International Military Tribunal - The Nuremberg Trials - Complete Tribunal Proceedings (V. 3)

But at least they established that the contracting powers accepted the general principle that, if at all possible, war should be resorted to only if mediation failed.

Although these conventions are mentioned in this Indictment, I am not relying on them save to show the historical development of the law, and it is unnecessary, therefore, to argue about their precise effect, for the place which they once occupied has been taken by far more effective instruments. I mention them now merely for this, that they were the first steps towards that body of rules of law which we are seeking here to enforce.

There were, of course, other individual agreements between particular states, agreements which sought to preserve the neutrality of individual countries, as, for instance, that of Belgium, but those agreements were inadequate, in the absence of any real will to comply with them, to prevent the first World War in 1914.

Shocked by the occurrence of that catastrophe, the nations of Europe, not excluding Germany, and of other parts of the world, came to the conclusion that, in the interests of all alike, a permanent organization of the nations should be established to maintain the peace. And so the Treaty of Versailles was prefaced by the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Now, I say nothing at this moment of the general merits of the various provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. They have been criticized, some of them perhaps justly criticized, and they were certainly made the subject of much bellicose propaganda in Germany. But it is unnecessary to inquire into the merits of the matter, for, however unjust one might for this purpose assume the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles to have been, they contained no kind of excuse for the waging of war to secure an alteration in their terms. Not only was that treaty a settlement, by agreement, of all the difficult territorial questions which had been left outstanding by the war itself, but it established the League of Nations which, if it had been loyally supported, could so well have resolved those international differences which might otherwise have led, as indeed they eventually did lead, to war. It set up in the Council of the League, in the Assembly and in the Permanent Court of International Justice, a machine not only for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, but also for the frank ventilation of all international questions by open and free discussion. At that time, in those years after the last war, the hopes of the world stood high. Millions of men in all countries—perhaps even in Germany itself—had laid down their lives in what they hoped and believed was a war to end war. Germany herself entered the League of Nations and was given a permanent seat on the Council; and on that Council, as in the assembly of the League, German governments which preceded that of the Defendant Von Papen in 1932 played their full part. In the years from 1919 to that time in 1932, despite some comparatively minor incidents in the heated atmosphere which followed the end of the war, the peaceful operation of the League continued. Nor was it only the operation of the League which gave ground, and good ground, for hope that at long last the rule of law would replace anarchy in the international field.

The statesmen of the world deliberately set out to make wars of aggression an international crime. These are no new terms invented by the victors to embody in this Charter. They have figured, and they have figured prominently, in numerous treaties, in governmental pronouncements, and in the declarations of statesmen in the period preceding the second World War. In treaties concluded between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other states, such as Persia in 1927, France in 1935, China in 1937, the contracting parties undertook to refrain from any act of aggression whatever against the other party. In 1933 the Soviet Union became a party to a large number of treaties containing a detailed definition of aggression, and the same definition appeared in the same year in the authoritative report of the Committee on Questions of Security set up in connection with the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. But at this time states were going beyond commitments to refrain from wars of aggression and to assist states which were victims of aggression. They were condemning aggression in unmistakable terms. Thus in the Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation, which was signed on the 10th of October 1933, by a number of American states, subsequently joined by practically all the states of the American continents and a number of European countries as well, the contracting parties solemnly declared that “they condemn wars of aggression in their mutual relations or in those of other states.” And that treaty was fully incorporated into the Buenos Aires convention of December 1936, signed and ratified by a large number of American countries, including, of course, the United States. And previously, in 1928, the 6th Pan-American Conference had adopted a resolution declaring that, as “war of aggression constitutes a crime against the human species . . . all aggression is illicit and as such is declared prohibited.” A year earlier, as long ago as September 1927, the Assembly of the League of Nations adopted a resolution affirming the conviction that “a war of aggression can never serve as a means of settling international disputes and is, in consequence, an international crime” and going on to declare that “all wars of aggression are, and shall always be prohibited.”

The first article of the draft Treaty for Mutual Assistance of 1923 read in these terms:

“The High Contracting Parties, affirming that aggressive war is an international crime, undertake the solemn engagement not to make themselves guilty of this crime against any other nation.”

In the Preamble to the Geneva Protocol of 1924, it was stated that “offensive warfare constitutes an infraction of solidarity and an international crime.” These instruments that I have just last mentioned remained, it is true, unratified for various reasons, but they are not without significance or value.

These repeated declarations, these repeated condemnations of wars of aggression testified to the fact that with the establishment of the League of Nations, with the legal developments which followed it, the place of war in international law had undergone a profound change. War was ceasing to be the unrestricted prerogative of sovereign states. The Covenant of the League of Nations did not totally abolish the right of war. It left, perhaps, certain gaps which were possibly larger in theory than in practice. But in effect it surrounded the right of war by procedural and substantive checks and delays, which, if the Covenant had been faithfully observed, would have amounted to an elimination of war, not only between members of the League, but also, by reason of certain provisions of the Covenant, in the relations of non-members as well. And thus the Covenant of the League restored the position as it existed at the dawn of international law, at the time when Grotius was laying down the foundations of the modern law of nations and established the distinction, a distinction accompanied by profound legal consequences in the sphere, for instance, of neutrality, between a just war and an unjust war.

Nor was that development arrested with the adoption of the Covenant of the League. The right of war was further circumscribed by a series of treaties, numbering—it is an astonishing figure but it is right—nearly a thousand, of arbitration and conciliation embracing practically all the nations of the world. The so-called Optional Clause of Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the clause which conferred upon the Court compulsory jurisdiction in regard to the most comprehensive categories of disputes, and which constituted in effect by far the most important compulsory treaty of arbitration in the postwar period, was widely signed and ratified. Germany herself signed it in 1927 and her signature was renewed, and renewed for a period of 5 years by the Nazi government in July of 1933. (Significantly, that ratification was not again renewed on the expiration of its 5 years’ validity in March of 1938 by Germany). Since 1928 a considerable number of states signed and ratified the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes which was designed to fill the gaps left by the Optional Clause and by the existing treaties of arbitration and conciliation.