William Atkinson - The Essential Works of William Walker Atkinson - 50+ Books in One Edition

In the closing talk, as in the sentence or paragraph, the speaker should seek to emphasize the main points and ideas, and subordinate the less important ones. And just as his paragraphs should be arranged with the idea of moving from the less important and less interesting points to the more important and more interesting, so in his closing he should move forward from the less interesting and less important toward those of a greater degree of importance and interest, until at last the climax is reached, and the discourse ends. That is, it should end there—but alas! too many are “unable to let go,” and after the climax is reached they persist in continuing, thus bringing about an anti-climax and weakening what would otherwise have been an effective closing. Follow this rule: When you have said all that is of importance, and have reached your climax—stop! Every word uttered after this point is reached, weakens what you have already said .

The study of the closing parts of the speeches of well-known orators will be valuable to the student in pointing out by actual example the technique of the peroration or closing talk. Far more may be thus gained from actual example than from stated rules or formal methods. The spirit of effective oratory is contagious—one’s torch must be lighted at that of a predecessor.

It is customary to close the discourse with an earnest appeal which brings the climax to a head. This is the closing chord— the final note of the trumpet. It should, if possible, be prepared and fixed in the mind before the argument is commenced. Just as the opening talk should be prepared after the discourse itself is fully mapped, so it is well to prepare the peroration or closing paragraph before the final mapping out of the argument. It should be the goal toward which the argument travels. It should be the crown which is sought for in the struggle of the discourse.

The following passage was used by Lord Brougham in closing his speech defending Queen Caroline, and was the result of previous study and preparation on his part—some authorities stating that it was rewritten over twenty times before its delivery:

“Such, my lords, is the case now before you! Such is the evidence in support of this measure—evidence inadequate to prove a debt—impotent to deprive of a civil right—ridiculous to convict of the lowest offence—scandalous if brought forward to support a charge of the highest nature which the law knows—monstrous to ruin the honor, to blast the name of an English Queen! What shall I say, then, if this is the proof by which an act of judicial legislation, a parliamentary sentence, an ex post facto law, is sought to be passed against this defenceless woman? My lords, I pray you to pause. I do earnestly beseech you to take heed! You are standing on the brink of a precipice— then beware! It will go forth your judgment, if sentence shall go against the queen. But It will be the only judgment you ever pronounced, which, instead of reaching its object, will return and bound back upon those who give it. Save the country, my lords, from the horrors of this catastrophe—save yourselves from this peril—rescue that country, of which you are the ornaments, but in which you can flourish no longer, when severed from the people, than the blossom when cut off from the roots and the stem of the tree. Save that country, that you may continue to adorn it—save the Crown, which is in jeopardy—the Aristocracy, which is shaken—save the Altar, which must stagger with the blow that rends its kindred Throne! You have said, my lords, you have willed—the Church and the King have willed—that the Queen shall be deprived of its solemn service. She has instead of that solemnity, the heartfelt prayers of the people. She wants no prayers of mine. But I do here pour forth my humble supplication at the Throne of Mercy, that that Mercy may be poured down upon the people, in a larger measure than the merits of their rulers may deserve, and that your hearts may be turned to justice!”

Table of Content

CHAPTER I. REASONING

CHAPTER II. THE PROCESS OF REASONING

CHAPTER III. THE CONCEPT

CHAPTER IV. THE USE OF CONCEPTS

CHAPTER V. CONCEPTS AND IMAGES

CHAPTER VI. TERMS

CHAPTER VII. THE MEANING OF TERMS

CHAPTER VIII. JUDGMENTS

CHAPTER IX. PROPOSITIONS

CHAPTER X. IMMEDIATE REASONING

CHAPTER XI. INDUCTIVE REASONING

CHAPTER XII. REASONING BY INDUCTION

CHAPTER XIII. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

CHAPTER XIV. MAKING AND TESTING HYPOTHESES

CHAPTER XV. DEDUCTIVE REASONING

CHAPTER XVI. THE SYLLOGISM

CHAPTER XVII. VARIETIES OF SYLLOGISMS

CHAPTER XVIII. REASONING BY ANALOGY

CHAPTER XIX. FALLACIES

Table of Content

"Reasoning" is defined as: "The act, process or art of exercising the faculty of reason; the act or faculty of employing reason in argument; argumentation, ratiocination; reasoning power; disputation, discussion, argumentation." Stewart says: "The word reason itself is far from being precise in its meaning. In common and popular discourse it denotes that power by which we distinguish truth from falsehood, and right from wrong, and by which we are enabled to combine means for the attainment of particular ends."

By the employment of the reasoning faculties of the mind we compare objects presented to the mind as percepts or concepts, taking up the "raw materials" of thought and weaving them into more complex and elaborate mental fabrics which we call abstract and general ideas of truth. Brooks says: "It is the thinking power of the mind; the faculty which gives us what has been called thought-knowledge , in distinction from sense-knowledge . It may be regarded as the mental architect among the faculties; it transforms the material furnished by the senses ... into new products, and thus builds up the temples of science and philosophy." The last-mentioned authority adds: "Its products are twofold, ideas and thoughts . An idea is a mental product which when expressed in words does not give a proposition; a thought is a mental product which embraces the relation of two or more ideas. The ideas of the understanding are of two general classes; abstract ideas and general ideas. The thoughts are also of two general classes; those pertaining to contingent truth and those pertaining to necessary truth. In contingent truth, we have facts , or immediate judgments, and general truths including laws and causes , derived from particular facts; in necessary truth we have axioms , or self-evident truths, and the truths derived from them by reasoning, called theorems ."

In inviting you to consider the processes of reasoning, we are irresistibly reminded of the old story of one of Moliere's plays in which one of the characters expresses surprise on learning that he "had been talking prose for forty years without knowing it." As Jevons says in mentioning this: "Ninety-nine people out of a hundred might be equally surprised on hearing that they had been converting propositions, syllogizing, falling into paralogisms, framing hypotheses and making classifications with genera and species. If asked whether they were logicians, they would probably answer, No! They would be partly right; for I believe that a large number even of educated persons have no clear idea of what logic is. Yet, in a certain way, every one must have been a logician since he began to speak."

So, in asking you to consider the processes of reasoning we are not assuming that you never have reasoned—on the contrary we are fully aware that you in connection with every other person, have reasoned all your mature life. That is not the question. While everyone reasons, the fact is equally true that the majority of persons reason incorrectly. Many persons reason along lines far from correct and scientific, and suffer therefor and thereby. Some writers have claimed that the majority of persons are incapable of even fairly correct reasoning, pointing to the absurd ideas entertained by the masses of people as a proof of the statement. These writers are probably a little radical in their views and statements, but one is often struck with wonder at the evidences of incapacity for interpreting facts and impressions on the part of the general public. The masses of people accept the most absurd ideas as truth, providing they are gravely asserted by some one claiming authority. The most illogical ideas are accepted without dispute or examination, providing they are stated solemnly and authoritatively. Particularly in the respective fields of religion and politics do we find this blind acceptance of illogical ideas by the multitude. Mere assertion by the leaders seems sufficient for the multitude of followers to acquiesce.