International Military Tribunal - The Nuremberg Trials - Complete Tribunal Proceedings (V. 3)

“Timing of the X-Order and the Question of Advance Measures.

“The Luftwaffe’s endeavor to take the enemy air forces by surprise at their peacetime airports justifiably leads them to oppose measures taken in advance of the X-Order and to demand that the X-Order itself be given sufficiently late on X minus 1 to prevent the fact of Germany’s mobilization becoming known to Czechoslovakia on that day.

“The Army’s efforts are tending in the opposite direction. It intends to let OKW initiate all advance measures between X minus 3 and X minus 1 which will contribute to the smooth and rapid working of the mobilization. With this in mind OKH also demands that the X-Order be given to the Army not later than 1400 on X minus 1.

“To this the following must be said:

“ ‘Operation Green’ ”—or Aktion Grün—“will be set in motion by means of an ‘incident’ in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provocation for military intervention. The fixing of the exact time for this incident is of the utmost importance.”—I call special attention to that sentence—“The fixing of the exact time for this incident is of the utmost importance.

“It must come at a time when the over-all meteorological conditions are favorable for our superior air forces to go into action and at an hour which will enable authentic news of it”—news of this prepared incident—“to reach us on the afternoon of X minus 1.

“It can then be spontaneously answered by the giving of the X-Order at 1400 on X minus 1.

“On X minus 2 the Navy, Army, and Air Force will merely receive an advance warning.

“If the Führer intends to follow this plan of action, all further discussion is superfluous.

“For then no advance measures may be taken before X minus 1 for which there is not an innocent explanation as we shall otherwise appear to have manufactured the incident. Orders for absolutely essential advance measures must be given in good time and camouflaged with the help of numerous maneuvers and exercises.

“Also, the question raised by the Foreign Office as to whether all Germans should be called back in time from prospective enemy territories must in no way lead to the conspicuous departure from Czechoslovakia of any German subjects before the incident.

“Even a warning of diplomatic representatives in Prague is impossible before the first air attack, although the consequences could be very grave in the event of their becoming victims of such an attack (that is the death of representatives of friendly or confirmed neutral powers).

“If, for technical reasons, the evening hours should be considered desirable for the incident, then the following day cannot be X-Day, but it must be the day after that.

“In any case we must act on the principle that nothing must be done before the incident which might point to mobilization, and that the swiftest possible action must be taken after the incident (X-Fall).

“It is the purpose of these notes to point out what a great interest the Wehrmacht has in the incident and that it must be informed of the Führer’s intentions in good time—insofar as the Abwehr Section is not also charged with the organization of the incident.

“I request that the Führer’s decision be obtained on these points.”—Signed—“J”—(Jodl).

In handwriting, at the bottom of the page of that document, are the notes of the indefatigable Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant. These reveal that the memorandum was submitted to Hitler on August 30; that Hitler agreed to act along these lines, and that Jodl was so notified on 31 August. There follows Jodl’s initials once more.

On 3 September Keitel and Von Brauchitsch met with Hitler at the Berghof. Again Schmundt kept notes of the conference. These will be found as Item 18 at Pages 39 and 40 of the Document Number 388-PS. I shall read the first three short paragraphs of these minutes:

“Colonel General Von Brauchitsch reports on the exact time of the transfer of the troops to ‘exercise areas’ for ‘Grün’. Field units to be transferred on 28 September. From here will then be ready for action. When X-Day becomes known field units carry out exercises in opposite directions.

“Führer has objection. Troops assemble field units a 2-day march away. Carry out camouflage exercises everywhere.”—Then there is a question mark.—“OKH must know when X-Day is by 1200 noon, 27 September.”

You will note that Von Brauchitsch reported that field troops would be transferred to the proper areas for Case Green on 28 September and would then be ready for action. You will also note that the OKH must know when X-Day is by 12 noon on 27 September.

During the remainder of the conference Hitler gave his views on the strategy the German armies should employ and the strength of the Czech defenses they would encounter. He spoke of the possibility, and I quote, “of drawing in the Henlein people.” The situation in the West still troubled him. Schmundt further noted, and here I read the final sentence from Page 40 of the English transcript:

“The Führer gives orders for the development of the Western fortifications: Improvement of advance positions around Aachen and Saarbrücken; construction of 300 to 400 battery positions (1600 artillery pieces). He emphasizes flanking action.”

Five days later General Stülpnagel asked Defendant Jodl for written assurance that the OKH would be informed 5 days in advance about the impending action. In the evening Jodl conferred with Luftwaffe generals about the co-ordination of ground and air operations at the start of the attack. I now read the 8 September entry in General Jodl’s diary, Page 5 of the English translation of Document 1780-PS.

“General Stülpnagel, OAI, asks for written assurance that the Army High Command will be informed 5 days in advance if the plan is to take place. I agree and add that the over-all meteorological situation can be estimated to some extent only for 2 days in advance and that therefore the plans may be changed up to this moment (X-Day minus 2)”—or as the German puts it—“X-2 Tag.”

“General Stülpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders whether the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned. It presupposed that the Western Powers would not interfere decisively. It gradually seems as if the Führer would stick to his decision, even though he may no longer be of this opinion. It must be added that Hungary is at least moody and that . . . Italy is reserved.”

Now, this is Jodl talking:

“I must admit that I am worrying, too, when comparing the change of opinion about political and military potentialities, according to directives of 24 June ’37, 5 November ’37, 7 December ’37, 30 May 1938, with the last statements. In spite of that, one must be aware of the fact that the other nations will do everything they can to apply pressure on us. We must pass this test of nerves, but because only very few people know the art of withstanding this pressure successfully, the only possible solution is to inform only a very small circle of officers of news that causes us anxiety, and not to have it circulate through anterooms as heretofore.

“1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with Chief of High Command of Armed Forces and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force. (Present were General Jeschonnek, Kammhuber, Sternburg, and myself). We agree about the promulgation of the X-Day order”—X-Befehl—“(X-1, 4 o’clock) and pre-announcement to the Air Force (X-Day minus 1”—X minus 1 day—“7 o’clock). The ‘Y’ time has yet to be examined; some formations have an approach flight of one hour.”

Late on the evening of the following day, 9 September, Hitler met with Defendant Keitel and Generals Von Brauchitsch and Halder at Nuremberg. Dr. Todt, the construction engineer, later joined this conference, which lasted from 10 in the evening until 3:30 the following morning. Schmundt’s minutes on this conference are Item 19 in the large Schmundt file, on Pages 41 to 43 of Document 388-PS.