Jonathan Edwards - The Freedom of the Will

Jonathan Edwards

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ISBN 978-80-272-4754-7

Preface

Part I.

Section 1. Concerning The Nature Of The Will.

Section 2. Concerning The Determination Of The Will.

Section 3. Concerning The Meaning Of The Terms Necessity, Impossibility, Inability, &C; And Of Contingence.

Section 4. Of The Distinction Of Natural And Moral Necessity, And Inability.

Section 5. Concerning The Notion Of Liberty, And Of Moral Agency.

Part II.

Section I. Showing The Manifest Inconsistence Of The Arminian Notion Of Liberty Of Will, Consisting In The Will's Self-Determining Power.

Section 2. Several Supposed Ways Of Evading The Forgoing Reasoning, Considered.

Section 3. Whether Any Event Whatsoever, And Volition In Particular, Can Come To Pass Without A Cause Of Its Existence.

Section 4. Whether Volition Can Arise Without A Cause, Through The Activity Of The Nature Of The Soul.

Section 5. Showing, That If The Things Asserted In These Evasions Should Be Supposed To Be True, They Are Altogether Impertinent, And Can't Help The Cause Of Arminian Liberty.

Section 6. Concerning The Will's Determining In Things Which Are Perfectly Indifferent, In The View Of The Mind.

Section 7. Concerning The Notion Of Liberty Of Will Consisting In Indifference.

Section 8. Concerning The Supposed Liberty Of The Will, As Opposite To All Necessity.

Section 9. Of The Connection Of The Acts Of The Will With The Dictates Of The Understanding.

Section 10. Volition Necessarily Connected With The Influence Of Motives.

Section 11. The Evidence Of God's Certain Foreknowledge Of The Volitions Of Moral Agents.

Section 12. God's Certain Foreknowledge Of The Future Volitions Of Moral Agents, Inconsistent With Such A Contingence Of Those Volitions, As Is Without All Necessity.

Section 13. Whether We Suppose The Volitions Of Moral Agents To Be Connected With Any Thing Antecedent, Or Not, Yet They Must Be Necessary In Such A Sense As To Overthrow Arminian Liberty.

Part III.

Section 1. God's Moral Excellency Necessary, Yet Virtuous And Praise-Worthy.

Section 2. The Acts Of The Will Of The Human Soul Of Jesus Christ Necessarily Holy, Yet Truly Virtuous, Praise-Worthy, Rewardable, &C.

Section 3. The Case Of Such As Are Given Up Of God To Sin, And Of Fallen Man In General, Proves Moral Necessity And Inability To Be Consistent With Blame-Worthiness.

Section 4. Command, And Obligation To Obedience, Consistent With Moral Inability To Obey.

Section 5. That Sincerity Of Desires And Endeavours, Which Is Supposed To Excuse In The Non-Performance Of Things In Themselves Good, Particularly Considered.

Section 6. Liberty Of Indifference, Not Only Not Necessary To Virtue, But Utterly Inconsistent With It; And All, Either Virtuous Or Vicious Habits Or Inclinations.

Section 7. Arminian Notions Of Moral Agency Inconsistent With All Influence Of Motive And Inducement, In Either Virtuous Or Vicious Actions.

Part IV.

Section 1. The Essence Of The Virtue And Vice Of Dispositions Of The Heart, And Acts Of The Will, Lies Not In Their Cause, But Their Nature.

Section 2. The Falseness And Inconsistence Of That Metaphysical Notion Of Action, And Agency, Which Seems To Be Generally Entertained By The Defenders Of The Arminian Doctrine Concerning Liberty, Moral Agency, &C.

Section 3. The Reasons Why Some Think It Contrary To Common Sense, To Suppose Those Things Which Are Necessary, To Be Worthy Of Either Praise Or Blame.

Section 4. It Is Agreeable To Common Sense, And The Natural Notions Of Mankind, To Suppose Moral Necessity To Be Consistent With Praise And Blame, Reward And Punishment.

Section 5. Concerning Those Objections, That This Scheme Of Necessity Renders All Means And Endeavours For The Avoiding Of Sin, Or The Obtaining Virtue And Holiness.

Section 6. Concerning That Objection Against The Doctrine Which Has Been Maintained, That It Agrees With The Stoical Doctrine Of Fate, And The Opinions Of Mr. Hobbes.

Section 7. Concerning The Necessity Of The Divine Will.

Section 8. Some Further Objections Against The Moral Necessity Of God's Volitions Considered.

Section 9. Concerning That Objection Against The Doctrine Which Has Been Maintained, That It Makes God The Author Of Sin.

Section 10. Concerning Sin's First Entrance Into The World.

Section 11. Of A Supposed Inconsistence Of These Principles, With God's Moral Character.

Section 12. Of A Supposed Tendency Of These Principles To Atheism And Licentiousness.

Section 13. Concerning That Objection Against The Reasoning, By Which The Calvinistic Doctrine Is Supported, That It Is Metaphysical And Abstruse.

Conclusion

Table of Contents

Many find much fault with calling professing Christians, that differ one from another in some matters of opinion, by distinct names ; especially calling them by the names of particular men, who have distinguished themselves as maintainers and promoters of those opinions: as calling some professing Christians Arminians, from Arminius; others Arians, from Arius; others Socinians, from Socinus, and the like. They think it unjust in itself; as it seems to suppose and suggest, that the persons marked out by these names, received those doctrines which they entertain, out of regard to, and reliance on , those men after whom they are named; as though they made them their rule; in the same manner, as the followers of christ are called Christians, after his name, whom they regard and depend upon, as their great Head and Rule. Whereas, this is an unjust and groundless imputation on those that go under the forementioned denominations. Thus, say they, there is not the least ground to suppose, that the chief divines, who embrace the scheme of doctrine which is, by many, called Arminianismt believe it the more, because Arminius believed it: and that there is no reason to think any other, than that they sincerely and impartially study the Holy Scriptures, and inquire after the mind of Christ, with as much judgment and sincerity, as any of those that call them by these names; that they seek after truth, and are not careful whether they think exactly as Arminius did; yea, that, in some things, they actually differ from him. This practice is also esteemed actually injurious on this account, that it is supposed naturally to lead the multitude to imagine the difference between persons thus named, and others, to be greater than it is; so great, as if they were another species of beings. And they object against it as arising from an uncharitable, narrow, contracted spirit; which, they say, commonly inclines persons to confine all that is good to themselves, and their own party, and to make a wide distinction between themselves and others, and stigmatize those that differ from them with odious names. They say, moreover, that the keeping up such a distinction of names, has a direct tendency to uphold distance and disaffection, and keep alive mutual hatred among Christians, who ought all to be united in friendship and charity, though they cannot, in all things, think alike.

I confess, these things are very plausible; and I will not deny, that there are some unhappy consequences of this distinction of names, and that men’s infirmities and evil dispositions often make an ill improvement of it. But yet, I humbly conceive, these objections are carried far beyond reason. The generality of mankind are disposed enough, and a great deal too much, to uncharitableness, and to be censorious and bitter towards those that differ from them in religious opinions: which evil temper of mind will take occasion to exert itself from many things in themselves innocent, useful, and necessary. But yet there is no necessity to suppose, that our thus distinguishing persons of different opinions by different names, arises mainly from an uncharitable spirit. It may arise from the disposition there is in mankind (whom God has distinguished with an ability and inclination for speech) to improve the benefit of language, in the proper use and design of names, given to things of which they have often occasion to speak, which is to enable them to express their ideas with ease and expedition, without being encumbered with an obscure and difficult circumlocution. And our thus distinguishing persons of different opinions in religious matters may not imply any more, than that there is a