen, Edward Pickering and William Greene), to consult Dutch ship-builders or mariners? She was to be an English ship, under the English flag, with English owners, and an English captain; why: should they defer to Dutch seamen or put other than an English “expert” in charge of her alterations, especially when England rightfully boasted the best? But not only were these Leyden leaders not guilty of any laches as indicted by Arber and too readily convicted by Griffis, but the “overmasting” was of small account as compared with the deliberate rascality of captain and crew, in the disabling of the consort, as expressly certified by Bradford, who certainly, as an eye-witness, knew whereof he affirmed.

Having bought a vessel, it was necessary to fit her for the severe service in which she was to be employed; to provision her for the voyage, etc.; and this could be done properly only by experienced hands. The Pilgrim leaders at Leyden seem, therefore, as noted, to have sent to their agents at London for a competent man to take charge of this work, and were sent a “pilott” (or “mate”), doubtless presumed to be equal to the task. Goodwin mistakenly says: “As Spring waned, Thomas Nash went from Leyden to confer with the agents at London. He soon returned with a pilot (doubtless [sic] Robert Coppin), who was to conduct the Continental party to England.” This is both wild and remarkable “guessing” for the usually careful compiler of the “Pilgrim Republic.” There is no warrant whatever for this assumption, and everything contra-indicates it, although two such excellent authorities as Dr. Dexter and Goodwin coincide—the latter undoubtedly copying the former—concerning Coppin; both being doubtless in error, as hereafter shown. Dexter says “My impression is that Coppin was originally hired to go in the SPEEDWELL, and that he was the ‘pilott’ whose coming was ‘a great incouragement’ to the Leyden expectants, in the last of May, or first of June, 1620 [before May 31, as shown]; that he sailed with them in the SPEEDWELL, but on her final putting back was transferred to the MAY-FLOWER.” All the direct light any one has upon the matter comes from the letter of the Leyden brethren of May 31 [O.S.], 1620, previously cited, to Carver and Cushman, and the reply of the latter thereto, of Sunday, June 11, 1620. The former as noted, say: “We received diverse letters at the coming of Master Nash [probably Thomas] and our pilott, which is a great incouragement unto us . . . and indeed had you not sente him [the ‘pilott,’ presumably] many would have been ready to fainte and goe backe.” Neither here nor in any other relation is there the faintest suggestion of Coppin, except as what he was, “the second mate,” or “pilott,” of the MAY-FLOWER. It is not reasonable to suppose that, for so small a craft but just purchased, and with the expedition yet uncertain, the Leyden leaders or their London agents had by June 11, employed both a “Master” and a “pilott” for the SPEEDWELL, as must have been the case if this “pilott” was, as Goodwin so confidently assumes, “doubtless Robert Coppin.” For in Robert Cushman’s letter of Sunday, June 11, as if proposing (now that the larger vessel would be at once obtained, and would, as he thought, be “ready in fourteen days”) that the “pilott” sent over to “refit” the SPEEDWELL should be further utilized, he says: “Let Master Reynolds tarrie there [inferentially, not return here when his work is done, as we originally arranged] and bring the ship [the SPEEDWELL], to Southampton.” The latter service we know he performed.